US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT2747

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 002747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, EAID, MARR, PGOV, KU, IZ 
SUBJECT: GOK CONCERNED WITH TONE OF DISCUSSIONS OVER AIK 
FUEL FOR IRAQ 
 
REF: A. BERNS-TUELLER EMAIL 08/21/04 
     B. 03 KUWAIT 5540 
     C. KUWAIT 127 
     D. KUWAIT 130 
     E. KUWAIT 243 
     F. KUWAIT 379 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller, Reasons 1.4(a), 
(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Following A/S Bloomfield and PDASD Flory's 
August 20 meeting in Washington with the Kuwaiti Charge 
concerning the GOK's decision to suspend assistance-in-kind 
(AIK) fuel for operations in Iraq effective September 4 in 
the absence of a formal contract, Acting Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Minister of Information Mohammed Abulhassan 
summoned CDA on August 23 to voice a number of concerns. 
First, Abulhassan objected to the implied threat that 
Kuwait's termination of free fuel for Iraq would harm the 
US-Kuwaiti relationship.  Second, he took issue with the US 
side's "constant references" to Congress and the warning that 
the GOK's decision to stop supplying OIF fuel would lead 
Congress to believe that Kuwait had not helped with OIF. 
Third, the Minister was critical of the suggestion that 
Kuwait,s major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status would be 
jeopardized by the fuel issue. CDA hoped the GOK would allow 
experts to work out a contract, but leave the price open for 
future discussions at the political level.   END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of 
Information Mohammed Abulhassan summoned CDA on August 23 to 
follow up on A/S Bloomfield and PDASD Flory's August 20 
meeting with Kuwait's Charge d'Affaires Ahmad Razouqi. 
Abulhassan began by stressing that the US-Kuwait relationship 
is one that Kuwait values highly, and is strong enough to 
weather differences of opinion.  He professed surprise that 
the U.S. had "hammered" Kuwaiti CDA Razouqi on the effect 
that Kuwait's proposed termination of free fuel for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would have on the US-Kuwait bilateral 
relationship, which he said Kuwait has worked to strengthen 
for forty years. 
 
3.  (C) Abulhassan said that the language used in the meeting 
"caused concern" within the Government of Kuwait (GOK), 
specifically in three areas.  First was the implied threat 
that Kuwait's termination of free fuel for Iraq would harm 
the US-Kuwaiti relationship.  (Later in the meeting, 
Abulhassan pointedly remarked that although Kuwait has seen 
little progress on access to or repatriation of its nationals 
detained at Guantanamo Bay -- an issue that he characterized 
as "very important" to Kuwait, and a source of constant 
tension between the government and the National Assembly -- 
Kuwait never threatened that it would affect the bilateral 
relationship with the US.) 
 
4.  (C) Second, he took issue with the US side's "constant 
references" to Congress and the warning that the GOK's 
decision to stop supplying AIK fuel would lead Congress to 
believe that Kuwait had not helped with OIF.  "We have given 
the whole of Kuwait for the liberation of Iraq while the 
entire Arab world was against us," Abulhassan stressed, 
"because we believe in your operation."  He continued by 
saying that "every day, we demonstrate our commitment," 
citing present and future access to Kuwait,s ports and 
airport.  Within this broader context, Abulhassan said, the 
fuel dispute is a small matter.   Furthermore, he complained, 
the reaction of Kuwait's National Assembly to the fuel deal 
had not been taken into consideration.  He pointed out that 
the National Assembly had recently excoriated the government 
for Kuwait's comparatively small assistance package for 
Jordan, and warned that if the USG thought that the GOK could 
ignore the National Assembly, we would need to think again. 
 
5.  (C) Third, the Minister objected to the suggestion that 
Kuwait,s major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status would be 
jeopardized by the fuel issue, which he said was not even 
relevant to MNNA.  The Minister openly wondered if the same 
"yardstick" was being used to measure other MNNA countries' 
cooperation. 
 
6.  (C) CDA agreed that the OIF fuel issue should not affect 
the bilateral relationship; however, our mutual vital 
interests in Iraq could be badly affected if fuel was 
interrupted.  CDA hoped the GOK would allow experts to work 
out a contract, but leave the price open for future 
discussions at the political level.   (Ambassador Khalid 
Al-Babtain, the head of MFA's Americas Desk, later said that 
he hoped the US would not leave a blank in the contract.) 
The Minister was not prepared to discuss the technical 
details, but stressed that the GOK oil sector is concerned 
with the "non-clarity" of the US position.  He claimed that 
the US plans everything years in advance, and the GOK 
therefore could not understand why the US could not be 
specific about its fuel needs.  For its part, he emphasized, 
the GOK could not go any further without planning and a 
contract. 
 
7.  (S) CDA asked that a clear distinction be made between 
fuel for forces in Iraq and fuel to be used by U.S. forces in 
Kuwait under the Defense Cooperative Agreement (DCA). 
Abulhassan confirmed that this distinction was clear.  The 
Minister said that the GOK has analyzed the DCA, and found 
that it does not/not support the provision of fuel for Iraq. 
For this reason, he added, the GOK needed to enter into a 
separate agreement with the US so that they could continue 
supplying fuel for use in Iraq.   The Minister then inquired 
about agreements that neighboring countries (Qatar 
specifically) had with the US to provide fuel for Iraq 
operations.  CDA replied that he believed Kuwait was the main 
supplier. 
 
8.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
TUELLER