US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA8900

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 008900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
GENEVA FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: CASC, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PTER, FARC, Hostages 
SUBJECT: US HOSTAGE STATUS: 18 MONTHS IN FARC CAPTIVITY 
 
REF: BOGOTA 2239 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b), 
(c), and (d). 
 
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 9. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S//NF) August 13, 2004 marked the 18-month anniversary of 
the FARC's kidnapping of three American crewmembers after a 
SOUTHCOM single-engine Cessna crashed.  The most significant 
change since the one-year update in reftel (NOTAL) has been 
the initiation and impressive progress of the COLMIL's Plan 
Patriota Phase IIB, which targets FARC strongholds in 
southeastern Colombia.  Given the operations, progress, it 
is possible that the FARC moved the hostages into a less 
volatile area, such as the Correguaje region, where the FARC 
has well-developed hostage camp infrastructure.  Although 
Embassy has not received any proof-of-life since July 2003, 
we assess that the hostages are still alive given their high 
value.  Sources indicate, however, that the FARC would kill 
the hostages rather than allow a rescue.  Embassy continues 
to hold biweekly interagency meetings to discuss the status, 
strategize and consider new leads.  End Summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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2. (S//NF) August 13, 2004, marked 18 months of captivity for 
Thomas R. Howes, Marc D. Gonsalves, and Keith D. Stansell, 
whose SOUTHCOM Reconnaissance System single engine Cessna 208 
Caravan aircraft crashed in northern Caqueta Department.  Two 
other members of the crew -- U.S. citizen Tom Jannis and 
Colombian Army Sergeant Luis Cruz -- were executed shortly 
after the crash when they apparently refused to follow FARC 
orders to move quickly out of the area.  Their bodies were 
found about a mile from the crash site.  The FARC took 24 
days to bring the three surviving American citizens to the 
first holding encampment. 
 
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STATUS AT EIGHTEEN MONTHS 
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3. (S//NF) Since our one-year assessment, the COLMIL has 
begun a major military offensive in the Yari region known as 
Plan Patriota Phase IIB (PPIIB).  The offensive has made 
serious inroads into FARC strongholds, which may have 
prompted the FARC to move the hostages to a more secure area. 
 A recent source claims the hostages are now located in the 
remote, mountainous Correguaje region of northern Caqueta and 
western Meta Departments.  This region is near well-developed 
FARC hostage camp infrastructure and lies outside the PPIIB 
area of operations.  Post is following up on all leads, but 
we do not have credible, precise information on the hostages' 
location. 
 
4. (S//NF) While the hostages are susceptible to a variety of 
jungle maladies, on balance we believe that they receive 
medical treatment and adequate food given their value to the 
FARC.  At the same time, FARC leadership has made it clear 
that, as they have in other situations, they it would kill 
the hostages rather than permit a successful rescue.  We 
believe the FARC would first attempt to move them and only 
execute them as a last resort.  Due to ongoing PPIIB 
operations, it is possible the FARC could use the hostages as 
"human shields" against COLMIL incursions into FARC 
strongholds. 
 
5. (S//NF) The Embassy continues to collect all available 
intelligence related to hostage locations and has implemented 
a "Rewards for Justice" program for information leading to 
their safe return.  This program has recently generated 
additional leads due to new ads placed in newspapers and on 
the radio outside Bogota.  In addition, the MilGroup's 
Regional Information Support Team (RIST) provided 75,000 
leaflets for dissemination around the areas of Larandia, San 
Vicente del Caguan, and Florencia on July 9.  These programs 
have been successful in spurring walk-ins but so far have not 
yielded verifiable information on the hostages' whereabouts. 
We hold hostage status meetings biweekly with representatives 
from the Embassy Intelligence Fusion Center, U.S. MilGroup, 
the Office of Regional Affairs, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Narcotics Affairs Section and the 
Executive Office.  Nevertheless, since leads go stale in a 
matter of hours, any rescue mission would have to be launched 
with U.S. forces based in Colombia and briefed to respond. 
 
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FARC STRATEGY MURKY; COLMIL INCAPABLE OF HOSTAGE RESCUE 
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6. (S//NF) The FARC may consider the hostages to be a 
bargaining chip with President Uribe in negotiating a trade 
of political hostages for imprisoned FARC commanders and 
troops.  One intelligence report mentioned that some FARC 
elements are lobbying to release the U.S. hostages to 
embarrass the GOC and diminish U.S. support for Colombian 
anti-terrorism efforts.  Unfortunately, an unconditional 
hostage release by the FARC is highly unlikely; in the past 
they have always sought a quid pro quo. 
 
7. (S//NF) Based on our analysis of the Colombian Military's 
training, equipment and tactics, the Colombian military is 
not capable of conducting a hostage rescue operation without 
endangering the lives of the hostages.  President Uribe has 
told us he would allow a unilateral U.S. effort to release 
the hostages, and we believe the security forces -- with some 
ruffled feathers -- would accept his decision to do so.  It 
is clear, however, given the likely remote location of the 
hostages when, and if a rescue is attempted by U.S. forces 
that some involvement of Colombian military is inevitable. 
The degree to which we can count on COLMIL participation will 
depend on the nature of our cooperation and our relationship 
with the COLMIL rescue units. 
 
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COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
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8. (S//NF) The hostages, fate remains uncertain despite the 
recent GOC proposal to release 50 imprisoned FARC members in 
exchange for political and military hostages, including the 
three Americans.  President Uribe has made it clear that any 
humanitarian exchange must include the three American 
hostages.  The FARC rejected the GOC proposal in an August 22 
communique.  The FARC continues to press for an unconditional 
exchange of jailed terrorists for kidnap victims that the GOC 
cannot accept.  The FARC does not/not explicitly include the 
Americans in their proposals. 
 
9. (S//NF) The limited intelligence we get on the hostages 
seems to have a short life.  We believe they are moved 
frequently, so intelligence on their whereabouts would be of 
limited value unless we could react instantly.  Consequently, 
Post recommends that preparations begin for a U.S.-led 
operation that could act on intelligence quickly.  Post also 
recommends identifying U.S. units that would take the lead in 
any rescue operation so we can begin familiarizing them with 
the area of operations.  We should revise the rules of 
engagement for those U.S. forces specifically involved in 
hostage rescue so they can act effectively if actionable 
intelligence is collected.  End Comment and Action Request. 
DRUCKER