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| Identifier: | 04ANKARA4887 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ANKARA4887 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2004-08-27 16:34:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PREL ENRG TU RS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004887 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 TAGS: PREL, ENRG, TU, RS SUBJECT: PUTIN VISIT TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 2-3 REF: 02 ANKARA 2914 (U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 11. 2. (C) Summary: The highest-level Russian visitor to Turkey since Podgorny in 1972, Putin will arrive amid steadily increasing bilateral economic ties -- particularly in Russian energy sales and interest in energy-sector investments and arms sales and one million Russian tourists in 2004 -- and a lively debate in Turkey about whether increased alignment with Russia represents a strategic alternative for Turkey. Embassy requests talking points about the visit to share with the GOT by August 31. End Summary. 3. (C) Putin's visit will take place in the context of three important trends in Turkish/Russian relations. First, Russia is steadily increasing its presence in Turkey's energy sector, both through exports of Russian gas to Turkey (Russia supplies over 60 % of Turkey's gas) and through increased transshipment of Russian crude through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The GOT is increasingly concerned about growing tanker traffic from the Black Sea traversing the Straits. Our contacts have acknowledged strong Russian pressure in favor of a trans-Thrace bypass pipeline backed by the Russian pipeline company Transneft (Note: the Russian-backed project competes with the trans-Thrace project of Trace Development Company in which there is U.S. commercial involvement. End note). 4. (C) Moreover, we have seen keen Russian interest here in buying Turkish energy infrastructure. For example, Russian Transneft heads a consortium which won the privatization tender for the TUPRAS refinery in Izmit, Turkey's largest; the privatization is tied up in the courts and one contact has told us the GOT is considering re-awarding the sale to a Saudi-U.S. consortium. There are persistent reports of Russian interest in Turkish natural gas networks and Ali Sen, an unsavory Turkish businessman with long-standing deep ties to Russia, heads a company which has just bought natural gas distribution rights in Izmir. Gazprom General Director Yuri Kamarov visited Ankara August 24. 5. (C) Second, Russian/Turkish commercial links are increasing broadly through Turkish exports of goods and services (principally in construction) and Turkish imports of Russian raw materials. The Russians are also interested in increasing arms sales to Turkey and have been pressing a Russian-Israeli attack helicopter. 6. (C) Third, over the last two and a half years there has been a lively debate in Turkey about the "Eurasia" (read: Russia) concept as an alternative for Turkey's general U.S. and EU strategic direction (ref). This is an emotional rather than an analytical fashion. Contacts enamored of the "Eurasia" concept either remain unaware of the strongly Russocentric and anti-Turkish nature of Alexander Dugin's thesis or scramble to assert that Dugin's recent rewrite of his book's preface, in which he makes a gesture toward Turkey, is sufficient evidence that there is a place for Turkey in the concept. As "Sabah" Ankara bureau chief Asli Aydintasbas commented in the daily's Aug. 26 edition, Putin comes in an atmosphere of unprecedented positive feeling toward Russia, with not one discernible negative comment about Putin in the Turkish press in the runup to his visit. 7. (S) In this context we have noticed a sea change in strategy by the Russian Embassy in Ankara, which is now using several fluent Turkish-speaking officers to cultivate a wider circle of contacts outside the traditional elites and leftist intelligentsia. Good contacts have been steadily reporting to us that the Russian Embassy is making a concerted push to develop close relations with Turkey's religious brotherhoods and lodges and has been offering trips to Moscow and research opportunities in Russian institutes to a broader circle of political think tanks and consultants. 8. (S) The approach is not subtle. Huseyin Kocabiyik, a prominent center-right political consultant/analyst and long-standing contact of ours, told us Aug. 24 that, while he and ruling AK Party MP Mahmut Kocak were recently in Baku, a Russian deputy foreign minister openly pitched to them the idea of Turkey's reorientation from the U.S./EU to a "Eurasia" partnership with Russia. Similarly, Sergey Makarov, one of the most active Russian Embassy officers in Ankara, queried another long-standing contact of ours with strong Islamic credentials whether it would be productive for Putin to bring a proposal for bilateral political cooperation far beyond the Joint Eurasia Action Plan that the two countries signed on the margins of the 2001 UNGA. 9. (C) We expect Putin will press the Turks on energy deals and other commercial ties and be keen to show that Russia and Turkey share a common strategy in the Caucasus, central Asia, and broader Middle East; the Russians have been keen to join the OIC and, given Turkey's status as ministerial-level chairman in office, may press for more than observer status. The Turks would like to see a definitive Russian break with the PKK. The two sides are likely to press each other for further anti-terrorism commitments, with the Russians focusing on what they perceive as Turkish tolerance for the Chechen movement and the Turks trying to end residual Russian support for, or tolerance of, PKK activities through Russia. 10. (C) Defense Minister Ivanov arrives Sept. 1 and the Russians may leave the discussion of arms sales at that level. Although the Turkish military has heretofore shown almost no interest in acquiring Russian arms, Turkey's civilian procurement agency has demonstrated willingness from time to time to put politics above other considerations when awarding arms contracts. 11. (C) Action Request: We request that the Department provide us background and talking points for the visit that we can share with the Turks by August 31. We would particularly appreciate talking points to encourage the Turks to talk from the same position the U.S. has on Georgia (including S. Ossetia, Abkhazia), Iran (especially nukes), Central Asia, Afghanistan, BMENA, Iraq, and energy issues (including Bosphorus bypass routes, tanker transit through the Straits, BTC). EDELMAN
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