US embassy cable - 04SANAA2009

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PARM, PREL, PREF, YM, OVID, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: YEMEN REQUESTS U.S. ROLE IN MANPADS BUY-BACK 
REMAIN SECRET 
 
REF: SANAA 1738 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Krajeski for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary.  Citing potential backlash from the tribes, 
price gouging by the merchants, and opposition from the 
street, National Security Bureau Deputy Ammar Saleh asked 
that any U.S. provided technical and financial assistance to 
buy-back illicit Yemeni MANPADS be kept secret. Ammar also 
shared information on ROYG procedures for collecting illicit 
weapons, discussed current ROYG official stocks, and proposed 
a joint plan to store MANPADS after collection and before 
destruction.  Ammar stressed that ROYG would not accept an 
inspection of its own official MANPAD stock.  End Summary. 
 
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The Case of the Missing MANPADS 
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2.  (S)  President Saleh's point-man on illicit MANPADS, 
Ammar Saleh, met with DATT and Pol/Econ Chief on August 18. 
Saleh discussed the on-going question of the missing 1000 
plus MANPADS (Note:  In July 2003 EmbOffs viewed 1100 MANPADS 
recovered from the illegal market, compared to just 79 in a 
July 2004 inspection. End Note).  He explained that the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) distributed these systems to its 
own forces, adding "they bought them, they own them, they can 
do what they like with them."  As for the 79 still in the 
warehouse, Ammar said these would not be deployed to the army 
but sold and destroyed as part of the tabled 
buy-back.(Comment: We are not surprised by this largesse as 
most of the 79 systems are obsolete. See Reftel. End Comment). 
 
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The Official Stock 
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3.  (S/NF)  As for a serialized current account of official 
MANPADS stock, Ammar told us this information was "top 
secret" adding, "Why would you want to know?"  DATT suggested 
 
SIPDIS 
that our interest stemmed from the leakage of official Yemeni 
MANPADS into the hands of al-Qa'ida terrorists in Kenya, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  Saleh agreed that this must be 
prevented in the future, claiming that these systems were 
smuggled out of Yemen during the chaos of the 1994 civil war. 
 As for a good estimate of the number of illicit MANPADS in 
Yemen,"Impossible!" says Ammar, "We just don't know." 
 
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Please Keep Your Assistance Secret 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (S)  Saleh requested that the role of the U.S. in 
financing the proposed buy-back be kept secret.  The arms 
merchants, he said, will increase their prices if they know 
that U.S. money is behind the program.  As for the tribal 
Sheikhs -- they may be willing to sell their MANPADS to the 
ROYG, but not necessarily to the USG.  The opposition Islah 
party, he added, would use U.S. participation to rally public 
opinion against the President. 
 
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The "Big Fish"  How the ROYG conducts Buy-Backs 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (S)  Ammar produced a list of 29 names which he described 
as the "big fish" Yemeni arms merchants.  These individuals 
collect illicit weapons of all types and then sell them to 
the Ministry of Defense.  In addition to MANPADS, the 
merchants collect all types of SA/LW and explosives.  As for 
the price list, "Ammar showed us an old one in Arabic" 
adding, "but in truth it depends on which dealers have the 
best relationship with MOD officials." 
 
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To Avoid a Bait and Switch 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Ammar said he did not want MANPADS collected under the 
new U.S.-funded buy-back to be stored in MOD warehouses, 
where official and non-official stock may get "mixed-up." 
Instead, he proposed that the NSB would buy land near Sanaa, 
if the U.S. would be willing to build a storage facility 
there -- the purpose being to properly store MANPADS until 
they can be destroyed. 
 
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Comment 
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7.  (S)  The meeting with the NSB served as an initial 
discussion of our expectations and a first go at coordinating 
the A/S visit.  A scenesetter will follow to suggest an 
itinerary for the visit.  We should consider Ammar's 
no-inventory assertion as an opening not a final position, 
although we can expect our proposal to be met with great 
suspicion. We will also have to push back firmly on his 
suggestion to rely on arms merchants in the buy-back process. 
The idea is to wean the ROYG from old habits, not reinforce 
them.  End Comment. 
KRAJESKI