US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2725

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MVR DEPUTIES ESPOUSE RECONCILIATION

Identifier: 04CARACAS2725
Wikileaks: View 04CARACAS2725 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Caracas
Created: 2004-08-27 12:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, VE 
SUBJECT: MVR DEPUTIES ESPOUSE RECONCILIATION 
 
 
Classified By: ACTING DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASON 1.5 D 
 
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Summary 
--------- 
 
1.  (C) Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) Deputies William Lara 
(Miranda) and Jose Khan (Caracas), told poloffs August 23 
that they hoped to devise a plan for reconciliation in the 
National Assembly.  Lara and Khan had avoided EMbassy contact 
for almost a year.  They also expressed objections to 
postponing the regional elections, and optimism about 
prospects for improving US-Venezuela relations.  The deputies 
were distrustful of the opposition and of the USG, which 
indicates the likely strict limits to any dialogue.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Reconciliation is possible. . . to an extent 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Poloffs met with Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) 
Deputies William Lara (Miranda) and Jose Khan (Caracas) 
August 23 to discuss the government's ideas about 
reconciliation with the opposition and the US Government, and 
to gain insight into the government's strategy for the 
regional elections.  Lara and Khan said that government 
legislators were hoping to devise a common legislative agenda 
with opposition deputies that could be used as the starting 
point for reconciliation.  The two examples they gave were 
the law that would regulate disbursement of federal funds to 
state and municipal governments, and the formation of the 
federal government council that would direct federally funded 
development projects nationwide.  To be able to reach this 
common ground, however, Khan said there would have to be an 
agreement on protocol rules for the National Assembly in 
which opposition deputies would agree not to filibuster or 
hinder the passage of bills within the Assembly.  In apparent 
contradiction to the possibility of reconciliation, Lara said 
there were other initiatives that the MVR knew it would have 
to push on its own, such as the appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), the media content law, and 
the national police law.  He also made clear the GOV would 
not/not negotiate with any opposition leaders who would not 
accept the results of the presidential referendum. 
 
--------------------- 
Plans for the future 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) When asked about the plan for deepening the 
revolution that President Hugo Chavez announced in his Alo 
Presidente program August 22 (septel), Khan explained that 
the government would begin investigating corruption charges 
lodged against government officials, including Chavez's 
cabinet members.  He said the party realized that one of the 
problems in implementing the 1999 Constitution was the 
rampant corruption that existed among those who had lost 
sight of the revolution.  The investigations would include a 
review of the social missions and their efficiency as well. 
(Comment: On August 25, Social Development Fund (FIDES) head 
Elias Jaua told the press he had asked the Fiscalia to 
investigate 10 of his staff for corruption.) 
 
------------------------------- 
No Delay in Regional Elections 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Turning to the regional elections, Lara was adamant 
that the regional elections be held 26 September as 
scheduled, unless a postponement was needed for technical 
reasons.  Lara argued the date should stand because the CNE 
does not have the legal authority to extend the terms of the 
governors and mayors in office.  In addition, Lara admitted, 
politically it would be more expedient for his party to hold 
elections to take advantage of the "coattail effect" produced 
in the wake of Chavez's victory.  Lara asserted with 
certainty that Coordinadora leader Governor Enrique Mendoza 
was finished politically and would be defeated by Diosdado 
Cabello in Miranda.  He said gubernatorial candidates Gen. 
 
(Ret.) Alberto Gutierrez (Zulia) and Gen. (Ret.) Luis Felipe 
Acosta Carles (Carabobo) would have tough races, given that 
the opposition incumbents can count on Chavista cross-over 
votes in their favor. 
 
-------------------- 
Bilateral Relations 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Lara and Khan expressed optimism that US-Venezuela 
relations would improve in the wake of the referendum, but 
alleged U.S. reluctance to recognize the results.  Both 
raised allegations that the CIA is conspiring to destabilize 
Venezuela.  Lara claimed former President Bush (sic) called 
President Chavez to congratulate him on his victory in the 
referendum, taking it as a positive sign that relations would 
improve.  Lara offered two areas for cooperation -- illegal 
drugs and terrorism -- and added that elements of the USG 
seem intent on impugning or at least not recognizing 
Venezuela's contributions.  Lara also recommended that the 
USG convince the opposition to drop its fraud allegations and 
accept the government's offer to dialogue. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) Lara had avoided contact with the U.S. Embassy for 
eight months, so we interpret his newfound interest in 
meeting poloffs as part of the GOV's post-referendum 
reassessment of bilateral relations.  The deputies' attitude 
toward the opposition raises doubts about the Chavistas' 
interest in a sincere give-and-take with the opposition. 
Their persistent suspicions about USG plotting in Venezuela 
indicates that while the GOV has turned down the volume on 
its criticism of the USG, it maintains its perspective. 
McFarland 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02725 - CONFIDENTIAL 

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