US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS3729

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 
TAGS: KNNP, PARM, PREL, MNUC, TRGY, IR, IAEA, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS ON IAEA IRAN REPORT: NOT READY FOR 
UNSC REFERRAL 
 
REF: STATE 188960 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Poloff discussed reftel with Council 
nonproliferation and nuclear policy advisors September 2 and 
3.  While acknowledging serious unresolved issues, they 
assessed DG El Baradei's new report as "overall more positive 
than the last one," and said that EU BOG members were 
unlikely to go along with our desire for UNSC referral, at 
least not before November.  One questioned why we were in 
such a rush.  They argued that without a plan for handling 
the issue at the UNSC, any BOG referral risked backfiring and 
undermining the UN's credibility.  They confirmed that the 
DG's report and a briefing by the EU-3 would feature 
prominently at the informal Gymnich meeting of EU FMs 
September 3 and 4, and thought that European countries might 
have a clearer idea about how to proceed in the short run 
after that meeting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE DG'S REPORT: OVERALL BETTER THAN THE LAST 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Poloff discussed reftel on September 2 and 3 with 
Andreas Strub, Deputy to WMD Rep Giannella and longtime 
Solana advisor, and Stephan Klement, Council nuclear policy 
advisor and former IAEA official.  The two had just finished 
writing an assessment of DG El Baradei's report for HiRep 
Solana and DG Cooper to use at the September 3-4 Gymnich 
(informal meeting of EU FMs).  Strub promised to report our 
demarche and pass our paper to both men in advance of the 
Gymnich meeting.  In contrast to our interpretation, Strub 
and Klement assessed the DG's report as "overall more 
positive that the last one," while also acknowledging that 
Iran was far from being off the hook on outstanding 
questions.  Klement highlighted HEU contamination of imported 
enrichment equipment and the Iranian P-2 program as the most 
serious of remaining open issues, but said that both would 
require better cooperation from third countries (presumably 
Pakistan) to resolve.  Many of Iran's explanations could be 
plausible, he said (referring especially to the HEU 
contamination issue), but there is no way the IAEA can 
determine that yet. 
 
NOT YET TIME FOR UNSC REFERRAL 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Strub and Klement argued that the time was not right 
for referring the issue to the UNSC.  Citing the more 
positive tone of this report compared to the last one, 
Klement said the IAEA should be given more time to learn 
about third countries.  He also said there was a risk that 
the larger General Conference, convening just after the BOG, 
could undertake efforts contradictory to the BOG if the BOG 
reported the file to the UNSC.  He thought the DG's report 
did not warrant taking such a political risk and said that 
the November BOG would be the earliest politically savvy 
opportunity for any UNSC referral.  Strub agreed that now was 
not the time for a referral and thought that EU Member States 
on the BOG would be much more inclined to entertain arguments 
for referral at the November meeting. 
 
WHAT WOULD YOU DO ONCE THERE? 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Strub also questioned the wisdom of proceeding to the 
UNSC without a clear strategy for success once there.  He 
said that if the Iranians decided to test the determination 
of the Security Council as well, and if the Council was 
unable to unify around a tough sanctions plan and path 
forward, it would be disastrous and undermine the credibility 
of the UN system. (COMMENT: The desire to defend the UN's 
credibility and to enhance its role at the center of EU 
efforts to promote "effective multilateralism" is a very 
powerful motivator among EU policymakers.  END COMMENT). 
Strub thought that very few European leaders would consider a 
UNSC referral without a clear and workable strategy for 
handling the next steps. 
 
THE EU-3 AND GYMNICH 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) Strub confirmed that EU FMs, led by France, Germany 
and the UK, hoped to agree on a new or revised near-term 
approach to Iran at their September 3-4 Gymnich meeting in 
Maastricht.  Our demarche would certainly feature prominently 
in discussions, he said.  Another Commission contact 
confirmed that RELEX Commissioner Patten is frustrated that 
the EU does not speak with one voice on Iran, but accepted 
that the tone of EU discussions would depend heavily on what 
the EU-3 have to say.  Council official Klement was careful 
to distinguish between IAEA and EU-3 efforts, saying that 
while Iran has failed in its commitments to the EU-3, that 
was a separate issue and should not influence the IAEA's 
process. 
McKinley