US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2261

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: KNNP, PREL, IR, NL, UNSC 
SUBJECT: IRAN/IAEA:  DUTCH MFA VIEWS ON POSSIBLE UNSC 
 
REFERRAL 
 
REF: A. STATE 191118 
     B. STATE 188960 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REA 
SONS 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch 
MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7.  Wilke 
does not believe it will be possible to gain support within 
the EU for referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in 
September.  He doubts ElBaradei's November report will be 
better than the current one.  Wilke does not expect any 
significant evolution in EU statements on Iran at the 
September 13-14 GAERC meetings.  The EU3 continues to provide 
limited information to EU partners on its approach.  In a 
September 6 meeting with PM Balkenende and FM Bot, Iranian 
National Security Secretary Rohani outlined Iran's proposed 
agreement acknowledging its right to a peaceful nuclear 
energy program, include the right to reprocess, in exchange 
for a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.  In general, 
Wilke expressed concern that the Iranians had seized the 
diplomatic initiative and were successfully parrying 
questions raised by the IAEA.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) PolMilOff discussed refs A and B with Dutch MFA 
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 7.  Wilke 
appreciated receiving ref A outline of U.S. ideas for 
possible UNSC action.  He was pessimistic regarding the 
prospects of gaining EU support for referring Iran to the 
Security Council, however, noting that "minds are not ripe" 
for such a step at this time.  He saw two obstacles:  the EU3 
does not believe it will be possible to gain consensus on the 
IAEA BOG for a referral, and Director ElBaradei's effort 
still needs to be carried forward.  Wilke was not certain 
ElBaradei would provide a more useful report in November, 
calling the trend of his reports "Iran friendly."  (That 
said, he observed that ElBaradei might be downplaying 
concerns deliberately to encourage Iranian cooperation.) 
Wilke believes that while taken together, ElBaradei's six 
reports paint a picture of non-compliance, it is harder to 
make the case on the basis of the latest report.  The GONL 
agrees with many of the U.S. concerns highlighted in ref B, 
but so far the Iranians have been effective in getting their 
counter-arguments to every question heard.  Looking ahead, 
Wilke did not expect a strong statement on Iran to emerge 
from the September 13-14 GAERC meetings.  Instead, he 
predicted the results of those meetings would be similar to 
ministerial comments following the September 4-5 Gymnich 
meetings, e.g., stressing the need for a "strong signal" 
regarding EU concerns about the Iranian program without any 
real teeth.  Wilke did not have the impression the EU3 had a 
clear idea as to next steps, and said they continue to be 
very unforthcoming with other EU partners. 
 
3. (C) Wilke provided a brief overview of Iranian National 
Security Council Secretary Rohani's September 6 meeting with 
PM Balkenende and FM Bot in The Hague.  This meeting had been 
organized on short notice at Iran's request.  Balkenende and 
Bot believed the meeting was useful inasmuch as it enabled 
them to tell the Dutch parliament that they are continuing to 
press the Iranians.  Wilke said the Dutch side "made the 
usual points" about the need for Iran to cooperate with the 
IAEA and resolve the doubts of the international community. 
Rohani, who apparently did "ninety percent of the talking," 
raised Iran's proposal for a cooperation package.  This would 
include reaffirmation of Iran's right to pursue a "peaceful" 
nuclear energy program in exchange for an Iranian promise not 
to develop nuclear weapons.  It would also call for 
cooperation in science and technology and would reassert 
Iran's right to engage in reprocessing.  Rohani also told 
Balkenende and Bot that the Majlis might only be willing to 
ratify an Additional Protocol after the resumption of Iranian 
nuclear activities. 
 
4. (C) Wilke said it was evident from every question raised 
in ElBaradei's latest report that the Iranians have been 
successful in gaining a hearing for their side of the story. 
In this regard, he said, the Iranians were probably justified 
in believing that they are gaining the diplomatic initiative. 
 He expressed concern that the Iranians may successfully 
focus the issue on their continued adherence to the NPT in 
exchange for acknowledgment of their right to a "peaceful" 
nuclear program. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  The Dutch have long supported the view that 
Iran's actions, viewed objectively, constitute non-compliance 
and justify referral to the UNSC.  That said, they are 
reluctant to support referral to the UNSC without a clear 
strategy for managing the issue -- and any potential fallout 
-- once it arrives there.  In this regard, Wilke said it was 
very helpful to have ref A points.  It is clear that despite 
the current Dutch role as EU president, the EU3 are still 
playing their hand close to the vest in determining a way 
ahead.  End comment. 
SOBEL