US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1588

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KINSHASA 001588 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AIDAC 
STATE FOR AF/C ALLAN EASTHAM, C.PASCHALL 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
STATE FOR PRM TSTOLTZFUS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA - JBORNS, MMARX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP - DWELLER, NCARLSON, NCOX 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI - GGOTTLIEB, AMARTIN 
AID/W FOR AFR - KO'DONNELL 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO - KSMITH 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP - PFESSENDEN, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG - TLAVELLE 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958; NA 
 
TAGS: EAID, PREF, PGOV, PHUM, CG 
SUBJECT:  RECENT OFDA NOTES FROM ITURI 
 
 
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Summary 
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1. (U) During a visit to Ituri from July 19 to July 24, 
OFDA Reps noted improvements in security, both in Bunia 
town and in rural areas. There remains concern however 
that the situation remains inherently unstable given 
that there is no political settlement in place and that 
various militias remain extremely distrustful of one 
another.  No strong presence of the central 
transitional government of Kinshasa can yet be felt in 
Ituri, though Kinshasa has named and sent out a new 
District Commissioner.  The relative calm of recent 
months has brought a dramatic improvement in 
humanitarian access, which has in turn highlighted 
problems in the relationship between MONUC and 
humanitarian organizations.  Though the overall number 
of IDPs in Ituri is diminishing, little progress has 
yet been made in reducing the size of the large IDP 
camp near Bunia airport.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) OFDA Reps Jay Nash and Ian MacNairn were in 
Ituri from July 19 to July 24, where they visited 
Kasenyi, Aru and Ariwara in addition to Bunia and met 
with both humanitarian staff and militiamen. 
 
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Security 
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3. (U) At the time of OFDA Rep Nash's last visit to 
Bunia in mid May, the town was still experiencing 
frequent shootings and armed robberies at night.  In 
July, security was reported to have improved 
considerably.  OFDA Reps were told by Bunia residents 
that militiamen of various types could be seen walking 
around with barely concealed weapons in peripheral 
areas at night, but people nevertheless generally felt 
that that town was much less dangerous than it had been 
at any time over the past year. 
 
4. (U) Though certainly partially attributable to 
increased MONUC foot patrols at night in the town, the 
improvement in security in Bunia is no doubt also due 
to a general decrease in inter-ethnic tension resulting 
from a decrease in incidents of inter-ethnic violence 
in rural areas outside Bunia.  During daytime hours, 
the town continues to grow more cosmopolitan and 
tolerant, with people of various ethnicity feeling 
increasingly comfortable walking into neighborhoods 
known to be dominated by members of one or another 
ethnic group.  Though people still largely stay close 
to their "home" neighborhoods at night, these also are 
slowly becoming less mono-ethnic.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, there are now some Hema families living 
in Nyambi - the area south of MONUC headquarters that 
has been nearly exclusively all non-Hema, non-Gegere 
for the past year.  Some Nande traders from North Kivu 
have started reestablishing their businesses in Bunia, 
and their trucks have begun arriving from Beni.  Gold 
trading has resumed, and there is again considerable 
foot traffic between Bunia and Mongbwalu, where the 
gold is mined.  As people involved in the gold trade 
must walk through the Gegere-dominated Mudzipela 
northern part of Bunia as well as Lendu areas on the 
way to Mongbwalu, this traffic itself is a sign of 
increasing tolerance and decreasing tension. 
 
5. (U) Outside Bunia, the trend in Ituri which started 
in December of 2003 of rural areas settling into 
distinct, but relatively peaceful "zones of control" - 
all completely outside MONUC's influence - has 
continued.  With the exception of the Hema pockets of 
Boga, Kasenyi, Tshomia and Sota, the area south of 
Bunia is under Ngiti control, with many Bira (who have 
no militia) also present.  The "central" area just 
north of Bunia is controlled by the Gegere-dominant 
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) militia.  Between 
the UPC area and Mahagi, and to the west of Bunia, 
Lendu militias are in charge.   From Mahagi northward, 
Jerome Kakwavu's FAPC militia has authority.  Though 
(with the exception of Jerome's area), these zones are 
generally less ethnically diverse than they were before 
hostilities began in 1999, none are completely mono- 
ethnic and during the daytime there is considerable 
freedom of movement between zones for persons of 
various ethnicity.  Completely outside the framework of 
various MONUC and Ituri Interim Administration peace 
efforts, a number of communities of different ethnicity 
have made their own "peace" arrangements in the 
interest of reviving agricultural trade.  Among 
civilians, it is not uncommon to hear people of various 
groups even state with confidence that "the ethnic war 
is over." 
 
