US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1552

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NI, ELECTIONS 
SUBJECT: 2007 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BUBA MARWA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1. (C) Ambassador lunched August 29 with retired Brigadier 
General Buba Marwa, an announced candidate for president in 
2007 whose posters already adorn Abuja and other cities. 
Marwa is quite confident of winning in 2007, believing that 
two of his three main potential rivals will not enter the 
race and that he has support in each of the six Nigerian 
political zones.  He asked for the meeting, brought his wife 
and three aides to the luncheon, and used the occasion to 
both sound out the American Embassy and make his case why he 
would be good for the U.S. as Nigeria's President from 2007. 
 
2. (C) Marwa's case boiled down to three points: first that 
he was close to the U.S. and had lived there for ten years; 
second that the experience had turned him into an 
American-style problem solver; and third that he would win 
the election.  Marwa noted that he had served in the U.S. as 
a soldier and as a diplomat in Massachusetts, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Pittsburgh, Washington and New York, the latter two 
in Nigeria's Missions to the U.S. and UN.  He remarked upon 
his graduate degree from Harvard, saying the experience made 
him approach issues with an American sense of solving 
problems instead of letting them slide as some Nigerian 
leaders did.  It was as close as he came to criticizing a 
President Obasanjo who is widely regarded, including by 
Marwa, as close to the USG.  Marwa claimed he had plans, not 
elaborated, for solving Nigeria's problems in the Delta and 
in the north. 
 
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ELECTION DYNAMICS 
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3. (C) Marwa told of winning support across Nigeria through 
his experience (a northern Muslim governor of Lagos in the 
south during military rule) and his foundation's largess.  In 
addition to funding a chair at Kansas University, Marwa's 
foundation has long funded scholarships for students across 
Nigeria at the secondary and college level.  These made him 
an especially potent force among younger Nigerians, and youth 
groups were a mainspring of support in areas where he would 
have no ethnic/religious ties.  The youth wing of the Igbo 
communal organization Ohnaeze, for example, had pledged its 
support and would bring the Igbo to his cause even if there 
was an Igbo running for one of the minority parties against 
him.  He claimed even more open support in the South-South 
region than in the Southeast, benefiting there too from 
demographics of a growing youth-voter population. 
 
4. (C) Marwa treated support in Lagos and the Southwest as a 
given, and travels there often.  Although he did not remark 
upon "zoning the next presidency to the North," he spent most 
of his analysis to the Ambassador and Political Counselor on 
his northern rivals.  He believed former head of state 
Ibrahim Babangida would probably not run, shying away in the 
end from a candidature into a king-maker role.  2003 ANPP 
candidate Muhammadu Buhari probably would not run either, 
Marwa thought, but Buhari would work hard to deny the 
Northwest to Babangida. 
 
5. (C/NF) VP Atiku would run, Marwa believed, but would lose 
to Marwa's appeal and Obasanjo's ill will.  Marwa claimed 
Atiku had huge financial resources, much more than Marwa. 
(Comment: Marwa is widely thought to be running on money 
looted from GON coffers by deceased military head of state 
Sani Abacha and his associates, and it was unclear whether 
Marwa meant Atiku had larger personal resources or had larger 
resources including the GON.)  Marwa believed that Obasanjo's 
ill will toward his VP would cause the ruling PDP to dissolve 
into factions, and that many would come to his standard.  He 
was, he said, the only one all Nigerians could rally behind. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6. (C/NF) Marwa is widely viewed within the political elite 
as the stalking horse for Babangida, who, as he points out, 
will likely shy away from a run at the Presidency.  Marwa 
derives more than a small measure of his support from 
Babangida in addition to his own resources from the Abacha 
regime.  His glowing assessment of his own popularity suffers 
from the usual Nigerian habit of self-promotion and his 
support, especially outside Borno and Lagos states, is 
directly dependent on his finances.  While he is probably not 
nearly as popular as he believes in either the South-South or 
the Southeast, he has the potential to become an important 
candidate as 2007 approaches. 
CAMPBELL