US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2188

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002188 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, OPDC, MOPS, MARR, IZ, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ:  MAINTAINING MULTINATIONAL 
FORCES IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. STATE 185525 
     B. THE HAGUE 2154 
     C. THE HAGUE 2055 
     D. THE HAGUE 1566 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B 
 AND D) 
 
 1. (S) Summary:  PolCouns and PolMilOff delivered ref A 
points to Dutch MFA Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems 
and MOD General Policy Director Lo Casteleijn in separate 
meetings on August 31.  While the current Dutch deployment in 
Iraq is scheduled to run through March 15, 2005, the GONL is 
not currently planning to extend it.  According to both 
Jochems and Casteleijn, the August 14 killing of a Dutch MP 
in an ambush in Rumaythah seriously disturbed Defense 
Minister Kamp.  They claimed the local population, with whom 
the Dutch have taken pains to develop good relations, had 
advance knowledge of the attack yet did not warn them.  Both 
local British and Japanese colleagues have received similar 
messages from these interlocutors.  While Kamp has publicly 
stated that the current Dutch deployment would not be renewed 
after March (ref B), Jochems felt that the door was not 
completely closed on a possible Dutch presence after that 
date.  Casteleijn also allowed that Kamp had not "absolutely" 
ruled out a further extension, but cautioned that a U.S. push 
at this point would not be productive.  PolCouns urged both 
not to lock the GONL into an exact date of departure as it 
would only play into hands of those seeking to take advantage 
of the situation.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) PolCouns and PolMilOff discussed ref A points with MFA 
Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems and MOD General 
Policy Director Lo Casteleijn in separate meetings on August 
31.  Jochems said Defense Minister Kamp had reacted strongly 
to the killing of a Dutch military police sergeant on August 
14 in an ambush in Rumaythah (ref C).  Apparently Kamp 
believed that the local population had had advance knowledge 
of the attack but did not warn the Dutch.  According to 
Jochems, Kamp had taken this as a personal affront, given 
Dutch efforts to build good relations with the locals, and 
this had been reflected in his public comments.  Jochems 
stressed that Kamp's statement that the Dutch deployment 
would not be extended past next March did not reflect a 
considered government position and, in his estimation, had 
not received significant press coverage.  He expressed hope 
that Ministers would not make any further such statements. 
Concerning the current security situation, the Dutch Polad in 
Al Muthanna had told him that the recent agreement in Najaf 
had helped "enormously" with local tensions, given the mainly 
Shi'a population of the province.  Jochems felt it was "too 
early to tell" whether it would be possible to renew the 
Dutch deployment beyond March.  He said MFA PolDir Siblesz 
had reminded Kamp in a recent meeting that Dutch personnel 
were present at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government 
and the UN; the attitude of the local population toward Dutch 
troops was not the only (or even most important) factor in 
determining Dutch actions.  Jochems said that even if the 
main Dutch deployment were to end as scheduled, there might 
still be continued Dutch involvement depending on the shape 
of NATO and EU operations at the time. 
 
3. (S) MOD General Policy Director Lo Casteleijn stressed 
that Kamp had been "really offended" by the August 14 
incident, as he had believed the Dutch had been successful in 
establishing an atmosphere of "mutual trust" with the locals. 
 While the recent agreement in Najaf would hopefully lower 
tensions, he noted, armed Al Sadr followers might yet 
disperse and cause further trouble, including for the Dutch. 
Casteleijn said MOD viewed March 15 as the end date for the 
Dutch deployment and were planning accordingly.  (He warned, 
however, that a dramatic deterioration of the situation would 
create pressure for an even earlier departure.)  Casteleijn 
stressed that the original Dutch plan (prior to the August 14 
attack) had been to transfer primary responsibility for 
security in the area to Iraqi authorities in January; the 
Dutch "exit strategy" now assumed that a follow-on, non-Dutch 
MNF presence would need to be in Al Muthanna after March.  He 
thought it might be possible the UK or another nation would 
be prepared to replace the Dutch in this role, and said the 
Dutch would coordinate with the UK on a force generation 
event this fall.   Casteleijn allowed that a continued Dutch 
presence in Iraq might be possible through an expanded NATO 
mission or other "new" configuration of forces.  He stressed, 
however, that any effort to put pressure on Kamp at this time 
to continue the Dutch deployment in Iraq would be 
counter-productive.   PolCouns urged Casteleijn against 
locking the GONL into a specific date for departure as that 
would only play into the hands of those who are seeking to 
exploit the situation.  Casteleijn agreed to take the message 
to Kamp and observed that Kamp had not used words like 
"absolute" in ruling out a possible further Dutch extension 
in his public statements. 
 
4. (S)  Comment:  The Dutch are currently committed to remain 
in Iraq through the upcoming elections, a position FM Bot 
publicly reiterated during his August 29 visit to Baghdad. 
While a premature Dutch pullout is possible, it is highly 
unlikely absent a dramatic deterioration in the security 
situation (the legacy of the 1995 debacle in Srebrenica is 
always in the back of Dutch minds).  It is clear, that the 
August 14 ambush has clearly rattled Kamp.  Local British and 
Japanese colleagues received similar impressions from these 
same interlocutors in recent days.  In view of Casteleijn's 
explicit caution, it would be unproductive to push Kamp too 
hard right now on an extension past March until tempers cool. 
 When the current deployment was renewed for eight months 
last June, GONL Ministers did not explicitly rule out an 
extension past March 2005 under "exceptional circumstances" 
(ref D).  The recent ambush has made such a renewal 
considerably more difficult but not impossible, especially if 
tensions in southern Iraq lessen.  A "new" Dutch deployment 
as part of an expanded NATO or other international presence 
is also a distinct possibility we should explore at the 
proper time.  In renewing their current deployment back in 
June, the Dutch were keenly sensitive to requests from the 
Iraqi Interim Government and the UN.  Such requests would be 
critical to any further extensions.  End Comment. 
RUSSEL