US embassy cable - 04BAGHDAD586

S E C R E T  BAGHDAD 000586 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I, PM DAS LIKENS, PMAT 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 08/20/14 
TAGS:  MOPS, PGOV, PTER, PREL, IZ, IR 
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN SADR CITY AND BAGHDAD:  PROGRESS IS 
SLOW 
 
Ref:  Baghdad 0320 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS 
1.4 (A) (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY. In the past, cooperation between U.S. 
military units operating in Baghdad -- especially in Sadr 
City -- and Iraqi police has been problematic.  Indeed, the 
police chief in Sadr City on occasion has been positively 
unhelpful, if not hostile.  Local U.S. military commanders 
have been trying to gain more cooperation by engaging 
Deputy Minister of Interior Hekmat Musa Salman, Baghdad 
Iraqi Police Chief Abdul Rasaq and Baghdad Governor Ali 
Rahdi al-Haidary.  It remains to be seen whether these 
efforts will bear fruit.  Initial results from the past 
week of fighting in Sadr City suggest that the Iraqi police 
there have not yet turned the corner.  Notably, that 
unhelpful police chief in Sadr City is hanging onto his job 
despite promises that he would be removed.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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IRAQI POLICE LEADERSHIP FAILURES 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (S) During the negotiations for the Sadr City Security 
Agreement outlined in reftel, Colonel Maaruf (Sadr City 
District Iraqi Police Chief) was one of the principal 
obstacles in moving forward and he openly refused to 
support the signing.  Sadr City District Council members, 
to include Ali Saudy and Kudair Alami, pointed to Colonel 
Maaruf as the source of IP intimidation of local political 
leaders.  Most recently, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
approved a local curfew in Sadr City beginning on August 5 
to minimize civilian casualties/interference with security 
operations.  Initially, the Ministry chose to use the IP as 
the principal means of disseminating this information.  An 
MOI follow-up of the curfew notification revealed that 
Colonel Maaruf had ordered his stations to stand down 
during the recent fighting, which prevented the message 
from reaching most of the public.  On August 7, the downing 
of a U.S. helicopter occurred near a Sadr City IP station. 
U.S. soldiers observed Colonel Maaruf leading several IP 
units in celebratory fire at the time of the helicopter 
downing.  When the IP station was engaged by JAM members 
shortly after this incident, Colonel Maaruf ordered his 
forces to take refuge in the station and not assist U.S. 
military units in suppressing the JAM gunfire.  To 
underscore the level of collaboration, Chief Rasaq advised 
PolOffs that Colonel Maaruf established a truce with JAM 
that is now in effect. 
 
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AGREEMENT ON MORE COOPERATION 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (S) Deputy Interior Minister Hekmat and IP Chief Rasaq 
have argued that the IP units in the field are sorely 
outgunned, ill-equipped and poorly trained, while local 
U.S. military commanders have pressed for a greater 
supporting role for the local police in combat operations. 
Following a series of discussions, Deputy Minister Hekmat 
and Police Chief Rasaq agreed to remove Colonel Maaruf from 
office and provide a suitable replacement for him supported 
by Ayatollah Sistani.  In addition, Deputy Minister Hekmat 
called for increased, aggressive sweeps by 1st CAV and the 
Iraqi Police of Sadr City to clear out the JAM.  Chief 
Rasaq pointed out that the National Conference posed a 
significant target for JAM forces in the area; urgent 
action was needed.  Deputy Minister Hekmat proposed that 
such operations should involve cordoning off Sadr City, to 
include the establishment of checkpoints on all seven 
bridges leading into this district. 
 
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PROMISES SO FAR NOT KEPT 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) In the end, however, the Iraqi Police response in 
Sadr City was minimal.  They manned checkpoints at some 
access points to the district.  They did not actively 
participate in any of the 1st CAV clearing operations, 
despite the promises and urgings from the Deputy Interior 
Minister and the Iraqi Police Chief. 
 
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COMMENT 
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5.  (S) We want a greater Iraqi security role in Sadr City 
in order to help promote the legitimacy of Iraqi Government 
entities with Sadr City residents.  Promises from the 
August 11 meeting notwithstanding, the actual conduct of 
operations in Sadr City have been carried out with U.S. 
forces and without much help from local police forces. 
Moreover, Colonel Maaruf still has his job despite promises 
from the Ministry of Interior to remove him.  This is in 
light of new reports of (unspecified) foreign fighters, the 
introduction of more sophisticated weapons -- to include 
surface-to-air missiles -- and daylight attacks on U.S. 
tanks.  This suggests a new vigor in the tempo of JAM 
operations in Baghdad.  If such reports prove true, it will 
be even harder for Coalition Forces to reestablish durable 
security in Sadr City without real cooperation and 
coordination from the Iraqi security forces. 
 
 
JEFFREY