US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1385

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SRI LANKA: TWO VIEWS OF THE EAST - TRINCO MOSTLY CALM, AMPARA EDGY

Identifier: 04COLOMBO1385
Wikileaks: View 04COLOMBO1385 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2004-08-20 05:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

200501Z Aug 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  08-20-14 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKA: TWO VIEWS OF THE EAST - TRINCO 
MOSTLY CALM, AMPARA EDGY 
 
Refs: (A) Colombo 371 (B)Colombo 1249 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Chargi d'Affaires. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The diversity of the humanitarian and 
security situation in the east is shown by differences 
between Trincomalee and Ampara.  In Trinco, the 
humanitarian situation is gradually improving and the 
area is generally peaceful.  Meanwhile, at the other end 
of the east, Ampara is tense due to a GSL crackdown on 
the LTTE, but LTTE-Muslim relations have calmed.  The 
difference in the security situation in Trinco and 
Ampara may be that ongoing tit-for-tat violence farther 
south of Trinco in Batticaloa and Ampara has tied the 
Tigers' hands ?he LTTE cannot afford to wage anything 
but a campaign for hearts and minds in Trinco.  In both 
areas, the LTTE is seeking to educate itself about 
development, likely to prepare for administering its 
proposed ISGA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Humanitarian Situation Gradually Improving in Trincomalee 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
2.  (SBU) Poloff traveled to the northeastern coastal 
district of Trincomalee August 1-3.  With the second- 
best natural harbor in the world, Trincomalee has long 
been seen as strategically important to both the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sri Lanka Navy 
headquarters its eastern fleet there.  The population of 
Trinco District is nearly evenly divided among 
communities - 38% Muslim, 31% Tamil, 29% Sinhalese - but 
it wasn't always.  Tamils deeply resent past GSL efforts 
to dilute the Tamil population in the area by promoting 
Sinhala colonization schemes meant to drive a wedge 
between Tamils in the north and east. 
 
3.  (SBU) Since the GSL and the LTTE signed a Cease-Fire 
Agreement (CFA) in February 2002, Trincomalee District 
has seen an increase in economic activity, primarily 
from tourism.  Humanitarian assistance in the area is 
changing from relief to development-oriented activity. 
S. Sutaram, Assistant Program Director for UNICEF told 
poloff that the business environment is improving, and 
many hotels are refurbishing to meet increased tourist 
demand.  However, the uptick in economic activity has 
not yet trickled down to benefit the 20,000 internally 
displaced people (IDPs) in the District, whose difficult 
living conditions remain basically unchanged.  85% of 
IDPs are Tamil, 10% Sinhala, and 5% Muslim. 
 
4.  (C) Many IDPs in Trinco have not returned to their 
homes (most have been displaced from areas within the 
district) for several reasons:  their land is mined, 
they have no land to which they can return, or they live 
in what they perceive to be an unsafe area.  Often, they 
cannot return to their homes because of limited 
infrastructure (e.g., water or schools) or because they 
have no access to livelihoods.  Nearly 90% of IDPs in 
Trincomalee town live with family and friends, rather 
than in IDP camps.  UNHCR Representative Brita Helleland 
noted that because some IDPs have gone home, the number 
of people living in welfare centers in Trincomalee 
District is declining: in 2003 there were 4000 IDPs in 
camps, but this year there are only 2,500.  She 
explained that while social problems associated with 
welfare centers - petty crime, illegal alcohol 
production, drug use, and the showing of pornographic 
films - do exist, they are not as severe as they are in 
welfare centers in other parts of the country (e.g. 
Jaffna).  She noted that last year the LTTE opened an 
office in one of the camps, which UNHCR successfully 
asked the Tigers to close. 
 
5.  (C) Local government officials from village council 
to provincial council report regular engagement with 
local LTTE leaders, who profess an interest in learning 
more about development activities.  The LTTE are also 
conducting a needs assessment survey.  For the past 
three weeks, 150 LTTE cadres from the Wanni went door to 
door in both LTTE- and GSL-controlled areas asking 
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims what they need to return 
to normalcy.  The cadres are also collecting biodata 
from Tamil families and offering them the "opportunity" 
to have three months of voluntary military training. 
Government Agent (GA) Gamini Rodrigo noted that the 
Tigers requested a meeting with staff in his office to 
talk about development - so the Tigers (and not the 
LTTE-affiliated Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO)) 
could offer up their own ideas about development in the 
LTTE-controlled areas in Trincomalee District.  On 
August 6, the LTTE met with members of Rodrigo's staff 
to submit development proposals to the GSL, which are 
under consideration. 
 
6.  (C) In a meeting with poloff on August 3, North East 
Provincial Council Chief Secretary S. Rangarajah spoke 
briefly about the development activities he oversaw, but 
really wanted to talk about issues relevant to the LTTE. 
The Tigers have a warm relationship with the North East 
Provincial Council, where tens of millions of dollars 
from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for 
rehabilitation of the north and east are funneled. 
[Note: The Provincial Council functions only as an 
administrative body, as the LTTE has not allowed 
provincial council elections in the north and east in 
over a decade.  UNICEF's Sutaram commented that because 
there are no elected members, the structure is actually 
working very well-ostensibly because political 
interference is minimal and Provincial Council 
administrative representatives are "professional," 
rather than political.  End note.]  Rangarajah strongly 
advocated the implementation of the LTTE's Interim Self 
Governing Authority (ISGA) as a solution to the 
rehabilitation and resettlement needs of people of the 
north and east.  He claimed that the central government 
and national legal system are impediments to these 
processes and suggested that the LTTE could take over 
the administrative machinery needed to accomplish these 
goals instead.  He said that the LTTE is interested in 
learning about development.  [Note: Rangarajah's public 
appointment board showed LTTE meetings scheduled for 
later the same day.  End note.]  Rangarajah also 
confided (please protect) that the LTTE "wanted him to 
work for the ISGA," (for the LTTE)a proposal he said he 
was seriously considering.  Finally, he urged the 
international community and the USG to encourage the 
opposition United National Party (UNP) to support the 
GSL negotiations with the LTTE and declared that there 
will be a decline in the peace process if the "no war/no 
win" situation continues. 
 
