US embassy cable - 04HELSINKI1137

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GYMNICH MEETING: FINLAND SAYS EU "FAIRLY UNANIMOUS" IN SUPPORT OF FINANCING UN PROTECTION FORCE

Identifier: 04HELSINKI1137
Wikileaks: View 04HELSINKI1137 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Helsinki
Created: 2004-09-02 14:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL FI IZ CH TU IR SU ZL XF EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, FI, IZ, CH, TU, IR, SU, ZL, XF, EUN 
SUBJECT: GYMNICH MEETING: FINLAND SAYS EU "FAIRLY 
UNANIMOUS" IN SUPPORT OF FINANCING UN PROTECTION FORCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 182534 
 
     B. STATE 180598 
     C. STATE 166158 
     D. HELSINKI 894 
     E. HELSINKI 1124 
 
Classified By: POL Chief John Hall for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In an August 27 meeting with the chief of the 
MFA's EU coordination unit, we reviewed the agenda for the 
September 3-4 Gymnich meeting.  We were told that the EU is 
leaning toward a financial contribution to support a UN 
protection force in Iraq -- and that Finland would consider 
making a national contribution if EU funds did not 
materialize.  (The GoF made that position official on 
September 1; see septel.)  On other issues, we were told the 
Finns: still favor shifting EU focus from the China arms 
embargo to improving the code of conduct; have no problem 
with giving Turkey a date for beginning accession 
negotiations; support sanctions against Sudan -- if those 
sanctions take into account the concurrent need to end 
Sudan's civil war; agree pressure must be kept on Iran; feel 
Ambassador Eide's recommendations on Kosovo make sense but 
may be hard to implement; and support the Sharon plan for 
Gaza withdrawal -- as long as it is not Gaza first and last. 
Our exchange on Burma/ASEM is reported in Ref E; the Finns 
seem still inclined to accept a lower-level Burmese presence 
at the summit.  End Summary 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
2. (C) On August 27 POL Chief and PolOff met with Kimmo 
Lahdevirta, chief of MFA's EU coordination unit, to review 
issues likely to be raised at the Foreign Ministers' upcoming 
Gymnich meeting.  Lahdevirta said that in addition to the 
topics mentioned in Ref A, the ministers' agenda includes 
Iraq and Middle East peace negotiations. 
 
3. (C) We asked whether the EU had come to any decision on 
the request that the European Union contribute financially to 
cover certain costs for countries that provide troops for a 
UN protection force (Refs B, C).  Lahdevirta said that the 
question had been discussed at that week's meeting of the 
PSC, and his understanding was the participants were "fairly 
unanimous" that the EU should provide some money (he did not 
say how much) from EU common funds to support this 
initiative.  He said that the FMs will take up the matter at 
the Gymnich, but in the meantime, the Commission has been 
tasked with finding the money to do this. 
 
4. (C) Lahdevirta added that Finland prefers the idea of the 
EU contributing as a group, rather than some individual 
members providing national funds.  But if EU funding does not 
materialize, he said, Finland "would be willing to consider" 
making a national contribution.  (Note: On September 1, the 
GoF reported formally to us, and to its fellow EU members, 
that this is Finland's position.  See septel for further 
details.) 
 
China Arms Embargo 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) We argued, as we have in past conversations with the 
GoF, that the government of China would portray lifting of 
the embargo as an endorsement of China's recent human rights 
record, an endorsement China certainly does not deserve. 
Lahdevirta said the Finns understand and agree that the 
Chinese human rights record is "very problematic." 
Nevertheless, the GoF still believes the most productive 
course would be to shift attention to the EU code of conduct, 
tighten it so that it more effectively controls 
high-technology items not covered by the arms embargo, and 
bring it into the EU's body of codified, binding legislation. 
 (Septel reports on a subsequent, more detailed conversation 
with nonproliferation chief and PolDir-designate 
Vierros-Villeneuve.) 
 
Turkey and the EU 
----------------- 
 
6. (C) Lahdevirta said that Finland (during whose 1999 EU 
presidency Turkey became a formal candidate for EU 
membership) has no problem with Turkey being given a date for 
the beginning of accession negotiations.  He added that the 
GoF has been "very disappointed" with the Greek Cypriots' 
reaction to the decision to widen contacts with Northern 
Cyprus. 
 
Sudan/Darfur 
------------ 
 
7. (C) Lahdevirta said Finland is prepared to consider 
sanctions against the Government of Sudan, but reiterated 
that those sanctions must take into account the ongoing and 
separate need to foster peaceful resolution of the 
government/SPLA civil war.  (See Ref D and previous.) 
Iran 
---- 
 
8. (C) The GoF is "waiting eagerly" for the UK/French/German 
report, but certainly agrees that the EU must be part of the 
international pressure on Iran to cooperate fully with the 
IAEA and to suspend all its enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
9. (C) Lahdevirta described NATO PermRep Eide's recent report 
to the UNSYG as "very critical and his recommendations very 
harsh -- but they may be necessary.  The question is how to 
implement them."  The report, he said, contains ideas that 
make sense, but are more easily said than done.  On the issue 
of Belgrade's interests in Kosovo, Lahdevirta remarked that 
Kosovo Serbs have a legitimate fear of being marginalized or 
cantonized.  They must be able to feel that they have a 
future. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
10. (C) The EU will do what it can to support PM Sharon's 
Gaza withdrawal plan, said Lahdevirta, but with the 
understanding that it cannot be Gaza first and last. 
 
MACK 

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