6. (U) Though the relative calm has held for eight 
months now, many observers in Bunia still feel that the 
situation is inherently unstable and that in reality a 
permanent solution for Ituri is no closer than it was a 
year ago.  Many suspect that the UPC of Thomas Lubanga, 
at least, still has a political agenda which would 
include minimally control of the city of Bunia, and 
possibly much more.  The only thing currently 
preventing the UPC from attempting to make territorial 
advances is believed to be the threat of a MONUC 
response.   Though "working arrangements" between 
militias may exist, it would be a gross overstatement 
to say that militiamen, or especially their leaders, 
have come to trust each other and join in the popular 
belief that the war may be over.   In mid July, FAPC 
and Lendu militiamen skirmished for a couple of weeks 
in areas between Mahagi and Djugu, reportedly over 
access to "taxes" on trade.  In this case, MONUC was 
able to successfully negotiate a ceasefire with the two 
factions involved, and to prevent the conflict 
spreading to larger contingents of the same militias 
present in Mahagi itself.  Flare ups of this sort 
would, however, seem to be inevitable with so many 
boundaries in place and so much at stake in terms of 
trade revenue.  Any minor incident could conceivably 
spread quickly into a larger breakdown of order that 
MONUC might find very difficult to control. 
 
7. (U) The central fact remains that none of the 
militia leaders are solidly implicated in any overall 
new political order planned for Ituri.  In the past 
year, MONUC has failed entirely to arrange a political 
settlement that could serve as the basis for a 
scheduled dismantling of militias and separate 
administrations, the reintegration of populations and 
the return of central authority.  The MONUC-supported 
"Interim Administration" (IA) never succeeded in 
gaining effective politico-administrative control of 
any part of Ituri, including even the town of Bunia 
itself.  The IA has now been replaced by the 
administration of Petronille Vaweka, the new District 
Commissioner, appointed by the transitional government 
in Kinshasa.  Though generally respected as a 
courageous and strong leader, Vaweka still has no 
police or army with which to impose governmental 
authority anywhere.  The "Ituri Brigade" of the new, 
integrated national army is just beginning to deploy to 
Ituri, and at least part of this force is currently 
occupied trying to contain territorial advances by 
dissident general Laurent Nkunda operating out of the 
Kalehe area in South Kivu. 
8. (U) Though Iturians of all factions, as well as 
MONUC officials, have been appealing loudly for greater 
Kinshasa government involvement in Ituri since the 
Ugandans left in May of 2003, observers more familiar 
with the situation outside Ituri - i.e. with the 
current state of the transitional government and the 
degree of readiness of the new army - tend to be less 
sure that a greater transitional government presence in 
Ituri will automatically make for a huge improvement in 
the overall situation, especially if the government is 
not in a position to strongly support (with, for 
example, timely payment of salaries) those that are 
sent there.  It is no doubt the case that in their 
strong desire to see a return of Kinshasa to Ituri, the 
Iturians are to some degree remembering a time when 
Kinshasa was able to impose order in the region, and do 
not fully realize to what extent today's central 
government is significantly weaker than that of an 
earlier Mobutu era. 
 
