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| Identifier: | 04KATHMANDU1714 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04KATHMANDU1714 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kathmandu |
| Created: | 2004-08-27 09:57:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL PTER PINS IN NP Political Parties |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001714 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINS, IN, NP, Political Parties SUBJECT: NEPAL: RPP PRESIDENT RANA ON THE COALITION, PEACE PLANS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ======= SUMMARY ======= 1. (C) The coalition government was working together fairly well and was discussing modalities for an eventual peace process with the Maoists, RPP President Rana told the Ambassador on August 24. Meanwhile, security cooperation between India and Nepal seemed to be improving, in Rana's view. Finally, Rana was unphased by the plans of the four opposition parties to go back onto the streets of Kathmandu in protest against the coalition government. =================================== POSITIVE ABOUT THE COALITION, INDIA =================================== 2. (C) Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) President Pashupati SJB Rana told the Ambassador on August 24 that the functioning of the coalition government was "not bad, actually." After a rough few months of establishing working relationships, the four parties in the coalition were being fairly mutually supportive, especially considering the inherent limits of coalitions. Having just returned from India where he had met with Indian National Security Advisor J.N. Dixit, Rana stated he had tried to "calm them (the Indians) down" about the blockade, although he feared he had been less than successful due to sensational media coverage. Meanwhile, the level of government-to-government cooperation between Nepal and India was clearly improving, and positive results on the security front were evident. ======================== PEACE TALK POSSIBILITIES ======================== 3. (C) The Maoists had made clear to each of the coalition partners that they wanted to talk, Rana stated, but had been thus far unwilling to do enough to engender real confidence among the coalition that they were serious. Explaining that the government did not want to jump too quickly into negotiations, Rana stated that the coalition partners were deciding on possible venues, negotiation procedures and desired outcomes for the talks. No decision had been made, but it seemed possible that the "talks with the Maoists about the talks" could take place in Nepal. At the same time, there was a great deal of public pressure for "peace at any price," Rana stated, but a real peace process with a productive outcome would take time. Thus, while the negotiations would need to stay confidential to keep public diatribes by either side from derailing the process, the sides would also have to agree on what to tell the media to minimize speculation and to feed the public's desire for progress. 4. (C) Rana explained that he believed the government should go into talks willing to put anything on the table, including a constituent assembly. However, he pointed out, to have a constituent assembly (to draft a new constitution), there would have to be free and fair elections. For free and fair elections to take place the Maoists would have to give up their arms. Nothing was as simple as it appeared. ================== THE OTHER PARTIES? ================== 5. (C) Turning to the announcement that the four opposition parties (including Koirala's Nepali Congress) planned to resume the "anti-regression" agitation, Rana speculated that the new protests would largely fail. Most significantly, the parties would have a difficult time bringing out many supporters without the CPN-UML and its cadres in tow. Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain protests against the government during the "blockade" of Kathmandu. When the Ambassador mentioned that it seemed some of Koirala's central committee members were starting to question their President's leadership, Rana agreed there was dissent in the NC party, but thought it would take a major event to overcome Koirala's "monolithic grip" on his party. ======= COMMENT ======= 6. (C) Rana heads one of the smaller coalition partners, and faces some internal challenges of his own within his party. However, the Oxford-trained politician is an insightful and reasonable interlocutor. Moreover, his party's traditionally conservative position in Nepali politics make it an important canary in the coalition to measure the likely reaction of the palace to government initiatives. END COMMENT. MORIARTY
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