US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1690

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001690 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, CG, MONUC 
SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON JVM KEY FOR DRC 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  DRC President Kabila told DAS Don Yamamoto, 
NSC Senior Advisor Cindy Courville and Central African 
Director Al Eastham that he would like to see the proposed 
Joint Verification Mission (JVM) operational before signing 
the trilateral agreement on the margins of the UNGA in New 
York.  Despite this declaration, the JVM seems unlikely to be 
functional that quickly, in part due to Congo's delay in 
selecting its team members.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
 
2. (C)  Following the successful third meeting of the 
U.S.-facilitated trilateral talks in Kampala August 24-25, 
bringing together FonMins and senior officials from Rwanda, 
Uganda and the DRC, U.S. particpants Yamamoto, Courville, and 
Eastham visited Kinshasa August 26.  Due to the RCD's 
temporary suspension of participation in the transistion, VP 
Ruberwa was unavailable; likewise, VP Bemba was on travel 
outside the Congo.  The team did, however, meet with 
President Kabila and several senior advisors, including 
FonMin Ramazani, National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo, 
Presidential Advisor Andre Kapanga, and Congolese Ambassador 
to the U.S. Mitifu, the Congolese delegation to the Kampala 
discussions. 
 
JVM "Life or Death" for DRC 
 
3. (C)  President Kabila began by summarizing the various 
peace initiatives between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC since 
1999, and their varying success.  In his view, after much 
work some progress has been made on improving bilateral 
relations with Uganda, and many of the elements in the 
various peace accords applying to Uganda have been mostly 
met.  In particular, he noted that the DRC already has in 
place a border-patrol and confidence-building measure with 
Uganda similiar to the proposed JVM with Rwanda.  Almost in 
passing he noted that Congolese-Burundian relations have 
proceeded on a different track, because Burundi is a "special 
case," but added, almost musingly, that particularly the 
Gatumba massacre suggests that perhaps Burundi should be 
included in the trilateral talks in the future. 
 
4. (C)  Regarding Rwanda, however, wounds are deep and slow 
to heal, especially when inflammed by mutual recriminations 
regarding Rwandan military presence in the DRC and alleged 
DRC support to the Interahamwe still present in Eastern 
Congo.  Repairing this relationship can only be managed by 
practical increments, Kabila said, noting that in his view, a 
functional JVM is critical to ensuring that the trilateral 
agreement is not merely another empty piece of paper signed 
with good intentions.  In fact, he said, the JVM is a life or 
death issue for the Congo, which is why the DRC must continue 
to insist that it be implemented immediately. 
 
5. (C)  Once this mechanism is in place, he said, he can 
foresee the Ministerial Commission referred to in the 
trilateral agreement meeting to discuss practical next steps 
in improving relations, including, ultimately, reopening 
embassies in Kinshasa and Kigali, respectively.  Kabila 
endorsed UN SecGen Koffi Annan's vision (expressed in an 
August 16 letter to the Presidents of the three countries) of 
the JVM being effective by September 6.  (Comment:  As NSC 
Courville noted in a later meeting with SRSG Swing, such an 
early implementation date seemed unrealistic, given that 
neither Rwanda nor the DRC had named their teams or reached 
agreement on the terms of reference for the JVM -- still an 
outstanding question.  End Comment.) 
 
6. (C)  Kabila concluded by reiterating that he wants to sign 
a practical document in New York, and doing so will require a 
fully functional JVM.  To that end he said he is willing to 
sit down in New York with Museveni and Kagame, with documents 
and notes on the table, and "reason together."  (Comment: 
PolCouns asked Kapanga after the meeting whether this meant, 
as it seemed, that the President would be personally willing 
to finalize negotiation of the terms of reference of the JVM, 
if it had not been completed.  Kapanga cautiously said that 
he thought that might indeed be what Kabila meant.  End 
Comment.) 
 
A Window of Opportunity 
 
7. (C)  In a meeting later the same day with SRSG Swing, NSC 
Courville asked for further information regarding Annan's 
letter.  Swing confirmed that the letter had been sent and 
that, so far, he had not received any reply from the 
Congolese.  When pressed by Courville as to how the exchange 
of letters was meant to rapidly finalize the JVM, especially 
with key issues of the terms of reference still outstanding, 
Swing seemed almost as uncertain as we.  Courville stressed 
that the U.S. does not want to usurp the UN initiative, but 
noted that if a need arose for technical opinions on aspects 
of the JVM, appropriate U.S. agencies would be prepared to 
assist.  She also stressed that there seems to be a narrow 
window of opportunity in which the UN can successfully move 
the JVM to closure, which might require personal negotiations 
rather than simple exchanges of letters. 
 
Comment 
8. (C)  Despite Kabila's apparent commitment to quickly 
finalizing the JVM, the Congolese have not yet finished 
selecting their team members.  The initial list, drawn up in 
response to Annan's letter, was rejected by Samba Kaputo as 
not sufficiently representative of the "componant" balance 
within the transition, and so another list is currently being 
developed.  The Congolese also appear poised to object to at 
least one of the suggested Rwandan changes to the terms of 
reference of the JVM -- and issue which almost certainly will 
have to be worked out during face-to-face negotiations. 
 
MEECE