US embassy cable - 04HARARE1423

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: A FEW FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 
 
 1. (C) Rather than reiterate previous analyses, I shall 
offer a few closing reflections in shorthand form. 
 
-- The  situation in Zimbabwe today is best defined as a 
"FROZEN TRANSITION," a political crisis whose lack of 
resolution affects and deepens all of Zimbabwe's other 
crises, economic, social, and humanitarian. Notwithstanding 
this fact, 80-year old Robert Mugabe is probably more 
entrenched than he has been in several years and is unlikely 
to be dislodged by pressure or persuasion from the West, 
African governments, the Zimbabwean opposition or population, 
or his own colleagues and support structure.  While there is 
certainly competition within ZANU-PF, Mugabe has taken none 
of the steps he could to facilitate an orderly transition, 
thereby ensuring substantial uncertainty and perhaps 
instability in the event of his sudden death or serious 
illness. 
 
-- Mugabe is not dotty; he pays attention to those things he 
chooses to focus on and pretends not to see those things he 
does not want to.  He is driven less by money than by vanity 
and fear of the consequences of "dismounting from the tiger 
he is riding." He remains a skilled politician and uses all 
means, fair and foul, to stay in power at all costs.  His 
unrivaled and unquestioned power within ZANU-PF sucks the 
oxygen out of the party, which remains largely a 
self-absorbed, paralyzed institution incapable of addressing, 
or even debating the nation's myriad real problems. 
 
-- Mugabe, the state security apparatus and ZANU-PF's 
instruments of repression and intimidation have succeeded for 
now in convincing the public once again that there is no 
alternative to Mugabe's rule and that they will be given no 
opportunity to choose a different future. In the face of 
these multiple pressures, most Zimbabweans have opted for 
submission, emigration or waiting until Mugabe dies. Unless 
political space reopens substantially, most Zimbabweans seem 
unwilling to take the risks of opposition politics or mass 
action. 
 
-- The political opposition is down, but not out.  The MDC 
still reflects the will of many, and probably most 
Zimbabweans if they thought their choice was free and could 
matter. Next year's parliamentary elections provide the MDC a 
better opportunity to preserve some strength than recent 
by-elections where ZANU-PF has been able to address all its 
attention to individual constituency by-elections.  The MDC 
has done well to hold together under the pressure of state 
repression, infiltration and intimidation, but it faces new 
and difficult challenges to maintain itself and stay united 
for the long haul since its prospects are dim of coming to 
power or even being allowed to exercise the shares of power 
it has won in the parliament, mayoralties and municipal 
councils. 
 
-- Because Mugabe is only focused on remaining in power and 
has learned that he can withstand sanctions, isolation and 
even sharp economic decline, the Mugabe Regime will continue 
to defy criticism from the West and seek to capitalize 
domestically and in Africa by playing the nationalist and 
anti-imperialist cards. The GOZ is also facing increased 
criticism from within Africa, although most is expressed in 
private or in polite terms.  The Regime appears willing to do 
battle with its critics, even in Africa, as witness state 
media critiques of Nigeria and other West Africans deemed to 
have been unsupportive and regular tirades against Botswana. 
Mugabe's reliance on backing from fellow Africans is an 
increasingly most vulnerable area, however, and would be even 
more important if the South African Government were willing 
to take a stronger stand in favor of crisis resolution. 
 
-- Mugabe shows little interest in re-engagement with the 
West on other than his own terms and Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
radicals seem inclined to run the 2005 parliamentary 
elections as a referendum against Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
a clear indication of the absence of any substantive campaign 
theme. Others in ZANU-PF, Reserve Bank Governor Gono and even 
the Armed Forces have expressed interest in reengagement 
because of their frustration over their exclusion from 
traditional Western cooperation. Accordingly, avoiding direct 
confrontation and focusing our attention on what the GOZ must 
do on election reform for positive reengagement are useful 
messages for regional leaders and also for the more moderate 
voices in ZANU-PF. 
 
-- HIV and AIDS remain an enormous crisis for Zimbabwe's 
present and future, aggravated by Zimbabwe's economic crisis, 
food deficit, emigration of health professionals and decline 
of the health system and by Zimbabwe's political leadership's 
diminished ability to lead the nation.  Nonetheless, Zimbabwe 
has some advantages in a still adequate and reasonably 
dispersed health system and those talented health 
professionals who do remain in country, as well as a populace 
which is used to reasonably good health care and might 
respond well if outside financing was available to provide 
substantial treatment to HIV and AIDS victims. 
 
-- Food shortages are somewhat less than in the past several 
years, but still loom as a major threat in the months ahead 
to the most vulnerable Zimbabweans.  Yet GOZ insistence that 
Zimbabwe has produced a bumper harvest as a result of the 
land redistribution program and GOZ refusal to request 
assistance threatens the lives of many Zimbabweans within 
several months.  It is not sufficient for us to say we will 
not allow hunger when we do not have the means to assist and 
would likely take several months to deliver food, should the 
GOZ belatedly make a request.  Instead, I urge that we be 
pro-active in forcing a report by UN agencies (WFP and FAO) 
to the UNSC Security Council in an effort to stimulate a GOZ 
request, or alternatively, identify where responsibility lies 
for upcoming food shortages. 
 
-- Emigration is the under-estimated phenomenon in Zimbabwe's 
crisis in a country that had very little emigration of its 
black population from 1980 until very recently. Now, however, 
as many as a quarter of Zimbabwe's population is living 
outside the country, relieving somewhat the burden on 
Zimbabwe's shrinking economy and sending home remittances to 
sustain their families in Zimbabwe, but also representing an 
enormous millstone around Zimbabwe's future. Sixty per cent 
of accountants, 80 per cent of medical school graduates, most 
experienced agronomists, many of the country's best judges 
and human rights lawyers are emigrating. How many or how few 
return depends on how long the crisis persists and on a 
return to positive economic and political prospects.  And if 
these emigrants do not return, Zimbabwe's recovery will be 
that much more difficult. 
 
2. Conclusions: The above depressing picture coincides with 
the national mood of depression, which in turn contrasts 
sharply with the excessive optimism that most black and white 
Zimbabweans exhibited several years ago.  Unfortunately, 
everything still seems to depend on Mugabe, and how short or 
long Zimbabwe's national crisis lasts likely depends on how 
long Mugabe insists on staying in unfettered control. And how 
rapid and complete a recovery can be depends on how much 
longer Zimbabwe's national crisis persists.  Zimbabwe's own 
population has mostly opted to flee rather than fight; 
Zimbabwe's near neighbors appear to hold the best prospect 
for avoiding indefinite prolongation of Zimbabwe's national 
agony.  I urge that we engage deeply and creatively with 
Southern African Governments to help find a way forward. 
 
SULLIVAN