US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5015

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MFA REACTS BADLY TO EXCLUSION FROM PSI CORE GROUP

Identifier: 04ANKARA5015
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA5015 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-09-07 15:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL ETTC TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2029 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, ETTC, TU 
SUBJECT: MFA REACTS BADLY TO EXCLUSION FROM PSI CORE GROUP 
 
REF: A. STATE 188228 
     B. ANKARA 3117 (NOTAL) 
     C. ANKARA 3740 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  MFA DDG for Disarmament and Arms Control 
reacted angrily to ref a points, threatening at one point to 
do all he could to scale back Turkish participation in PSI. 
We talked him out of withdrawing Turkey from the Spanish 
exercise in early 2005 for now, although whether Turkey will 
send an observer to the Japanese exercise is in question. 
Instead, he demanded assurance that the next time the PSI 
participants assemble (such as the meetings in Krakow and 
Lisbon) that Turkey be accepted into the Core Group, if it 
still exists.  This reaction was disappointing but not 
surprising.  We will follow up with the Turkish military to 
try to contain the fallout. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Polmilcouns and EXBS Advisor delivered ref a points to 
MFA DDG for Disarmament and Arms Control Haluk Ilicak on Sept 
3.  Polmilcouns highlighted the need for Turkey to decide 
whether it would prefer to host an operational experts 
exercise or a regional exercise in 2006 and the USG offer to 
then talk to the Dutch to accommodate the Turkish desires. 
On Turkey's request for the criteria for membership in the 
core group (ref b), polmilcouns emphasized how the center of 
activity within PSI was now with the Operational Experts 
Working Group (OEWG) activities and that there were no plans 
to convene the core group for the foreseeable future. 
 
3. (C) Ilicak said that the GOT had held an interagency 
meeting on Sept 2 to discuss PSI.  At that meeting, COL Iptes 
who led the Turkish delegation to the Copenhagen and Oslo 
meetings, asserted that following those meetings Turkey was 
now seen as one of the leading 18 nations participating in 
PSI.  Ilicak said he told Iptes he was wrong.  Every 
international activity has a steering group, and Turkey was 
not in PSI's.  He understood ref a points to mean Turkey 
would not be accepted into the core group.  While he was not 
the ultimate decision maker, he pledged to do everything he 
could to withdraw the Turkish aircraft from the 2005 Spanish 
exercise, to refuse to send an observer to Japan's exercise 
in October, and to generally reduce Turkey's participation in 
PSI to a minimal level.  (He lamented that it was too late to 
stop the Turkish delegation from attending the Maritime 
Interdiction Game in Newport, Rhode Island later this month.) 
 If he were not able to convince his superiors to agree with 
his recommendation, he certainly would work to delay 
everything related to PSI within the GOT.  He explained his 
ire was due to the fact that he and TGS Strategy Department 
Chief MG Arslan had personally argued against those in the 
GOT who initially argued that PSI was equivalent to "official 
piracy."  To convince the others, Arslan and Ilicak had 
applied considerable pressure plus a carrot -- if Turkish 
agencies contributed actively to the initiative, Turkey would 
be recognized as among the leaders of the Initiative. 
 
4. (C) Polmilcouns noted that it would only make sense to 
scale back Turkey's participation if Ilicak did not believe 
that PSI served Turkey's interest in preventing 
proliferation.  Ilicak acknowledged that PSI was in Turkey's 
interest, but Turkey was capable of conducting its own 
anti-proliferation activities, such as the ongoing operation 
Black Sea Harmony, or multilaterally, such as through 
BLACKSEAFOR.  Polmilcouns again drew Ilicak's attention to 
the point that the Core Group was not expected to meet in the 
foreseeable future and that PSI would henceforth be focused 
on the OEWG.  EXBS Advisor added that the US delegation to 
the Oslo meeting reported that the Turks there were helpfully 
influential in steering the OEWG meeting. 
 
5. (C) After further discussion of the value of PSI and some 
back and forth on Russia's acceptance into the core group, 
Ilicak concluded the meeting by asking whether we could 
assure that Turkey would be accepted into the core group by 
the time of the next meeting of all PSI participants as 
occurred in the past with Singapore and Russia, assuming the 
core group still existed by that time.  Polmilcouns said that 
he had delivered all the points contained in his instructions 
and would convey Ilicak's question to Washington.  Ilicak 
said that he would not recommend reversing any decisions the 
GOT had already taken regarding PSI (such as participation in 
the Spanish exercise), but whether Turkey would send an 
observer to the Japanese exercise would "need to be assessed 
in light of the US message." 
 
6. (C) Comment: Ilicak's response is not surprising given his 
earlier emotional reaction to the lack of answers to his 
questions about the core group (ref c).  We will follow up 
with MG Arslan, but based on his past comments to us, we 
expect he will be as angry as Ilicak.  Both feel personally 
invested in Turkey's PSI participation and are bitter that 
Turkey appears locked out of what they view as PSI's steering 
committee, the core group.  For now, we have bought some 
time.  We will urge the Turks to send an observer to the 
Japanese exercise, but we doubt that Ankara will decide on 
the kind of exercise (experts or regional) it will host in 
2006 (or whether it will host any PSI activity at all) until 
after the GOT reconsiders its future in PSI.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN 

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