----- 
Humanitarian access and relations between MONUC and the 
humanitarians 
----- 
 
9. (U) The relative calm that has come to Ituri has 
also brought a dramatic improvement in terms of 
humanitarian access, and with it something of a 
strategy dilemma for humanitarian agencies.  While the 
humanitarians' credibility in the region can be said to 
have gone up as a result of their persistent efforts to 
reach and assist populations in need during the crisis, 
MONUC's credibility, never particularly great, has 
fallen through the floor, with MONUC now distrusted and 
despised by all the Ituri militia groups.  MONUC is 
resented both because whenever it imposes its authority 
it decreases the power of the militias, and because it 
is perceived to have made many promises that have not 
been kept, particularly with regard to the supplying of 
food and other benefits to promised sites of 
demobilization. 
 
10. (U) On the other hand, the militias, eager to have 
their populations obtain access to humanitarian 
assistance and anxious to show the outside world that 
they are not barbarians, but are instead capable of 
providing order and security within the territories 
they control, have grown more and more cooperative to 
humanitarians.  Humanitarians who make the effort to 
disassociate themselves with MONUC and contact the 
various militia leaders on their own to negotiate 
access can now move around relatively securely nearly 
anywhere in Ituri.  In contrast, MONUC cannot safely go 
more than a few kilometers outside Bunia town without 
armed guards, and MONUC personnel tend to be coldly 
received wherever they travel. 
 
11. (U) Among the international NGOs present in Ituri, 
German Agro Action (GAA) has so far gone the farthest 
in exploiting the new opportunities to reach rural 
populations.  Using a well-developed network of 
contacts, and establishing a transpartent relationship 
of trust simultaneously with all the different militias 
in the region, GAA can now travel pretty much anywhere 
in Ituri where there is a road after making just a few 
preliminary telephone calls. On various visits, OFDA 
Rep has accompanied GAA staff to meet with leaders of 
all the major militias, and in every instance the 
leaders have complimented GAA on their initiative in 
reaching their communities and communicated the same 
message:  other humanitarians are also more than 
welcome as long as they remain neutral and apolitical, 
and as long as they do not bring MONUC with them. 
 
12. (U) MONUC has never enjoyed good relations with the 
humanitarian agencies present in Ituri.  The 
humanitarians have long felt that MONUC, in addition to 
being a weak and largely ineffective military force, 
has generally manifested a poor intelligence capacity 
and a poor understanding of the situation.  As a 
result, they feel that MONUC has frequently misread the 
context on the ground, sometimes with catastrophic 
consequences.  MONUC personnel appear to the 
humanitarians to exude arrogance and paternalism, and 
the humanitarians feel that information they provide to 
MONUC rarely receives the attention it deserves. 
 
13. (U) The humanitarians also resent what they 
perceive as an effort to make them all fall under 
MONUC's overall authority.  Though the humanitarians 
readily acknowledge the necessity of the presence of a 
large international force, and though all ultimately 
have depended on MONUC for security whenever there has 
been open fighting in Bunia, they are keenly aware of 
the extent to which MONUC is disliked and distrusted by 
all the armed groups controlling the rural areas of the 
region, and would consequently like to maintain an 
independent identity and disassociate themselves with 
MONUC to the extent possible.  As UNOCHA staff told 
OFDA reps on this visit, "if you travel with MONUC, you 
will not be well received."  MONUC, however, puts 
considerable pressure on all international 
organizations not to go anywhere outside Bunia without 
an armed MONUC escort.  With the exception of GAA, none 
of the INGOs have sufficiently large networks of 
contacts, or are sufficiently self-confident, to be 
willing to take responsibility for their own security 
by refusing the MONUC escorts.  (In the case of the UN 
Agencies, refusal is probably not even an option, given 
that the SRSG has authority not just over MONUC but 
over the entire UN team in DRC.) 
 
