US embassy cable - 04AMMAN7199

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN REACTION TO EVENTS IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 6173 
     B. AMMAN 6968 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Strong GOJ backing for the  Iraqi Interim 
Government (IIG) continues, but the GOJ has yet to comment 
publicly on the situation in Najaf or the new Iraqi Interim 
National Council (IINC).  The Najaf situation draws 
significant negative attention here.  End Summary. 
 
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NAJAF STIRS JORDANIAN EMOTIONS 
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2. (C) The Najaf fighting is a leading topic of conversation 
among Jordanians (though still not as prominent a concern as 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.) The U.S. is the prime 
target of Jordanians' criticism for the violence in Najaf, 
although many question Sadr's motivations for holing up in 
the Imam Ali mosque.  Some PA contacts see him as an 
opportunist who is riding a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment for 
his own political gain.  Voicing a view that we hear often 
from the Jordanian regime, one Interior Ministry official who 
covers human rights argues that, as much as Sunnis dislike 
Shia's, many Jordanians see Sadr as a courageous figure 
because he is standing up to U.S. forces. 
 
3. (C) However, there is nervousness about the potential 
fallout of a military response to Sadr.  Palestinian 
political activist Jamal Rifai said the uprising in Najaf 
should be ended immediately or else more "Moqtada Al Sadrs" 
would challenge IIG authority.  Dr. Ibrahim Badran, Director 
of the International Relations Department at Philadelphia 
University, told poloff that Iraqi forces need to be--out in 
front--where the Arab media could see them.  He feared that 
resorting to military action against Sadr risked further 
mobilizing the Shi'a population and creating larger problems 
down the road, particularly if greater care was not taken to 
protect the civilian population and the holy sites in Najaf. 
The specter of an Iraq dominated by radical Shi'a is at the 
back of most Jordanians, concerns over the future of their 
eastern neighbor. 
 
4. (C) The Jordanian government has yet to comment on the 
situation in Najaf, but the local press has given the 
conflict prominent--and usually anti-U.S.-- coverage over the 
past week.  One recent press report admiringly characterized 
Moqtada al-Sadr as a "phantom," inspiring Shi'a fighters in 
Najaf, while another portrayed Sadr's fighters as 
"impassioned" and "organized," legitimately resisting a 
"Christian crusade."  A recent press commentary in Al 
Ghadd--a new, independent daily trying to win mass 
appeal--contrasted him favorably with Sistani and the other 
Shi'a leaders, who are accused of being opportunists -- those 
in bed with the CPA previously -- and cut off from the Shi'a 
street.  Meanwhile, some debated the legitimacy of the 
"resistance."  One Islamic advice columnist in al Ghadd 
advised a "troubled Iraqi reader" that while it was wrong for 
resistance fighters to kill fellow Iraqis because it could 
lead to civil war, the coalition forces were legitimate 
targets as occupiers. 
 
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IRAQI COUNCIL, ALLAWI GET MIXED REVIEWS 
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5. (U) The GOJ has publicly expressed support for the new 
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), particularly during Iraqi PM 
Allawi's July visit (ref A), but has yet to publicly comment 
on the new Iraqi Interim National Council (IINC).  Meanwhile, 
press coverage and popular reaction to the Iraqi government, 
Prime Minister Allawi, and the IINC coverage has been less 
emotional, but decidedly mixed and tied to developments in 
Najaf.  One op-ed said Allawi missed the "chance of a 
lifetime" to prove he was independent by declaring his 
opposition to the attack on Najaf and asking MNF forces to 
withdraw.  One editorial praised the recently held Iraqi 
National Conference for representing an "Iraqi consensus" and 
called for support for new Iraqi political institutions. 
Another editorial questioned efforts of the conference, 
characterizing it as an empty democracy that did not include 
opposing views, Arab parties, and representatives of Shi'ite 
and Sunni trends. 
 
6. (C) On the IIG, many of our contacts outside the 
government view PM Allawi as a CIA tool with no independence 
from the U.S., and see little difference between the status 
of Iraq before and after the June 28 handover.  Some 
Jordanians take a more nuanced view.  Palestinian reformist 
Oreib al-Rintawi, Director of the al-Quds Research Center, is 
optimistic about the situation in Iraq.  He believes that 
Allawi was a good choice to lead the interim government for 
now, and it was the right decision to respond with force to 
Sadr's intransigence and unwillingness to disarm.  He 
suggested that it is important now to make an example of the 
militants in part to discourage other like-minded insurgents 
from similar activity.  Hamadeh Faraneh, a former MP and a 
leftist columnist close to the Palestinian authority, also 
expressed optimism that the new Iraqi government was on the 
right track, but he dismissed "paranoia" among some Jordanian 
quarters about a rising Shi'a and/or Iranian influence in 
Iraq. 
 
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IRAQIS IN JORDAN WORRY ABOUT NAJAF'S OUTCOME 
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7. (C) Our Iraqi contacts in Jordan--mostly secular 
businessmen from both the Sunni and Shi'a communities--voice 
support for Iraqi PM Allawi and said the Shi'a resistance in 
Najaf needed to be put down immediately.  They have expressed 
fear, however, that if the Imam Ali Mosque or other holy 
places are destroyed in the process, there would be a wave of 
Shi'a reaction against/against Sadr -- for going in there in 
the first place -- as well as against the U.S.  Many have 
characterized Sadr as an opportunist, who is "uneducated" and 
unqualified to be a real Shi'a leader.  That said, former 
Iraqi Minister for Oil Issam Chalabi said PM Allawi should 
have done more to bring Sadr into the political process (ref 
B). 
 
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COMMENT 
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8. (C) Because opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq 
was so widespread here, any course the U.S. and its Iraqi 
partners take is criticized.  A military solution to the Sadr 
insurgency will of course be highly unpopular here, 
especially if it provides gruesome TV footage.  But 
appeasement of Sadr would leave many Jordanians quite uneasy 
as well.  Even thoroughly secular Shi'a, like Allawi, evoke 
suspicion among Jordanians inside and outside government.  If 
a conversation in Amman about Iraqi Shi'a lasts long enough, 
racist, anti-shi'a bigotry usually surfaces. 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
 
 
 
 
 
HALE