US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1528

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SU, NI, DARFUR 
SUBJECT: OBASANJO TO SEND LETTER ADVOCATING LARGER AU FORCE 
 
REF: STATE 191028 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 b AND d. 
 
1. (C) The Ambassador met with President Obasanjo September 5 
to deliver Darfur demarche.  The Ambassador laid out the 
proposed draft UNSCR, and provided Obasanjo with a copy of 
the excerpts (reftel).  Obasanjo read the excerpts and said 
he thought they would work well.  He has been pushing for a 
larger AU troops and monitors deployment in the negotiations, 
had inserted that into the agenda of the negotiations, and 
had forced the GOS to accept its being part of the agenda. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG is considering 
restricting military air operations over Darfur, in response 
to repeated attacks or feigned attacks by GOS aircraft. 
Obasanjo said that seemed both positive and possible.  He saw 
no reason why the AU could not or should not station military 
observers at GOS airbases, asking how many airbases there 
were to be observed and how many AU observers were currently 
available for the mission.  He noted that he was trying to 
get President Bouteflika of Algeria to send 10 more military 
observers to Darfur, and felt Egypt could contribute more 
observers too. 
 
3. (C) President Obasanjo agreed to send a letter on 
September 6 to the President of the UNSC, and also to UNSYG 
Annan, advocating a larger AU military observers force.  He 
would lay out the humanitarian necessity for such a larger 
force, and note his personal letter to Sudanese President 
Bashir along similar lines.  He hoped the USG could transmit 
his letters to the Dutch and the UNSYG in order to save time. 
 (Note: We will forward the text to the Department and USUN 
upon receipt.) 
 
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DARFUR TALKS DYNAMICS 
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4. (C) Obasanjo said he had met earlier that day with leaders 
of both the GOS delegation and the rebel delegations.  He had 
told all of them to move on to the next parts of the agenda, 
and they had reacted positively.  That said, Obasanjo felt 
"there will be a time when we need a club (of sanctions) to 
move the GOS," especially when the negotiations turn to the 
third agenda item, political issues.  He did not regard 
greater AU force deployment -- even at GOS airbases -- as 
sanctions or as a violation of Sudan's sovereignty, noting 
that the AU Enabling Act allowed AU deployments of troops 
within African countries as non-foreign forces. 
 
5. (C) Obasanjo and the Ambassador praised FM Adeniji's 
performance at the talks.  Obasanjo said all three Sudanese 
sides wanted Adeniji to work with them, and the Ambassador 
noted that all three Sudanese sides liking the same person 
was a rare occurrence.  Adeniji had reported back to Obasanjo 
that the GOS was emphasizing its sovereignty, but wanted to 
reach an agreement with the rebels at Abuja.  Adeniji would 
be out of town at the beginning of this week, but would 
return September 8.  Obasanjo mused that he might seek to get 
Adeniji back to the Abuja negotiations sooner. 
 
6. (C) COMMENT:  President Obasanjo's strong commitment and 
effort have been critical to success at the peace talks.  He 
has been personally involved both directly at the 
negotiations and behind the scenes, as in his letter to 
Bashir.  He is pulling out all the stops to make the peace 
talks and the AU deployment work, and exerting pressure on 
the Sudanese government and both rebel groups to accomplish 
the same aims we seek. 
 
7. (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL