US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5029

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, MARR, TU 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEPT. 1 MEETING WITH FONMIN GUL 
 
 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador reiterated U.S. support for 
Turkey's EU candidacy; pressed for Turkish agreement with 
Greece/Cyprus to forego annual exercises in Aegean and 
Cyprus; urged Turkey to use its weight in OIC to persuade 
Sudan to abide by UNSC resolutions on Darfur; asked for a 
rapid decision on the U.S. request to use Incirlik airbase as 
an air mobility/logistics hub; urged an opening to Armenia 
and a firm line on Iran; and probed FonMin Gul's thinking on 
the future of U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations.  Asserting he 
had been firm with the Iranians regarding nukes, Gul gave 
vague answers on the other subjects.  In turn he expressed 
frustration at EU delay on ending the isolation of Turkish 
Cypriots and pressed for joint action on trucker security in 
Iraq and U.S. action against the PKK.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Opening by passing Gul the draft agenda for the Sept. 
24 Forum for the Future (FFF) meeting on the margins of UNGA, 
Ambassador underscored President Bush's enduring commitment 
to BMENA and his realism regarding the long-term nature of 
the initiative; the bipartisan support for BMENA means it 
will remain a key element of U.S. policy. Turkey can play a 
constructive role as well. 
 
3. (C) Gul confirmed that he will attend the FFF meeting and 
Turkey will also attend the U.S. Treasury-hosted  separate 
meeting for finance ministers.  Concerning BMENA, Gul averred 
that Turkey believes in the issues: "I am very sincere when I 
say we want to be active," he asserted.  But Turkey should be 
more active on its own, he added; this is a strategic 
position, and Turkish involvement through its own official 
and unofficial efforts (NGOs, intellectuals) is at the top of 
his agenda, he added. 
 
-- 
EU 
-- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador noted that a date for Turkey's accession 
negotiations -- which the U.S. foresees the EU granting at 
its December summit -- will not only be a great 
accomplishment for Turkey but also validate 40 years of U.S. 
support for Turkey's candidacy.  We understand some EU member 
states would prefer not to hear U.S. views, but the U.S. will 
continue to support Turkey's candidacy in a helpful and 
appropriate way.  A the same time it will be crucial for 
Turkey to take advantage of the Dutch presidency; in our 
experience the Dutch Embassy in Ankara is committed to 
improving the channels of communication between Ankara and 
Brussels/capitals (Note: the Dutch Embassy has told us the 
Turks do not make it easy for them to manage the process and 
has acknowledged that the Turks find the Dutch Ambassador -- 
who has some of the broadest Turkish contacts among EU 
Ambassadors -- overbearing.  End note) 
 
5. (C) Gul made as if to brush aside EU resentment of U.S. 
support.  An EU yes in December will have positive 
repercussions in Muslim countries, which are closely 
monitoring what happens to Turkey's candidacy, he said. 
These countries think that a green light to Turkey's 
accession negotiations will mean EU recognition of the need 
not to isolate the Muslim world and expect that Turkey's 
accession will provide a link for them to the EU. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Aegean/Cyprus Military Exercises 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ambassador noted he had raised with D/CHOD Basbug the 
Greeks' and Greek Cypriots' willingness to cancel this year's 
Aegean and Cyprus exercises if Turkey will do so.  Gul 
responded that the MFA needs to consult with military experts 
before taking a decision; in any event, relations are better 
between Turkey and Greece. 
 
--------------- 
Northern Cyprus 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) Gul segued into strong Turkish discomfort at the EU's 
failure to move expeditiously to end Turkish Cypriot 
isolation.  Months have passed and the Council's legal 
committee, headed by a Greek, has decided there must be a 
unanimous decision on the Council's program to end isolation, 
a program which does not meet all of Turkey's and the Turkish 
Cypriots' expectations.  Turkey supported the Turkish 
Cypriots' yes in the April referendum and the Turkish side is 
being punished; the Greek Cypriots said no and are being 
rewarded.  Talat is also frustrated.  The EU should act 
wisely instead of small-mindedly; mutual trust depends on it. 
 At the same time Turkey appreciates U.S. efforts. 
 
8 (C) Ambassador expressed disappointment at the EU approach, 
a disappointment shared by the UK.  The U.S. is working on 
the possibility of direct flights, most likely through code 
share arrangements with existing flights. 
 
-------------- 
OIC and Darfur 
-------------- 
 
9. (C) Underscoring Secretary Powell's personal engagement in 
seeking Sudanese compliance with UNSC resolutions and a 
end to the persecutions and killings in Darfur, Ambassador 
noted that the Janjaweed militias continue to wreak havoc. 
The U.S. always supported election of a Turk as OIC SecGen, 
and we hope Turkey as ministerial chairman in office will use 
its influence in OIC to have Sudan abide by UNSC resolutions. 
 Darfur will undoubtedly be an important subject when Gul 
meets Secretary Powell at UNGA. 
 
10. (C) Claiming he had advised the Sudanese FonMin during 
the latter's recent visit to hew to UNSC resolutions, Gul 
gave a general answer and expressed an interest in seeing the 
situation on the ground for himself.  One of his aides 
present in the meeting chimed in that Gul would receive a 
full briefing Sept. 2 and that Turkey will send two 
planeloads of humanitarian assistance, accompanied by a 
minister and MPs, within a couple of weeks. 
 
