US embassy cable - 04HARARE1505

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2009 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI, U.S.-Zimbabwe Bilateral Relations 
SUBJECT: MUGABE ACCEPTS AMBASSADOR'S CREDENTIALS - OFFERS 
OPENNESS TO DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
SUBJECT: MUGABE ACCEPTS AMBASSADOR,S CREDENTIALS - OFFERS 
OPENNESS TO DIALOGUE 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: President Mugabe on September 2 accepted 
Ambassador Dell's credentials during a longer than scheduled 
90-minute session at State House.  Mugabe opened with a 
lengthy historical diatribe that criticized USG policy, 
primarily for following the U.K.,s lead.  Mugabe stressed 
that his government was hostile toward the UK, not the United 
States, and urged the USG to press the UK to recognize its 
historical commitment to support Zimbawean land reform.  The 
President emphasized his government's interest in improving 
bilateral relations and expressed openness to more dialogue. 
Mugabe said that he welcomed USG criticism and advice but 
warned that he could not accept foreign interference in 
Zimbabwe's political affairs.  The Ambassador invited the 
President to examine his and Secretary Powell,s recent 
comments on Zimbabwe.  At no time had "regime change" been 
raised.  The Ambassador welcomed President Mugabe,s offer of 
dialogue and better communication, stressing that U.S. was 
more concerned with ensuring that there be genuinely free and 
fair elections than in the identity of the eventual winner. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Hostile to Britain, not to United States 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a large parlor following formal acceptance of 
credentials and brief photo spray outside, the President 
welcomed the Ambassador "as a diplomat" and expressed hope 
that he would "further and help sustain" the bilateral 
relationship.  He invited the Ambassador to disabuse 
Zimbabweans of press reports that he was here to effect 
regime change.  The President warned against USG support for 
regime change and then launched into a lengthy and familiar 
elaboration of Zimbabwe,s armed struggle, colonial 
injustices, and the necessity of land reform. 
 
3.  (C) Mugabe was especially critical of the U.S. for 
following Britain,s lead in southern Africa and Zimbabwe in 
particular.  He expressed appreciation for constructive roles 
played by the USG at Lancaster House and through foreign 
direct assistance but faulted the USG for generally aligning 
with the UK.  According to the President, the UK was central 
to Zimbabwe,s historical and current problems.  Because of 
strategic considerations relating to Iraq, the USG backed the 
British approach on Zimbabwe in a "quid pro quo." 
Zimbabwe,s "political exclusion" from the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act was an example of Washington,s reluctance to 
be seen taking an independent approach from the UK.  Mugabe 
stressed that "at the moment, we are not hostile to the 
United States; we remain hostile to Britain."  He urged the 
USG to "impress on Blair" the UK,s historical obligation to 
fund land reform. 
 
Open to Better Relations, not Interference 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Mugabe said the GOZ was open to working with the 
United States, including through multilateral institutions 
such as SADC, COMESA, and the AU.  However, he noted that 
Zimbabwe adhered to international obligations and urged the 
USG to also accept international norms and avoid interference 
in Zimbabwe,s internal affairs.  Zimbabwe welcomed USG 
advice and criticism, but would not brook active involvement 
in the country,s politics.  Mugabe emphasized his 
government,s faithful execution of its constitutional 
responsibilities, noting that all elections since 
independence had been held on time and that no party and no 
candidate had ever been denied the right to stand in 
elections.  Mugabe urged the Ambassador to travel throughout 
Zimbabwe to observe but not to influence.  It was fair to 
prefer the victory of one party but not to express a desire 
publicly or to support one or the other. 
 