14. (U) An important aspect of the problem is that the 
humanitarians see their mandate as quite distinct from 
that of MONUC.  It is clear that MONUC has been given a 
political task in addition to its security function: 
it is supposed to be bringing the armed groups in Ituri 
together into a peace process.  This inevitably means 
using pressure at times to get the leaders of armed 
groups to agree to things they may not necessarily want 
to or like, and pressure always risks provoking the 
disfavor of those who may feel that they are being 
coerced.  The humanitarians, on the other hand, see 
their role as to remain apolitical and to provide 
assistance to those suffering the consequences of the 
conflict, regardless of the success or failure of 
various political initiatives.  To obtain and maintain 
access to vulnerable populations, the humanitarians 
feel that the militias must perceive them as being 
completely neutral.  This implies being viewed as 
separate and different from MONUC, since the militiamen 
often doubt MONUC's neutrality.  Moreover, the 
humanitarians are very aware that association with 
highly unpopular MONUC might on any given day have 
hugely undesirable consequences in terms of INGO 
personnel safety. 
 
15. (U) The difference in mandate does not appear to be 
completely appreciated by MONUC.  The MONUC 
headquarters in Bunia has made it clear to the 
humanitarians present in Ituri that it does not approve 
of INGOs having independent relations with the armed 
groups.  According to the humanitarians, the MONUC 
administration's view is that to successfully exert 
influence over the armed groups, the international 
community, including its humanitarian representatives, 
must be strongly cohesive and must always present a 
common front (with MONUC, it is assumed, setting the 
course and leading the way).  As these two perspectives 
are largely incompatible, every INGO attempting to work 
in Ituri finds itself frequently having to make 
difficult choices as to how to manage the relationship. 
 
16. (U) The question of INGO independence from MONUC 
can be expected to get even more difficult to manage in 
the near future as MONUC embarks on its joint 
disarmament/reintegration program with PNUD. There has 
already been at least one small crisis.  USAID/OFDA and 
GAA had agreed on a project to rehabilitate the Bogoro- 
Aveba road as a food-security initiative long before 
Aveba was selected by MONUC as a site for one of its 
new planned militia disarmament-demobilization camps. 
GAA had already discussed with the Ngiti communities 
along the road how the project would proceed, using the 
community-based approach that it found so successful on 
the Bunia-Kasenyi road, when MONUC, in a hurry to have 
the road fully operational so as to be able to readily 
ship supplies down to its future demobilization camp 
site, began pressuring GAA for a faster and more heavy- 
machinery-dependent approach.  Though some use of MONUC 
heavy equipment assets had always been planned, GAA had 
promised the communities to use local youth to do the 
work wherever possible, thereby providing the 
communities valuable employment opportunities.  MONUC 
now wanted to send their engineers and heavy equipment 
down immediately, and worse, planned to send them with 
an armed escort.   As MONUC was in serious disfavor 
with Ngiti groups at the time, having just arrested an 
important Ngiti leader, GAA was extremely concerned 
about appearances and the potential association of 
their team with MONUC soldiers (whose behavior GAA 
would not be able to control).  In the end, GAA was 
able to arrange that the MONUC road crew go without an 
armed escort while simultaneously quelling Ngiti fears 
of a MONUC invasion of their territory and a possible 
abduction of another of their leaders.  GAA is 
nevertheless concerned that the road project has now 
been irreversibly linked to in the minds of the Ngiti 
to MONUC's disarmament program, which they fear may 
eventually be viewed highly negatively by the 
communities. 
 
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Disarmament 
----- 
 
17. (U) The humanitarian community in both Bunia and in 
Kinshasa continues to have deep reservations with 
regard to the appropriateness and quality of the 
disarmament/reintegration plan that MONUC and UNDP have 
adopted for the Ituri region.  In particular, they 
question the wisdom of embarking on any type of militia 
cantonment program before any viable political process 
is in place and seen to be moving forward.  They 
especially question the validity of a cantonment plan 
such as the present one in which MONUC will not be 
guaranteeing security at the sites and where it is as 
yet unclear that the transitional government is ready 
to receive some of the militiamen as candidates for the 
new army and transfer them out of Ituri.  In addition, 
there continues to be disagreement regarding whether 
the militias are ready and willing to disarm.  MONUC 
and UNDP insist that they have commitments from the 
armed groups.  Most others remaining skeptical that 
these commitments are sincere, given the lack of any 
accepted political settlement to Ituri's problems and 
communities' persisting fears that they could be attack 
by their enemies.  Finally, there is disagreement even 
as to whether disarmament is an attainable and 
reasonable goal in Ituri, given the proximity of the 
district to abundant arms supplies in Sudan and Uganda. 
Some would argue that the emphasis should rather be on 
creating sufficient security and stability through a 
new political order so as to make the arms unnecessary 
and relatively valueless rather than on simply 
implementing an arms reduction program. 
 
