US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT2742

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LOCAL PRESS TRACKS KUWAITI JIHADIS

Identifier: 04KUWAIT2742
Wikileaks: View 04KUWAIT2742 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2004-08-23 14:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PREL ASEC KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 002742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, DS, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, KU 
SUBJECT: LOCAL PRESS TRACKS KUWAITI JIHADIS 
 
Classified By: CDA MATTHEW TUELLER; REASON 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
 1. (U) SUMMARY: News dailies continue to report on the 
still-breaking story of widespread arrests of suspected 
Islamic extremists here.  The reporting stream began with the 
July accounts of the repatriation of four Kuwaiti minors 
caught in Syria by local security forces on their way to join 
anti-coalition insurgents in Iraq.  Based on interrogations 
of the four, press reports indicate between 10 and 20 
suspected Islamic militants--most of whom are Kuwaiti--have 
been apprehended to date since the security sweeps began in 
late July.  The widespread arrests brought reports of 
possible complicity between extremists and Islamist MPs and 
calls for re-educating jihadists and further GOK oversight of 
Friday sermons. END SUMMARY. 
 
The Jihadis Who Started It All 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (U) According to local media, the four Kuwaiti teens at 
the heart of the investigation remain in custody and 
reportedly gave Kuwaiti security services information 
regarding those who recruited them in Kuwait, arranged for 
their training, met them in Syria, and sent them to Iraq. 
Press reports indicate that this information led to the 
sweeps and arrests that began in late July and are currently 
ongoing.  Early reports indicated that the youths got only as 
far as Syria, however, subsequent accounts say they made it 
to Fallujah where they were instructed and equipped to 
conduct suicide operations.  Apparently lacking the stomach 
for such violent acts, one of the four reportedly called home 
and received family assistance which facilitated their return 
to Syria. 
 
3. (U) The father of one of the four minors, Dhari 
Al-Zahameel, went public with his complaints telling one 
local daily, on July 19, that those who spread extremist 
ideas and recruit jihadis are well-known to state security. 
He further criticized those he called "air-conditioned 
jihadis,"--those who remained in Kuwait while sending others 
to do their fighting for them.  Press sources claim the four 
were influenced to undertake jihad by the scenes from Abu 
Ghraib and the siege of Falluja and that such thoughts were 
planted through seminars, lessons, and Islamic audio and 
video tapes, which glorified suicide attacks and Mujahedeen 
adventures.  The trip to Syria for all four was reportedly 
arranged in Kuwait with the help of Khaled Al-Dossari, 
currently a fugitive from Kuwait State Security, who press 
sources claim connected them with facilitators in Jahra, 
Kuwait, who in turn linked them with a contact named Abu Ali 
in Damascus. 
 
Sweeps Net Suspects 
------------------- 
 
4.  (U) On 24 July, newspapers reported a widespread sweep of 
militants that netted 12 suspected extremists.  The arrests 
took place in homes and mosques in rural Jahra and other 
unidentified areas.  The suspects were reportedly found with 
small arms, RPGs, and surveillance information on US military 
convoys in the Doha and 7th ring road areas of Kuwait. 
Security services are reportedly still looking for the two 
suspected ringleaders: Ahmad Al-Mutairi and Khaled Al-Dossari. 
 
5.  (U) Reports indicated that the suspected jihadi 
facilitator Al-Dossari, who headed a committee dedicated to 
protecting the rights of prisoners, had been in contact with 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Minister Dr. Abdullah Maatooq 
Al-Maatooq for two weeks prior to his attempted arrest. 
Other reports indicate he was arrested in Morocco several 
months ago, repatriated to Kuwait, and was released by Kuwait 
State Security at the behest of unknown Islamist MPs.  One 
daily ran front-page photos of Al-Dossari laughing and 
talking with Islamist MPs Awad Barad Al-Enezi and Dr. Walid 
Al-Tabtabaei. 
 
6.  (U) More raids, primarily in the rural Western and 
Southern communities, were reported August 2-4 detailing the 
capture of five more suspects while four more suspects were 
added to the list of fugitives.  Among those arrested is one 
identified as "M.A." who is believed to be Al-Dossari's 
right-hand man.  Additional arrests on 8 and 9 August 
included the apprehension of a Saudi soldier, identified as 
"Shlash," who was detailed to the Kuwaiti Defense Ministry. 
Another Kuwaiti identified as "A." was captured but his Iraqi 
partner reportedly escaped, however a large number of 
European passports were found in the house where the arrest 
took place.  "Shlash," later identified as "Al-Dhufari" and 
another Kuwaiti, Ahmed Al-Otaibi, were released on 22 August 
on KD 300 bail. 
 
7. (U) In early August, the public prosecution began 
referring some suspects to the courts and ordering others to 
be detained for longer periods.  The suspects reportedly fall 
into two groups: minors, who are sent to Iraq to conduct 
suicide bombings and adults, recruited for more conventional 
attacks inside Kuwait.  On August 14, three suspects charged 
with weapons possession and recruiting jihadis, Mohammed 
Al-Asfour, Mohammed Al-Harbi, and Motlaq Al-Ajmi, were 
released on KD 300 bail each.  The four minors repatriated 
from Syria and four other adults were also recently referred 
to the public prosecutor's office. 
 
 
Official Reaction 
------------------ 
 
8. (U)  At an 18 August conference on extremism, Awqaf 
Minister Al-Maatooq said that "extremism in Kuwait is 
minimal, and we are not underestimating it."  Al-Maatooq 
further stated publicly that extremists are drawn to the 
ideology through the Internet and not through official Muslim 
clerics.  The Awqaf Ministry also spoke against the preaching 
of extremism in Mosques and threatened to fire any preacher 
found promoting extremism.  An official at the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labor reported that his office plans to 
re-educate those who have been influenced by extremist 
teachings.  The plan includes lectures, seminars, and other 
awareness campaigns. 
 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: Increasing editorial comment, near-daily 
press updates, and Embassy contacts indicate a growing 
extremist influence in mosques, schools, and Islamist youth 
outreach.  Although the numbers of willing militants, 
recruiters, and complicit supporters are still unknown, the 
list of those involved grows publicly on the pages of the 
local dailies with each passing day.  In spite of this, the 
Government appears unwilling to publicly acknowledge or 
meaningfully address this trend.  The growing list of 
suspected extremists is mostly comprised of Kuwaitis from 
rural, tribal, and less affluent areas, which present a more 
fertile ground for militant recruiting and indoctrination. 
TUELLER 

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