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| Identifier: | 01CAIRO6321 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 01CAIRO6321 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Cairo |
| Created: | 2001-10-04 16:03:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PTER PINR EG |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 041603Z OCT 01 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4495 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T CAIRO 006321 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2010 TAGS: PTER, PINR, EG SUBJECT: SHARING THE CASE AGAINST AL-QA'IDA WITH EGYPT REF: STATE 170698 (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM RENO HARNISH. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D). -------------------------- MAKING THE CASE TO THE GOE -------------------------- 1. (S) ON OCTOBER 3 AND 4, DRAWING ON DOCUMENTS PROVIDED REFTEL, MISSION STAFF MET WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO MAKE THE CASE AGAINST AL-QAIDA. IN PREPARATION FOR THE BRIEFINGS, WE HAD DISTILLED INFORMATION IN REFTEL INTO FOUR BASIC SECTIONS: AL-QA'IDA'S INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACKS, TACTICAL SIMILARITY TO EARLIER ATTACKS, LINKS BETWEEN THE TALEBAN AND AL-QA'IDA, AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TALEBAN AND AFGHANISTAN. 2. (S) DATT, OMC, ROAL CHIEFS BRIEFED DMI HEAD MG TOHAMY WHO REACTED VERY POSITIVELY, ASSERTING THAT HE "UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY" WHAT THE INTENT OF THE REPORT HAD BEEN, WISHED THAT OTHERS IN THE U.S. HAD "LISTENED TO WHAT WE HAD TO SAY" PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS, AND PROMISED TO INSURE THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWY WAS FULL AWARE OF THE TEXT PRIOR TO DISCUSSIONS WITH SECDEF RUMSFELD. -------------------- MAINTAIN CLOSE TOUCH -------------------- 3. (S) DCM DISCUSSED THE REPORT WITH PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL MAGID ABDEL FATTAH ABDEL AZIZ. HE WELCOMED THE BRIEFING, TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES, AND PROMPTLY BRIEFED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. NEITHER OFFERED SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO THE MATERIAL AND TOOK IT AT FACE VALUE. ABDEL AZIZ DID NOTE THAT, WHILE LIMITED DEMONSTRATIONS ACROSS CAMPUSES IN EGYPT HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY EVENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WHEN THE U.S. REACTION OCCURRED, THERE WOULD BE SOME FACTIONS WHICH WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE TO EXPAND THEM. THE GOE, HE SAID, WOULD LIKE AN HOUR OR TWO NOTICE BEFORE THE STRIKE AS IT WOULD THEN TAKE EXTRA INTERNAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. ABDEL AZIZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK MIGHT RAISE THIS WITH VISITING SECDEF OCTOBER 4. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. MAINTAIN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GOE ON THE SCOPE OF THE MILITARY REACTION SO AS TO PRECLUDE HEZBALLAH/SYRIA FROM STOKING AND DISSEMINATING CONSPIRACY THEORIES AS TO WHERE THE U.S. WAS HEADING. IN ADDITION, HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK WAS UNDER THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN ORAL ASSURANCES TO OMAR SOLEIMAN THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT HIT SYRIA, LIBYA, OR LEBANON. CONCLUDING, FATTAH REITERATED MUBARAK'S VIEW THAT FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH WOULD NOT BRING ANYTHING USEFUL TO THE PROCESS AND THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT ON PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD HAD BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED. --------------------- IT WON'T HAPPEN HERE --------------------- 4. (S) THE AMBASSADOR MET OCTOBER 4 WITH SALAH SALAMA, DIRECTOR OF STATE SECURITY INVESTIGATION SECTOR (INTERIOR MINISTRY). SALAMA PREDICTED THERE WOULD BE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A STRIKE ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE GREATER POTENTIAL FOR SUCH ACTIONS WOULD RESULT FROM CONTINUING VIOLENCE UNDERTAKEN BY ISRAELIS AGAINST PALESTINIANS. HE ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS ALSO POLITICAL AGITATION IN UNIONS AND SYNDICATES BUT THIS TOO RESULTED FROM ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE. SALAMA PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS (SHOWED GREAT "SERIOUSNESS") ON RESOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. 5. (S) CONTINUING, SALAMA DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ACTION BY BIN LADIN IN EGYPT. HE DID ALLOW,HOWEVER, THAT A "CRAZED INDIVIDUAL" OR PEOPLE COMING FROM THE OUTSIDE WITH FORGED DOCUMENTS MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING. SALAMA'S CONFIDENCE SPRANG FROM THE JULY ROUND-UP OF A GROUP OF EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ) MEMBERS BY THE SECURITY SERVICES. THE EIJ HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS FROM THE RANKS OF THE WEALTHY IN EGYPT. 6. (S) TO COMPLETE OUR BRIEFINGS, ECONOMIC/POLITICAL MINISTER- COUNSELOR PROVIDED THE CASE TO MOHAMMED FARNAWANY OF THE FM'S CABINET AND ROAL BRIEFED EGIS DIRECTOR OMAR SOLEIMAN, WHO DISMISSING THE NEED TO HEAR THE EVIDENCE, WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH A DISCUSSION ON NEXT STEPS AND ASSURANCES HIS SERVICE WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY.. WELCH
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