------- 
Armenia 
------- 
 
11. (C) As Ambassador explained how steps by Turkey to open 
its border or allow increased economic exchanges will help 
the Administration manage the "Armenian Genocide" issue. 
Ambassador continued: a tripartite meeting with Gul's 
Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts on the margins of UNGA 
which moved the ball forward or Turkish success in getting 
Russia to persuade Armenia to be more forthcoming on some of 
the occupied territories would also be helpful. 
 
12. (C) Gul responded that he hoped to meet his counterparts 
in New York and hoped such a meeting would be more meaningful 
than previous ones.  Turkey should indeed have relations with 
its smaller neighbor, and has shown its good intentions by 
allowing charter flights and transit of third-country goods. 
However, Armenia needs to make a gesture, for instance 
withdrawal from a few of the occupied regions.  Turkey has 
told Azerbaijan that the situation cannot continue as is; at 
the same time Armenia must make a move.  Oskanian is clever 
and rational, but we don't know if he is capable of movement; 
Turkey will ask the Russians (note: Putin was scheduled to 
pay a Sept. 2-3 visit, but postponed at last minute.  End 
note) to use their leverage on the Armenians, but we don't 
know if the Russians prefer the problem to be solved or not, 
Gul stated. 
 
------------------------------- 
Incirlik Military Transport Hub 
------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Ambassador reiterated the U.S. request to use the 
Incirlik airbase as an air mobility and logistics hub; the 
sooner the Turks could respond, the better.  Gul limited 
himself to noting that the GOT is working the issue and 
continues to consult with the Turkish military. 
 
---------------------------- 
Whither Bilateral Relations? 
---------------------------- 
 
14. (C) Recalling that a new poll shows Turkish approval of 
the U.S. even lower than the poll results from France, 
Ambassador noted the U.S. view that Turkey does not have to 
choose between the U.S. and Europe but asked Gul how he sees 
bilateral relations evolving in the longer term if Turkey 
indeed gets an accession negotiation start date from the EU 
and moves closer to Europe. 
 
15. (C) Initially at a loss for words, and with his 
notetakers -- all career diplomats -- looking uncomfortable, 
Gul then made a series of general remarks about relations not 
being artificial or conjunctural but continuing "as they 
are."  Ambassador recalled that he had previously encountered 
the Eurasia theory when dealing with then-Russian FonMin, 
later PM, Primakov, and was surprised to find a similar 
discourse in Turkey, with figures across the spectrum on both 
right and left espousing Eurasianism as an alternative to the 
U.S. or EU.  Gul's special assistant Turkoglu jumped in to 
characterize Eurasia's adherents as very marginal.  Another 
notetaker from MFA Policy Planning also hastened to dismiss 
Eurasia as an alternative to good relations with the U.S. 
Gul then stated that both "intellectually" and as a statesman 
he thinks Turkish-U.S. relations "will always be very 
special." 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
16. (C) Noting Graham Fuller's recently articulated view that 
the U.S. has to take account of Turkey's increased role in 
peripheral regions, Ambassador underscored that what will 
draw Washington's attention is Turkey's policy toward an Iran 
pursuing nukes.  Gul asserted he had warned a high ranking 
Iranian emissary a few months ago that Iran could not manage 
to pull this policy off and should take a lesson from what 
happened to Saddam.  The Iranians, who had come looking for 
Turkish support, were upset, Gul claimed, "because they 
didn't expect to hear this message from me." 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Turkish Driver/Worker Security in Iraq 
-------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Gul expressed concern that the problem of security 
for Turkish drivers and workers is getting more serious.  The 
Turks have intelligence that Iraqi kidnappers have sources 
inside the compounds.  On at least five occasions Iraqi 
police have worked in league with kidnappers by alerting them 
to the onward route of Turkish drivers they temporarily 
detain at police stations.  therefore it is crucial to work 
together to increase security, Gul stated.  Ambassador noted 
he had spoken to Minister for Foreign Trade Tuzmen Aug. 30 
and, at Tuzmen's invitation, would call on him shortly to 
continue to discuss security cooperation; to the Turkish 
Union of Chambers; the truck drivers' association; and to 
high-ranking USG officials, asking for help from Washington 
and from the U.S. embassy and military in Iraq. 
 
--- 
PKK 
--- 
 
18. (C) Gul recalled his previous day's TV interview in which 
he had warned Turkey would keep all its options open, 
including cross-border incursions into Iraq.  Every day 
Turkey is losing soldiers in the renewed fighting with the 
PKK, and the Turkish people are susceptible to the resulting 
anti-American propaganda.  Ambassador noted our continuing 
joint intelligence work and the non-military actions we are 
considering.  Regarding how to deal with the PKK stronghold 
on Kandil Mountain, the TGS would agree -- from its own 
experience -- how tough it would be to take out the 
stronghold militarily.  In addition, the U.S. continues to 
confront serious disorder elsewhere in Iraq. 
 
------------------ 
Aiyos Mamas Church 
------------------ 
 
19. (C) At meeting's end Ambassador raised the lack of a GOT 
statement condemning the Aug. 27 bomb attack on Aiyos Mamas 
church in Guzelyurt/Morphou, northern Cyprus.  A statement 
would help in the runup to the EU's December summit.  Gul 
answered coldly that "PM" Talat had issued a statement and 
that his (Gul's) own general comment had been overlooked by 
the press.  At this point DDG for the Americas Ilicak jumped 
in to point out that the MFA spokesman might have an 
opportunity to say something at the regular press conference 
later. 
EDELMAN