US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1714

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NEPAL: RPP PRESIDENT RANA ON THE COALITION, PEACE PLANS

Identifier: 04KATHMANDU1714
Wikileaks: View 04KATHMANDU1714 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2004-08-27 09:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PTER PINS IN NP Political Parties
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001714 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINS, IN, NP, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: RPP PRESIDENT RANA ON THE COALITION, PEACE 
PLANS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
======= 
SUMMARY 
======= 
 
1. (C) The coalition government was working together fairly 
well and was discussing modalities for an eventual peace 
process with the Maoists, RPP President Rana told the 
Ambassador on August 24.  Meanwhile, security cooperation 
between India and Nepal seemed to be improving, in Rana's 
view.  Finally, Rana was unphased by the plans of the four 
opposition parties to go back onto the streets of Kathmandu 
in protest against the coalition government. 
 
=================================== 
POSITIVE ABOUT THE COALITION, INDIA 
=================================== 
 
2. (C) Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) President Pashupati 
SJB Rana told the Ambassador on August 24 that the 
functioning of the coalition government was "not bad, 
actually."  After a rough few months of establishing working 
relationships, the four parties in the coalition were being 
fairly mutually supportive, especially considering the 
inherent limits of coalitions.  Having just returned from 
India where he had met with Indian National Security Advisor 
J.N. Dixit, Rana stated he had tried to "calm them (the 
Indians) down" about the blockade, although he feared he had 
been less than successful due to sensational media coverage. 
Meanwhile, the level of government-to-government cooperation 
between Nepal and India was clearly improving, and positive 
results on the security front were evident. 
 
======================== 
PEACE TALK POSSIBILITIES 
======================== 
 
   3. (C) The Maoists had made clear to each of the coalition 
partners that they wanted to talk, Rana stated, but had been 
thus far unwilling to do enough to engender real confidence 
among the coalition that they were serious.  Explaining that 
the government did not want to jump too quickly into 
negotiations, Rana stated that the coalition partners were 
deciding on possible venues, negotiation procedures and 
desired outcomes for the talks.  No decision had been made, 
but it seemed possible that the "talks with the Maoists about 
the talks" could take place in Nepal.  At the same time, 
there was a great deal of public pressure for "peace at any 
price," Rana stated, but a real peace process with a 
productive outcome would take time.  Thus, while the 
negotiations would need to stay confidential to keep public 
diatribes by either side from derailing the process, the 
sides would also have to agree on what to tell the media to 
minimize speculation and to feed the public's desire for 
progress. 
 
4. (C) Rana explained that he believed the government should 
go into talks willing to put anything on the table, including 
a constituent assembly.  However, he pointed out, to have a 
constituent assembly (to draft a new constitution), there 
would have to be free and fair elections.  For free and fair 
elections to take place the Maoists would have to give up 
their arms.  Nothing was as simple as it appeared. 
 
================== 
THE OTHER PARTIES? 
================== 
 
5. (C) Turning to the announcement that the four opposition 
parties (including Koirala's Nepali Congress) planned to 
resume the "anti-regression" agitation, Rana speculated that 
the new protests would largely fail.  Most significantly, the 
parties would have a difficult time bringing out many 
supporters without the CPN-UML and its cadres in tow. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain protests against 
the government during the "blockade" of Kathmandu.  When the 
Ambassador mentioned that it seemed some of Koirala's central 
committee members were starting to question their President's 
leadership, Rana agreed there was dissent in the NC party, 
but thought it would take a major event to overcome Koirala's 
"monolithic grip" on his party. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
6. (C)  Rana heads one of the smaller coalition partners, and 
faces some internal challenges of his own within his party. 
However, the Oxford-trained politician is an insightful and 
reasonable interlocutor. Moreover, his party's traditionally 
conservative position in Nepali politics make it an important 
canary in the coalition to measure the likely reaction of the 
palace to government initiatives.  END COMMENT. 
MORIARTY 

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