5.  (C) Mugabe questioned the demands by some for inter-party 
dialogue.  Such demands should be geared to address certain 
issues of form - it was not about removing an illegitimate 
system so much as adjusting the existing legitimate system. 
The opposition wanted a system that would be more favorable 
to it but the system already was essentially fair.  The 
President maintained that multiparty democracy so far had 
done more harm than good in Zimbabwe.  The ruling party 
originally had wanted a more "African system" - a one party 
system with a broad forum for debate - but western-educated 
elements had prevailed.  Too often the resulting system had 
been "like war;" the opposition and the government each had 
at times pursued violent and disruptive tactics.  It was a 
learning process that would take time.  Still, Zimbabwe was 
doing well by many measures; election-associated violence in 
South Africa, for example, had left far more dead than in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Ambassador,s Response 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador said he agreed with many - but not all 
- of the President,s points.  The United States and Zimbabwe 
shared colonial pasts and a mutual priority in overcoming 
challenges posed by historical social injustice.  Like 
Zimbabwe, the United States had to overcome a history of 
racial injustice; Americans understood difficulties 
associated with that history,s legacy.  Saying that Mugabe 
could not possibly expect him to comment on his outlandish 
description of U.S. policy, the Ambassador stressed that the 
USG was not beholden to any government and would make its own 
choices in foreign policy.  He especially welcomed the 
President,s offer of dialogue and better communication and 
said he looked forward to working with the GOZ and its 
ministers. 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the USG did not 
support "regime change" and invited the President to read 
closely USG statements, including Secretary Powell,s 
statement at the Ambassador,s swearing-in as well as the 
Ambassador,s statement at his Senate hearing.  Neither 
statement, contrary to Zimbabwean press reports, spoke of 
regime change.  The Ambassador said the USG priority was that 
the people of Zimbabwe be free to express their will.  What 
mattered was not who won an election but the legitimacy of 
the political process.  If there were a genuinely free and 
fair election that reflected the will of the people, we would 
have no dispute with their choice.  In that vein, the 
Ambassador welcomed the President,s commitment to 
constitutional processes.  Finally, the Ambassador suggested 
that the GOZ consult with its Angolan counterparts on his 
fruitful bilateral engagement in Angola, which acceded to 
AGOA during his tenure.  He hoped similarly to work toward a 
restored friendship while in Zimbabwe. 
 
State Media Downplays Exchange 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (SBU) In coverage of the credential presentations of 
seven ambassadors that day, the state media gave most 
prominent attention to the President,s exchanges with 
Nigeria, the UK and Australia.  The TV replayed selected 
anodyne passages from a brief encounter with Ambassador Dell 
at the session,s conclusion.  State radio commented at 
length on presidential lectures to the UK and Australia and 
offered a positive spin to the Nigerian Ambassador,s session 
but only noted that Ambassador Dell presented credentials 
along with ambassadors from Egypt, Mexico, and Benin.  The 
GOZ-controlled Herald newspaper gave brief attention to 
Ambassador Dell,s meeting after more lengthy treatment of 
the Nigerian, UK and Australian meetings.  Coverage of 
Ambassador Dell,s meeting was fairly straight, although the 
Herald fabricated a quote to the effect that there was no 
questioning the legitimacy of President Mugabe,s election 
and that the US would respect the verdict of the next 
election without qualification. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  Mugabe,s deep concern over his legacy permeated the 
meeting as, indeed, it does Zimbabwean politics.  He appeared 
in good health but somewhat frail throughout the session.  He 
generally walked very stiffly except when, ever the 
politician, he skipped sprightly up the stairs in the 
presence of television cameras.  Through the meeting,s first 
several minutes he spoke very slowly and somewhat 
disjointedly but became more animated and in control of 
himself as the meeting progressed.  He appeared to warm to 
the Ambassador somewhat as the meeting progressed, and laid 
his hand on the Ambassador,s arm in an apparently cordial 
gesture through much of the meeting,s final fifteen minutes. 
 
 
10.  (C) Mugabe,s mixed message and the meeting,s low 
profile in the media reflect GOZ ambivalence toward the USG 
in the run-up to next year,s national parliamentary 
elections.  Hostility to the West is a central plank in 
ZANU-PF,s campaign platform that is not likely to be 
abandoned.  However, many in the party elite and Mugabe 
himself probably appreciate the value of greater 
normalization at some point; a toned down approach for now 
may foreshadow a more overt effort to repair bridges if, as 
ZANU-PF expects, it steamrolls the opposition in next year,s 
election.  He signaled no meaningful flexibility on dialogue 
with the MDC but appeared to leave an opening for us, 
although the apparent contrast with his attitude toward the 
U.K. may be little more than an effort to drive a wedge 
between us.  Moreover, it was evident that the GOZ is trying 
to hamstring our effectiveness here by asserting that the 
Ambassador is only provisionally welcome subject to his 
continuing "good behavior."  While we expect to hear more of 
this line in the weeks ahead, it is unlikely - but not 
altogether impossible - that Mugabe wants to risk a 
full-blown crisis with Washington. 
Dell