18. (U) OFDA Rep's own conversations with militia 
commanders tend to substantiate skepticism with regard 
to the Ituri demobilization program.  In a conversation 
on this trip, FAPC commander General Jerome Kakwavu 
told OFDA Rep that he did not feel that this 
disarmament/demobilization process had anything to do 
with his forces, since the FAPC considered itself part 
of the transitional government and was only waiting for 
the procedures to be put in place to confirm their 
reintegration with the new national army.  With the 
exception of child soldiers, he did not see 
demobilization as being in the cards and warned that 
any attempt to forcefully disarm his men would be 
resisted with force.  In a meeting during a previous 
trip, Commander Linganga, the second in charge of the 
UPC command after Bosco, told OFDA Rep that they were 
willing to negotiate reintegration with the national 
army with the Kinshasa government, but would never 
disarm to MONUC.  In still other conversations, 
Commanders Germain (leader of the Ngiti militia) and 
Chief Kahwa (leader of the main Hema-South militia) 
expressed continuing high levels of distrust of UPC, 
suggesting they did not feel they were yet in a 
position to be able to let down their defenses. 
 
19. (U) The humanitarian community's reservations 
regarding the proposed disarmament program have been 
expressed repeatedly since November 2003 when the 
document first surfaced, but appear to have had little 
effect on the MONUC/UNDP plans.  September 1 has now 
been set as the opening date for the cantonment sites. 
(Though MONUC has started work on preparing the actual 
sites, few observers think that these will in fact be 
ready in the time frame specified and thus expect that 
the date will have to be pushed packed yet again).  At 
this point, the humanitarian community has given up 
resistance and is just hoping that the program will not 
be the large-scale fiasco that many are afraid it could 
be.  Few think that the program has much chance of 
success in doing anything to defuse the long-term 
threat of violence in Ituri.  Many think it has the 
potential to create new problems as MONUC will 
inevitably be unable to meet all the militiamen's 
expectations of the program. 
 
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Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
----- 
 
20. (U) The IDP situation has greatly improved in 
Ituri, with more and more people able to return to 
their villages as a result of the relative calm that 
has reigned for the past eight months.  On a field trip 
into Lendu areas northwest of Bunia, OFDA reps saw many 
houses under construction, and MONUC has reported a 
major return of Gegere to the Fataki area.  Return is 
still problematic, however, for minority communities 
desiring to return to areas controlled by the militia 
of another ethnic group.  MONUC tried unsuccessfully, 
for example, to negotiate with Lendu and Ngiti leaders 
the return of former Hema residents of Bogoro, but were 
told that "it was not yet time."  As Ituri originally 
had a very "speckled" ethnic make up, this problem 
minimally affects tens of thousands of people. 
 
21. (U) The IDP camp near the airport is reportedly 
down to an estimated 13,000 residents from a peak of 
15,000 last year, but movement out of the camp 
continues to be very slow.  Approximately two-thirds of 
camp residents are registered as being from the town of 
Bunia itself.  Several months ago, the thinking was 
that these people did not return home because a large 
number of houses had been destroyed or were now 
occupied by squatters.  Recent investigations conducted 
by INGO Atlas Logistic in several neighborhoods in 
Bunia, however, show clearly that this is not a problem 
in the vast majority of cases.  Given recent 
improvements in the security situation, danger would 
also not seem to be a valid justification for remaining 
in the camp.  It is now suspected that many camp 
residents continue to stay there simply because in the 
camp they have access to free food, free shelter and 
free education.  Those who own houses in the town can 
also make some money by renting out their homes. 
Despite offers of returnee packages to those who 
volunteer to leave the camp, the incentives still seem 
to fall more heavily on the side of staying.  Atlas 
Logistique and others are currently considering 
alternative strategies that might enjoy more success in 
encouraging a departure from the camp for those who 
could safely return to their homes. 
 
