US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1705

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR GREEN/DORMANDY 
STATE FOR P, D, AND SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, PGOV, NP, IN, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NSC OFFICIAL ON THE MAOIST INSURGENCY, ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge Elisabeth I. Millard, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
 Summary 
------------ 
 
1.  (C) The Maoist overall objective is the creation of a 
single-party "People's Republic" in Nepal, according to Major 
General Kul Bahadur Khadka, co-coordinator of Nepal's 
National Security Council.  Khadka told the Ambassador on 
August 24 that the Maoist leadership would be willing to 
achieve that objective by entering the political mainstream, 
if their ultimate success were assured and if they did not 
have to surrender all their weapons.  Khadka thought the GOI 
was being more helpful with respect to the insurgency, but 
hoped New Delhi would arrest more Maoist leaders.  He thanked 
the U.S. profusely for security assistance to date, but noted 
that Nepal needed more.  Finally, he raised concerns 
regarding the government's ability to conduct successful 
elections at this time.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) General Khadka serves as co-coordinator of Nepal's 
National Security Council.  The NSC in turn serves as a 
think-tank on security, political and economic affairs for 
Nepal's National Security Committee, which consists of the 
Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army 
Staff (COAS).  (Note: Prime Minister Deuba also serves as the 
Defense Minister.  End Note.)  The National Security Council 
also prepares tactical intelligence summaries from all 
relevant agencies and distributes them twice daily through 
the PM and the COAS. 
 
The Maoists and Their Objectives 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) General Khadka began by stating that the Maoists have 
9-10,000 armed guerilla fighters.  In addition, the Maoists 
have perhaps 25,000 militia and 75,000 political cadres. 
Their ultimate objective, according to Khadka, is the 
establishment of a single party Communist People's Republic. 
To achieve that goal, Khadka continued, the Maoists were 
attempting to disrupt and terrorize the regime and people at 
large and to organize their own armed elements.  A major part 
of their efforts focused on collecting necessary funds 
through extortion, and occasionally, outright robbery. 
 
4.  (C) Khadka noted that the Maoist leadership would like to 
achieve the establishment of a single-party communist 
republic by coming into the political mainstream.  They 
realized that staying in the jungle would probably lead 
nowhere.  Unfortunately, it was unlikely that a majority of 
the armed militants shared these views.  Most of the actual 
Maoist fighters were not educated and they would have no 
future without their weapons.  Indeed, even if peace talks 
succeeded, many of the militants would presumably try to 
retain their weapons. 
 
5.  (C) Khadka believed that the Maoist leadership would be 
willing to implement a long-term plan to achieve power.  This 
would involve initially coming into the government and then 
contesting elections to try to get a majority in the 
Parliament.  The Maoists would also insist, however, on 
keeping a certain amount of weapons to improve their 
prospects at the polls.  Interestingly, Khadka thought the 
Maoist leadership unimpressive;  Prachanda had been elevated 
mostly because of a lack of anyone more charismatic, and 
Bhattarai was brilliant but clearly very erratic. 
 
Peace Talks 
-------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Government was moving ahead with preparations for 
peace talks and had already established a Peace Committee (a 
body of political leaders) and would soon establish a Peace 
Secretariat, Khadka said.  Nevertheless, the Maoists did not 
 
SIPDIS 
appear ready for serious talks at this time. 
 
The International Environment 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Gen. Khadka conceded that New Delhi was adopting a 
more helpful attitude with respect to the Maoist insurgency. 
Nevertheless, the open border with India remained a serious 
problem and arms smuggling was occurring on a regular basis. 
"With money you can buy anything in India, and the Maoists 
have money," Khadka said.  Khadka also pointed out that 
India's federal system made it absolutely essential that the 
GON work closely with the governments of the bordering Indian 
states.  He added that, while new Indian Foreign Secretary 
Saran understood Nepal well and would be very helpful, 
National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit was a devious man who 
could prove problematic.  Khadka also felt that the Indian 
government could be doing more to arrest Maoist leaders 
resident in India.  Nepal's northern neighbor, China, was by 
and large helpful on the insurgency and did not appear to 
seek an active role in Nepal. 
 
US Assistance 
------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Khadka saluted U.S. military assistance to date, 
noting that the M-16's, night vision goggles and body armor 
were all making a big difference in the field.  "Your 
assistance to date has been great but unfortunately we need 
more,"  Khadka said.  He cited the difficulties of fighting 
an insurgency with only 75,000 RNA troops, particularly in 
light of Nepal's difficult topography and the RNA's limited 
mobility. 
Elections 
----------- 
 
9.  (C) Khadka confirmed that PM Deuba was obviously 
interested in moving ahead with parliamentary elections, 
perhaps beginning in April, even in the absence of any 
agreement with the Maoists.  Khadka noted that he had advised 
the PM that, if the elections were held on a phased basis 
with the army moving from one area of the country to another 
to provide security, the RNA could ensure that the actual 
balloting went off in a fairly safe environment.  While it 
would be more difficult, the army could also probably provide 
security for candidates in the run-up to the election in 
given areas.  However, since the army would be rotating out 
to new areas by phase, it would not be able to provide 
security for voters after the election.  The Maoists 
presumably would do everything possible to disrupt the 
elections, including intimidation, and therefore the turnout 
could be very low and there could be a large spike in 
violence and killing in the countryside.  Khadka worried that 
the credibility of elections under such circumstances could 
be questioned. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
10.  (C) Khadka's observations on the state of the insurgency 
are obviously well informed and strike us as fairly 
reasonable.  The Maoists face the problem of turning their 
growing influence in the countryside into anything resembling 
real political power.  Presumably, the Maoist leadership at 
least will be interested in examining any plan that allows 
them to achieve power by entering the political mainstream. 
Khadka is also correct in pointing out the difficulties the 
government will face if it decides to move ahead with 
elections.  We are reporting septel our conversation with the 
Election Commissioner on this topic. 
MILLARD