US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1590

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2014 
TAGS: ECIN, ECON, EINV, ETRD, EWWT, PREL, SENV, CG 
SUBJECT: AFRICAN CANAL A PIPE(LINE) DREAM 
 
 
Classified By: Econoff Peter Newman for reasons 1.5b/d. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The DRC Ministry of Energy reported that a 
regional delegation with strong backing from Nigerian 
President Obasanjo visited Kinshasa to discuss a proposed 
canal linking the Congo River with Lake Chad.  Involved 
parties include Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, 
Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, and Libya. 
The project is politically and economically impractical, but 
various GDRC officals may be entertaining the proposal in 
attempts to garner regional support.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On August 19 Econoffs met with a high ranking official 
of the Ministry of Energy to discuss matters relating to 
electrical power and foreign direct investment in the DRC. 
The official instead steered the conversation towards recent 
meetings between the GDRC and a foreign delegation known as 
the Lake Chad Commission (LCC). 
 
3. (C) The LCC is composed of Ministry of Energy officials 
and MPs from Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.  On August 
10, 2004, the LCC came to Kinshasa aboard Nigerian President 
Obasanjo's private aircraft for meetings with the DRC 
Minister of Energy.  The LCC is seeking GDRC approval for the 
construction of a canal from the Ubangi River to Lake Chad. 
(Note.  The Ubangi River on the border between the DRC's 
Equateur province, Congo-Brazzaville, and the Central African 
Republic is the major northern branch of the Congo River. 
Lake Chad lies on the border between Chad and Cameroon, and 
has been decreasing in size since the 1960s due to diversion 
of its waters for irrigation.  End Note.) 
 
4. (C) Other parties interested in the project include 
Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic (whose 
territory the proposed canal would traverse) and Muammar 
Qaddafi (who is reportedly seeking to divert some of the 
proposed canal's water to Libya via pipeline).  According to 
source, Obasanjo not only loaned the LCC his plane, but has 
also apparently agreed to fund USD 2.5 million of the 
project's costs, with USD 1 million already released for 
feasability studies. 
 
5. (C) The Ministry of Energy is extremely skeptical of the 
proposal.  Source cited a number of concerns including 
project costs, environmental impact, continuing regional 
instability, and low Congo River water levels as possible 
impediments to a canal.  The Ministry of Energy is aware of 
the potential problems of diverting a portion of the river's 
water because it oversees SNEL, the electricity parastatal. 
SNEL runs and maintains the Inga hydroelectric complex, and 
is experiencing a severe shortage of generating capacity due 
to low Congo River water levels.  With Kinshasa bracing for 
rolling blackouts, the idea of diverting the river not only 
seems economically unsound, but also politically disastrous. 
 
6. (C) The Nigerian delegate, Bashir Ishola Awotorebo, 
pitched the project as a move toward regional integration, 
painting a picture of "boats traveling on a canal from West 
Africa to the DRC."  Source believes that the Nigerians are 
merely seeking access to the DRC's freshwater resources. 
 
7. (C) Source opined that the proposal would likely be 
dismissed out of hand were it not for Obasanjo's support. 
(Comment.  The DRC views Obasanjo as one of Africa's most 
powerful statesmen.  Source repeatedly noted Obasanjo's 
contacts with President George W. Bush.  The perception that 
Obasanjo has the ear of the American president lends him 
further influence in the region.  End Comment.) 
 
8. (C) Officially, the LCC is seeking cooperation with the 
DRC transitional government.  However, Obasanjo, et al are 
purportedly hedging their bets through high-level contacts 
with MLC and even RCD-G officials in preparation for a 
government reshuffling.  While no material support for 
opposition parties was mentioned, source noted that numerous 
promises of political support have been exchanged.  DRC 
President Kabila met earlier this month with Obasanjo in 
Lagos.  Vice President Bemba of the MLC has also recently 
traveled to Libya and Congo-Brazzaville.  While it is 
possible that the canal issue was discussed, no official 
mention of the project has yet been made by GDRC officials. 
 
9. (C) Comment.  While the idea of a Congo-Lake Chad canal is 
somewhat outlandish, foreign support for the project could 
significantly effect the DRC's internal political dynamics if 
LCC advances are taken seriously within the government.  Many 
high-ranking officials in the GDRC would prefer to avoid 
elections, they view them as inevitable.  Hence, postponing 
elections while collecting war chests from regional powers is 
a possible motivation for entertaining the LCC proposal.  To 
its credit, the Ministry of Energy appears to have brushed 
the topic aside. 
 
10. (C) Comment Continued.  Reports of Obasanjo's politicking 
provide further evidence of external forces acting as 
divisive elements in transitional government politics.  Most 
importantly, the canal proposal shows that foreign 
governments once again perceive the DRC as ripe for 
exploitation.  It is unclear why source brought up Obasanjo 
in such a negative light.  Source is in a PPRD controlled 
ministry, is close to former National Security Advisor Jean 
Mbuyu, and is perhaps trying to portray Obasanjo as having 
blurred the line between arbitration and personal interest at 
the recent Abuja summit.  End Comment. 
MEECE