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| Identifier: | 04CARACAS2817 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04CARACAS2817 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Caracas |
| Created: | 2004-09-08 20:41:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV KDEM PHUM VE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002817
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA AT A
CROSSROADS
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4 (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) Venezuela's Coordinadora Democratica is hobbling after
its defeat in the presidential recall referendum August 15.
Some Chavez opponents blame the Coordinadora's leadership for
either losing the referendum via an inept campaign or for not
preventing the alleged fraud. The dozens of opposition
political parties and NGOs are split also over the fraud
allegations and on how to proceed to the regional elections
scheduled for October 31. Another immediate concern is how
to keep disillusioned anti-Chavez voters interested in
electoral politics. Further along, the Coordinadora faces
the challenges of restructuring and maintaining unity among
political parties and NGOs, a situation which will be greatly
affected by how the regional elections play out. End summary.
----------------------------
Coordinadora Turns On Itself
----------------------------
2. (C) Since the victory of President Hugo Chavez in the
August 15 recall referendum, the opposition Coordinadora
Democratica has suffered from lack of leadership and internal
squabbling. Union Party Secretary General Luis Manuel
Esculpi September 1 described the Coordinadora as
representative of the Venezuelan opposition, with some
believing Chavez beat them legitimately and others believing
he used massive fraud to steal the election. Either way,
said Esculpi, the effect is a political defeat for the
opposition and, thus, the Coordinadora. Noticeably absent
has been Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza, head of the
Coordinadora, who is reportedly dedicating much of his time
to his own re-election campaign. The Coordinadora continues
to operate, Esculpi said, but with few important meetings.
The campaign committee, for example, has not met since just
after the referendum.
3. (C) Leonardo Carvajal, leader of the NGO Education
Assembly, told poloff September 2 he had resigned from the
political committee (though his organization remains a
Coordinadora member) in protest of Mendoza's leadership.
Carvajal said senior Coordinadora representatives in the run
up to the election had ceased to consult with the political
committee. Both Carvajal and Esculpi asserted that Mendoza
had become increasingly closed off before the referendum,
putting his people in charge of key areas and not
disseminating information. Jose Luis Mejias, Secretary
General of Primero Justicia, told poloff September 3 that
Mendoza "collapsed" psychologically when he learned that
Chavez had won. Carvajal said Mendoza offered his
resignation to the political committee on August 16, which
the majority of the committee rejected. Carvajal, believing
Mendoza's continued leadership to be an error, withdrew from
the political committee.
4. (C) Carvajal, among others, also complained that the
Coordinadora's negotiators at the National Electoral Council
(CNE) accepted the terms of the CNE's first audit of voting
machines that later proved to be fundamentally flawed.
Movement to Socialism (MAS) Secretary General Felipe Mujica,
one of the negotiators, contradicted Carvajal to poloff
August 31, noting the opposition's only leverage in its
dealings with the CNE was to withdraw from the referendum,
which was not a politically viable option.
-------------------------------
GOV Kicks 'Em When They're Down
-------------------------------
5. (C) The GOV has also circled in on the wounded opposition.
President Chavez declared on August 22 he no longer
recognizes the Coordinadora as the legitimate representatives
of the opposition, adding that it is past time the
Coordinadora "disappear from the face of the earth." Vice
President Jose Vicente Rangel reiterated this line on
September 6, saying that the Coordinadora is dead and
deserves a "good Christian burial." Numerous pro-Chavez
politicians have conditioned negotiations between Chavez
opponents and the GOV on the unconditional acceptance of the
referendum results. Mujica told poloff the GoV's
non-recognition policy is nothing more than a ploy to keep
the opposition from negotiating acceptable terms for the
October 31 regional elections.
------------------------------
Fraud and Elections Loom Large
------------------------------
6. (C) Though shaken, the Coordinadora focused on making its
case that the GOV rigged the referendum and pressing for
acceptable conditions with the CNE for the regional
elections. A Coordinadora committee headed by constitutional
lawyer Tulio Alvarez will formally contest the CNE's
certification of the referendum results, using comprehensive
documentation of allegations of irregularities, bias and
fraud. Esculpi said the Alvarez report would be useful for
highlighting vulnerabilities of the electoral process that
the CNE should resolve before the opposition agrees to
participate. Mejias said the report would be convincing, but
he said he was not sure where it would lead the opposition
politically. Mejias complained there were too many "heads
with no bodies" within the Coordinadora, making decisions
difficult. Both Carvajal and Mejias are wary of the
opposition's chances in the elections, warning that
abstention among anti-Chavez voters will be high due to
suspicions about the CNE's handling of the electoral process.
-----------------------
Whither the Opposition?
-----------------------
7. (C) Mejias said opposition groups would have to wait until
after the regional elections to determine the fate of the
Coordinadora. Fresh from elections, Mejias said, the
political parties will have a better sense of their relative
strengths and, therefore, of the possible makeup of a new
opposition coordinating entity. Esculpi said he had
consulted with center-left parties on the possibility of
forming a new political alliance for the 2006 presidential
race.
8. (C) Juan Fernandez, leader of the NGO Gente de Petroleo,
told poloff September 3 he had been holding town hall
meetings with his membership throughout Venezuela to discuss
his organization's post-referendum strategy. Fernandez, a
member of the Coordinadora's campaign committee, said he had
received harsh criticism from some members over the
Coordinadora's handling of the referendum and its aftermath.
Fernandez noted that opposition parties are not clearing the
air with their supporters as he is doing, and predicted that
it will cause parties to lose in the regional elections.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) The Coordinadora is effectively rudderless and in need
of re-invention. Rather than attempting to salvage what grew
to be a defined organization that took diverse opponents of
Chavez through 18 months of electoral hurdles, Coordinadora
members are choosing to shoot their own wounded. The
upcoming regional elections serve to intensify each party's
focus on its own fortunes. The GOV has also done its best to
ease the passing of the Coordinadora into the political
afterlife. But it may be too soon to write it off the
Coordinadora. The fraud report is an important step by the
opposition to buck up supporters and, though more difficult,
to prove to them and to others that Chavez stole the
election. The Coordinadora's future depends on its member
groups, and on whether they can come back from their
political defeat, and to the extent to which they can find
common purpose. A key test will be whether opposition
parties can agree on unified candidacies in the regional
elections so as to increase the opposition's ability to
defeat Chavista opponents.
Brownfield
NNNN
2004CARACA02817 - CONFIDENTIAL
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