US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1584

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CG 
SUBJECT: RUBERA ON THE EDGE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.5 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In a late August 18 telephone conversation, 
Vice President Ruberwa was unreceptive to the Ambassador,s 
message underscoring the importance of continuing engagement 
with the transition government.  Ruberwa complained that the 
status quo was doing nothing to improve the situation of 
Congolese Tutsis.  He did not, however, say that he is 
resigning his position.  Pressed, Ruberwa listed three 
actions that he said could represent a way forward, including 
an Mbeki or Obasanjo chaired meeting of GDRC principals to 
obtain commitments to progress, a regional gathering of 
governments to pledge actions against "negative forces," and 
pressure to force the GDRC to make changes to government 
military deployments in the east.  We believe Ruberwa is 
likely to stay for some time in Goma, although not 
necessarily formally resign from the Government.  We assess 
his conditions to reflect in part personal frustration, but 
it also reflective of internal RCD problems.   End summary. 
 
Ruberwa and RCD/Goma Uncertainties 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (C)  Vice President Ruberwa is presently in Goma, North 
Kivu Province, following a scheduled tour of eastern Congo. 
As reported septels, Ruberwa went to Goma following the 
August 14 attack  on the Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi 
which targeted Congolese Tutsi refugees.  Ruberwa immediately 
issued several unhelpful public statements, which among other 
things accused Mai Mai and other Congolese of being involved 
in the Gatumba attack (Comment: Although to our knowledge, 
Ruberwa has no additional evidence of Congolese involvement 
beyond the somewhat confusing accounts of attack survivors. 
End comment). 
 
3. (C)  There is widespread speculation in Kinshasa that 
Ruberwa and/or the party he heads, RCD-Goma, is preparing to 
formally withdraw from the Transition Government.  As covered 
septels, there are major divisions within RCD-Goma, and 
certainly at least some members are advocating such a 
withdrawal. 
 
Ambassador,s August 18 Call 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) After multiple attempts starting the evening of August 
17, the Ambassador successfully reached Ruberwa by phone the 
evening of August 18.  Expressing condolences for the Gatumba 
attack, and reiterating points from the Washington-issued 
statement, the Ambassador nonetheless emphasized to Ruberwa 
the importance of remaining engaged in the Transition 
Government.  The basic message was that the GDRC transition 
process represents not only the best chance to bring peace 
and stability to the Congo, but as well ensure the security 
of vulnerable populations, notably including Tutsi 
communities, in eastern Congo. 
 
5. (C) Not surprisingly, Ruberwa did not embrace the message. 
 Instead, he launched into a lengthy explanation of why the 
Transition Government was failing in key objectives.  He said 
specifically many senior officials are still opposed to 
reconciliation leading to further criminal attacks such as 
that in the Burundi camp.  What is the point of continuing 
the process?  Ruberwa, however, stopped short of saying that 
he is resigning from the Vice Presidency or that his party or 
he himself are withdrawing formally from the transition 
government. 
 
Some View Forward 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Near the end of the conversation, pressed on what he 
believed represents a way forward, Ruberwa listed three 
points.  He indicated that a conference of GDRC principals, 
perhaps chaired by South Africa President Mbeki or Nigeria 
President Obasanjo, could be convened to obtain fresh 
commitments for progress, in essence correcting problems of 
the current transition.  Second, Ruberwa wanted changes made 
to the composition of the FARDC military forces in South 
Kivu, specifically including the removal of 10military region 
commander General Mabe, and an overall major reduction in the 
number of forces currently deployed.  Finally, Ruberwa called 
for a conference of regional leaders to promise firm action 
against "negative forces" (note: a traditional phrase used to 
refer to Hutu extremist elements.  End note).  Ruberwa asked 
for U.S. support in the CIAT and generally to achieve these 
goals. 
 
Comment: No Clear Strategy 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (C)  It did not appear that Ruberwa,s three points 
reflected well-considered positions, but rather more of an 
on-the-spot effort to define some objectives.  Much of 
Ruberwa,s reported actions and speech since the Gatumba 
attack suggest that he has been reacting emotionally, but has 
no planned long-term strategy.  As the RCD-Goma Vice 
President, Ruberwa has been been the object of sustained 
suspicion by much of the rest of the Congolese political 
class.  As well, he has more recently been buffeted by major 
public divisions within the RCD-Goma, with his leadership 
under challenge by Bizima Karaha and 7 other "dissident" 
parliamentarians and undoubtedly other influential RCD-Goma 
hard liners.  It is therefore difficult to determine how much 
of Ruberwa,s stated position stems from his personal 
convictions and frustrations, his current position under fire 
within RCD-Goma, or reflected views of the part of the 
RCD-Goma leadership currently gathered in the east.  He is 
reportedly hearing a similar message to the Ambassador,s 
regarding the need to stay engaged from a lot of sources in 
the international community, and from other moderate 
Congolese leaders.  We do not expect Ruberwa to return soon 
to Kinshasa, however, as he works out a personal and 
institutional way forward. 
MEECE