US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2138

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INFORMAL EU FOREIGN MINSTERS MEETING (GYMNICH), SEP 3-4: DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE2138
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE2138 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-08-26 15:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL NL EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: INFORMAL EU FOREIGN MINSTERS MEETING (GYMNICH), 
SEP 3-4:  DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 182534 
     B. (B) THE HAGUE 02074 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS A. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  MFA Political Affairs Department Director 
Jaap Werner told emboffs that although the Gymnich agenda 
must remain open until very shortly before the meeting, he 
expects that it will cover ASEM, the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, 
the Balkans, and the Sudan.  On ASEM the Dutch are looking 
for a compromise solution that will combine lower level 
Burmese participation with positive human rights action by 
the Burmese and possible additional EU sanctions on Burma. 
At the Gymnich the Foreign Ministers will discuss the state 
of play and the EU bottom line, but Werner continued to 
indicate strong EU interest in the ASEM taking place.  The 
Middle East discussion will probably result in further EU 
urging of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and possibly something 
on settlements.  The Dutch may also use the occasion to 
discuss the Forum for the Future bilaterally with key FMs. 
On Iraq the focus will be a response to the Annan letter on 
financing for a UN protection force.  On Iran the Ministers 
will be briefed by the "EU-3" on their conclusions.  The 
Balkans discussion will be about the status of EU partnership 
efforts in the region.  Discussion of the Sudan will depend 
on the assessment of the situation there at that point. 
Turkey and the China arms embargo are not on the formal 
agenda, but the Dutch intend to use the occasion to probe for 
the degree of member state commitment to lifting the arms 
embargo. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) PolCouns and Poloff met with Werner on 26 August to 
discuss the EU's Sept 3-4 Gymnich using reftel A 
instructions.  Werner said that the agenda for the subject 
meeting is generally known but still subject to chance 
depending on events.  Polcouns made the points in reftel A at 
appropriate times in the discussion. 
 
ASEM 
---- 
 
3. (C) The EU's assembled Foreign Ministers will hear a 
report from Dutch Presidency Special Envoy Van den Broek on 
his visits and contacts with Asian and European governments 
concerning the issue of Burmese attendance at the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), scheduled for October 8-9.  The Dutch are 
looking for a compromise that will be a "package" of elements 
to include some or all of (a) lower level Burmese 
participation (minister or lower), (b) strengthening EU 
sanctions on Burma to assure that a message of continuing 
disapproval is sent, (c) discussion of Burmese human rights 
performance at the ASEM, and (d) some significant Burmese 
action demonstrating progress, such as the release from house 
arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi.  Asian governments are adamant 
about Burmese participation and are being told that they have 
to help by putting pressure on the Burmese to take such a 
step prior to the ASEM. 
 
4. (C) Werner clearly indicated that the ASEM is likely to 
come off, however much of the package is successfully 
assembled.  It would be "disastrous for EU-Asia relations," 
he said, if the meeting were canceled.  Those EU governments 
with the strongest domestic pressure to be stern with the 
Burmese -- UK, Netherlands and Denmark -- all seem to be 
moving toward making the summit possible (the UK at least 
partly because PM Blair does not plan to attend and therefore 
would not have to be seen at the same table anyway). 
 
Middle East/Forum for the Future 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Werner did not believe that discussion of the Middle 
East would take up much time at the Gymnich, mainly because 
there are few perceived openings for EU involvement in the 
region and no new ideas for EU action on the table for 
discussion.  A statement might include something about urging 
follow-through on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and perhaps 
something on the settlements. 
 
6. (C) Werner said that the Dutch may use the FM gathering to 
explore positions on the Forum for the Future and the 
possibility of The Netherlands hosting the event.  The Dutch 
remain unsure of the degree of EU member state support for 
the Forum, though Werner admitted it would be odd for the big 
member states also at the G-8 to now try to disassociate from 
the process.  A visit to The Hague next week by French FM 
Barnier provides a good occasion to discuss the Forum. 
(Werner said it would be very useful to have a US response to 
the concerns about the Forum raised by FM Bot with Ambassador 
Sobel (ref B) prior to these discussions.)  He responded very 
positively to the possibility of Moroccan co-sponsorship of 
an event in The Hague, noting that this would be add an 
additional point in favor of hosting. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
6. (C) The EU's "exploratory mission" to Iraq (headed by MFA 
Deputy Political Director Hermann Schaaper) will report its 
findings to the Gymnich.  Werner hopes the FMs will endorse 
whatever the results of that mission are and perhaps have 
some Commission proposals on the table to consider as well. 
He cautioned that the EU would probably not be able to take 
concrete actions until October or November, however.  He 
admitted that the Commission has been difficult on this 
issue, partly because of the timing coincident with a 
lame-duck Commission, but also because of tensions between 
the Council Secretariat and the Commission as the EU's 
foreign relations structure undergoes change. 
 
7. (C) Ministers will discuss funding for the UN protection 
force in Iraq. The Gymnich may agree on a reply to the Annan 
letter requesting funds, though Werner was not sure that 
member states will have prepared themselves for that in time. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
8. (C) The "EU-3" (UK, German, France) will brief the FMs on 
their discussions with Iran regarding its nuclear program. 
Werner does not know what they will say, and described the 
EU-3 as "secretive" about their interaction with Iran to 
date.  He wondered if the EU-3 themselves are having trouble 
reaching a consensus about conclusions and recommendations. 
If they have indeed reached a dead end, he suggested, the 
EU-3 might be considering whether it was time to return the 
whole problem to the EU. 
 
9. (C) In any case Werner expected the Gymnich to agree on a 
strong message urging Iran to meet its commitments.  He asked 
for further details on the US position, e.g., what time line 
does "as soon as possible" (para 8 ref A) imply, and what 
should be the result of the September IAEA Board meeting. 
 
Balkans 
------- 
 
10. (C) Ministers will be briefed on the status of the 
Serbia-Montenegro stability agreement negotiations, which 
have encountered difficulties with different conditions in 
Serbia vs. Montenegro.  The agreement must deal with this 
without implying any signal of separation.  Discussion will 
probably not be at the level of the issues raised in ref A. 
On Kosovo the Ministers will discuss the status of the 
Standards process, which Werner agreed is important to the 
long-term project of integrating Kosovo into European 
institutions. 
 
Sudan 
----- 
 
11. (C) Ministers will make an assessment of the situation. 
Werner noted that the Gymnich timing is fortunate, coming 
just after the UN assessment and just before the UN 
discussion of next steps.  The EU expects a mixed assessment, 
progress on some fronts, not on others.  FM Bot will visit 
Khartoum after the Gymnich but before the regular Sep GAERC 
on Sep. 13-14. 
 
Other issues 
------------ 
 
12. (C) The China arms embargo is not expected to be on the 
agenda.  Werner confirmed Bot's indication ref B of some 
movement on the issue.  The Dutch will use the occasion for 
bilateral informal discussions to assess how strongly France 
and others are attached to lifting the embargo as soon as 
possible.  The US message has been heard, though, and 
although the EU member states generally want to get rid of 
the embargo, whether it is done in December "depends (to some 
extent) on the amount of collateral damage it would cause." 
The success of the summit is still a major consideration: 
the lifting of the embargo was to have been a "present" for 
the Chinese, and if that is not available, some other present 
will have to be found. 
 
13. (C) Turkey also will not be discussed.  It is, Werner 
said, "too soon" with the Commission report not due until 
October.  The Dutch intend to follow the process step by 
step, waiting for the report, reacting to the report after it 
is issued, making the decision in December. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RUSSEL 

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