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visit to Aru and Ariwara 
----- 
 
22. (U) To obtain a perspective on the mid-July 
fighting near Mahagi between Lendu militia and FAPC 
forces, as well as a sense as to whether further 
population displacements might be expected in the 
future in that area, OFDA Reps traveled briefly to Aru 
in northern Ituri, where they were invited to meet with 
General Jerome 40 km further north in Ariwara.  The 
young general was gracious and cordial throughout.  He 
praised USAID/OFDA partner German Agro Action for its 
work in the Aru-Mahagi area and assured OFDA Reps that 
other agencies would be most welcome to come to Aru. 
He guaranteed that humanitarians would be able to move 
about freely and in total security within all FAPC- 
controlled areas. While dismissing the Mahagi incidents 
as minor and stating that he believed the problems 
between the groups had been satisfactorily resolved, he 
confirmed that if FAPC positions were attacked again, 
they would again retaliate. 
 
23. (U) General Jerome took advantage of the 
opportunity to discuss other subjects of concern to 
him.  He categorically denied the rumors that he had 
any connection with the insurgency of General Laurant 
Nkunda in South Kivu, emphasizing that he was 
Congolese, had served long in the Congolese army, and 
had no allegiances elsewhere.   When asked whether he 
was at all optimistic about the future, he replied that 
he was not, given that he had been given reassurances 
by Kinshasa authorities that he and his administration 
would be integrated into the transitional government 
but that many weeks had since passed and there had been 
no noticeable progress. He was now wondering whether 
the TG had really negotiated in good faith.  He urged 
the USAID delegation to encourage the USG to exert 
pressure, through the Ambassador's role as a member of 
the CIAT, to move more quickly on integration of the 
army and administration.  He said that the FAPC was 
open to Kinshasa's appointment of new authorities to 
the Aru-Mahagi area, but felt that before doing so, 
Kinshasa should examine the performance of the FAPC 
appointees presently in place and either decide to 
retain them or find appropriate new appointments for 
them elsewhere, since in his estimation they had been 
doing an excellent job.  The general commented that he 
did not himself feel that his future was necessarily 
tied to that of the Ituri region, since he was not 
himself an Iturian. 
 
24. (U) The general highlighted the multi-ethnic 
composition of his military and civil administration 
and pointed out that the Aru area, under FAPC 
direction,  remained extremely orderly and was an 
economic success.   The FAPC had made Aru a place, he 
said, where business and development could be conducted 
in a completely secure environment.  With regards to 
demobilization, Jerome said that though the FAPC would 
certainly be willing to demobilize any child soldiers 
in its ranks, everyone else should be absorbed into the 
new Congolese army.  If it was determined that some 
candidates were too old to continue service, or not 
sufficiently fit, they should be provided 
transportation back to their home areas and given a 
retirement package as part of their demobilization. 
 
25. (U) Back in Aru, after the meeting with General 
Jerome in Ariwara, a close aid to the general rather 
passionately expressed his personal view that it would 
be a mistake to classify Jerome as having much in 
common with such dissident Tutsi commanders as Mutebusi 
and Nkunda.   The aide claimed to have grown up in the 
Goma area with both Jerome and Nkunda, and to know them 
both well.  While he was clearly a fan of Jerome, the 
aide viewed Nkunda as extremely "arrogant," and was 
sure that Nkunda's Bukavu intervention had been largely 
planned by General Bora, whom he believed was trying to 
use some territorial acquisitions in South Kivu as 
leverage to negotiate amnesty and acceptable high-level 
positions for himself and Nkunda in the TG.  According 
to the aide, Bora and Nkunda had been counting on Vice- 
President Ruberwa to support their bid, and that the 
plan had fallen apart when this did not happen.  MEECE.