US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1149

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, NLD 
SUBJECT: INSIDE BURMA'S NLD PARTY: YOUNG TURKS VS OLD LIONS 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1090 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 1035 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. RANGOON 924 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The National League for Democracy (NLD) held 
a series of recent meetings that pitted state and divisional 
party officials (younger leaders who demand a pro-active 
stance approach to the regime) against members of the NLD 
Central Executive Committee (octogenarians who are 
disinclined to stir the SPDC hornet's nest in the absence of 
the NLD's detained senior leaders).  The regime, meanwhile, 
believes that it has rendered the NLD increasingly incapable 
of mounting a serious threat, an assessment that may 
underestimate the NLD's capacity to remain a thorn in the 
thigh of totalitarian rule.  Nonetheless, with Aung San Suu 
Kyi (ASSK) under house arrest, most offices shuttered, and 
lessening international pressure on the Burmese regime, the 
NLD has hit an all-time low point.  The growing chorus of 
voices from among the NLD's younger members demanding party 
action is one indication that the status quo is creating 
considerable frustration within the pro-democracy movement. 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) From August 25-30 the NLD CEC hosted a six-day seminar 
at Rangoon headquarters with several dozen of the party's 
state and divisional leaders.  According to party Chairman U 
Aung Shwe, the session was a productive effort to address 
numerous party issues, but he admitted that emotions ran high 
during contentious discussions regarding potential party 
actions and demands from the ranks for leadership changes. 
 
3. (C) Seven members of the nine-member CEC (whom the SPDC 
detained after the May 2003 Depeyin attack but subsequently 
released between November 2003 and April 2004) began an 
executive meeting on September 1 to analyze and discuss the 
results of their seminar with local party leaders.  However, 
according to party sources, the CEC is not inclined to 
implement any of the recommendations put forth by the 
regional leaders while CEC members ASSK and U Tin Oo remain 
under house arrest.  Recommendations from the rank and file 
membership included the following: 
 
--Expand the Central Executive Committee:  Local leaders 
would like to see more diversity on the CEC, including women 
and youth.  However, the current CEC members say that an 
expansion is not in the party's by-laws and, furthermore, is 
impossible to undertake without the presence of ASSK and U 
Tin Oo (Note: the CEC has nine members and one vacancy.  U 
Kyi Maung, who passed away on August 26, resigned in 1998 
after a falling-out with ASSK and was not replaced). 
 
--Expand the Central Committee:  In theory, local NLD members 
elect the 30 members of the Central Committee (CC) who, in 
turn, appoint or elect the CEC.  In practice, top party 
leaders (ASSK, U Tin Oo, or U Aung Shwe) have hand-picked 
members of the CEC and the CC.  As with the CEC, NLD members 
would like to see more women and youth on the Central 
Committee.  However, in 1989 the then-SLORC jailed or forced 
the retirement of most CC members and the regime responded in 
similar fashion after a 1998 reorganization by arresting all 
members of the CC.  The current CEC believes that 
reinvigorating the CC now would provide no benefit to the 
party and would simply provoke the SPDC. 
 
--Convene a "Pyi Thu Hluttaw" (People's Parliament):  The NLD 
won 395 of 485 seats in the 1990 elections and party members 
have always believed that the Parliament belongs rightfully 
to the pro-democracy movement.  In 1998, the NLD formed the 
Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP), which 
included participants from 14 political parties.  However, 
the SPDC responded with a massive wave of arrests, forced 
resignations, and prolonged repression.  The CEC will mull 
over this recommendation, but is unlikely to take serious 
action.  The NLD, however, plans to lead efforts to 
commemorate the sixth anniversary of the CRPP on September 16. 
 
--A small, but vocal, number of NLD members apparently 
demanded that the CEC "politicize" an ongoing petition 
campaign to free party leaders and reopen party offices (ref 
C), press the international community to introduce the Burma 
question at the UN Security Council, and even consider moving 
the party toward an armed struggle against the military 
regime.  The CEC reportedly rejected these suggestions out of 
hand as being either impractical or against party objectives. 
 
Comment: "We've Got Them Right Where We Want Them" 
 
4. (C) According to a foreign diplomat in Rangoon, who has 
close contacts with the SPDC's military intelligence, the GOB 
recently completed a classified assessment of the NLD party 
for the SPDC leadership.  The GOB analysis reportedly 
observes that the NLD has a rigid hierarchy that does not 
adhere to democratic practices within the party structure, 
has no tolerance for internal dissent, and is incapable of 
mounting a serious threat against the regime.  Such barbs 
would sting the NLD leadership, which prides itself on 
transparency, inclusiveness, and a long-term commitment to a 
peaceful transition to democracy.  However, the reported GOB 
analysis would be music to the generals' ears, affirming that 
the SPDC has successfully implemented a campaign of 
harassment, intimidation, and repression that has rendered 
the NLD harmless. 
 
5. (C) We would maintain that the regime underestimates the 
NLD's reserve of support among the Burmese people and the 
capacity to remain a serious thorn in the thigh of 
totalitarian rule.  Nonetheless, it is clear that with party 
leaders in detention, offices shuttered throughout the 
country, and lessening international pressure on the Burmese 
regime (especially on the part of ASEAN and other in the 
region), the NLD has hit an all-time low point.  The growing 
chorus of voices from among the NLD's younger members 
demanding party action is one indication that the status quo 
is creating considerable frustration within the pro-democracy 
movement.  End Comment. 
Martinez