Trincomalee Security Situation Mostly Calm 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) Trincomalee appeared calmer than other areas of 
the east, where killings continue almost daily.  GA 
Rodrigo noted that the area was generally peaceful. 
Only one of the dozens of killings by the LTTE in the 
last month has taken place in Trincomalee (reported 
septel).  Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 
interlocutors report that there are few repercussions 
from the LTTE's internal break in March, when eastern 
LTTE military leader Karuna broke away from LTTE supremo 
Prabhakaran.  SLMM contacts noted that most Cease-Fire 
Agreement (CFA) violations in Trinco stem from the 
ambiguous border between LTTE- and GSL-controlled 
territories.  Child abductions and child recruitment are 
also the source of a number of violations, although 
cases reported to the SLMM are declining.  UNICEF's 
Sutaram reported that child recruitment in Trinco is 
slowing, but cautioned that town residents were much 
more likely to report recruitment than rural residents. 
ICRC's Trinco Representative Patrick Walder noted that 
people are coming to ICRC with recruitment complaints, 
but it is ICRC's policy not to share this information 
with the more "political" UN agencies, including UNICEF. 
 
8.  (C) Days after poloff's visit, however, an (anti- 
LTTE) Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) member was 
killed in Trinco on August 10.  In subsequent 
demonstrations, the EPDP accused the LTTE of the murder. 
In an earlier conversation with poloff, Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission Trincomalee Head Dagfinn Aadnanes 
described the EPDP as in "hiding," and not very active. 
He reported that police guard the office and that most 
EPDP members had resigned their membership and now 
support the organization privately instead of publicly. 
Tension between the LTTE and Muslims continues, 
occasionally manifested by hartals (general strikes) 
called by either the LTTE or Muslim community leaders. 
The SLMM reported that while there are allegations of 
radical Muslim groups organizing in Muttur (south of 
Trincomalee), there is no evidence of a serious problem. 
 
A JVP MP from Trinco? 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Jayantha Wijesekera, first-time Marxist 
Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) MP from Trincomalee, is 
an enthusiastic advocate for his adopted constituency - 
self-reported as local farmers and fishermen from Tamil, 
Muslim and Sinhala communities.  A JVP member since 
1986, Wijesekera was originally a paddy farmer, but left 
his own fields to become a community organizer.  He is 
Sinhalese, but switches from Sinhala to Tamil with ease, 
and claims a diverse voter base: 15% Tamil, 25% Muslim, 
and 60% Sinhala.  In a conversation with poloff, 
Wijesekera was more concerned about obtaining 
development resources for his local constituencies, like 
paddy seed and improved irrigation, than with national 
politics.  Trinco GA Rodrigo noted that Mr. Wijesekera 
was the only Trinco MP who has submitted his proposals 
for the approximately US $50,000 funding for development 
proposals each MP is allocated. 
 
10.  (C) Wijesekera's ideas about the peace process are 
in line with the usual JVP rhetoric.  He professes to 
believe in the integration of communities and that, by 
working together for the good of the country, these 
groups will forget their differences.  Wijesekera said 
he envisions achieving peace in Sri Lanka through 
greater state employment which, he explained 
disingenuously, the GSL could achieve simply by building 
more factories.  He asserted that people with jobs and 
full stomachs will forget their differences - and if the 
10,000 GSL job vacancies in the north and east are 
filled, there would be no need for the LTTE's Interim 
Self Governing Authority (ISGA).  He also reported that 
people in Trinco are concerned about the separation of 
the east from the rest of the island, and are worried 
that if peace talks begin there will be a division of 
the country.  Wijesekera asserted that he has proven to 
the LTTE that he is working for all communities.  He 
noted that the LTTE comes to talk to him, although he 
attributed their interest to a turf-conscious concern 
that he is helping Tamils. 
 
Ampara Humanitarian Situation 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C) The population of Ampara, on the southeastern 
coast of the island, has suffered its share of 
displacements due to conflict, but has been able to 
recover more easily than other areas.  A decade ago 
about 10,000 people were displaced - mostly Tamils from 
coastal areas, although some Muslims were also 
displaced.  IDPs stay with friends and family; there are 
no welfare centers in Ampara.  The population of Ampara 
District is 41% Muslim, 40% Sinhala and 18% Tamil. 
Barriers to IDP return are fewer, especially because 
very few areas in Ampara District are landmine-affected. 
However, access to livelihoods continues to be a problem 
for many people, including the area's farmers and 
fishermen.  While Ampara District is considered GSL 
controlled, there are pockets of LTTE-controlled areas. 
Development activities in Ampara, which are supposed to 
be overseen by the GA, appear to lag considerably behind 
initiatives in Trincomalee. 
 
Security Situation: STF Crackdown on LTTE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) The Israeli, British, and U.S. trained 
paramilitary Police Special Task Force (STF) is in 
charge of security for Ampara District, rather than the 
Army.  Some interlocutors report that the LTTE respects 
the STF for its discipline and its fighting ability.  In 
the past decade, many members of this highly trained 
unit have moved to higher positions in Colombo, and some 
high-ranking police interlocutors admit that the STF has 
consequently lost some of its strength.  Following 
Karuna's defection in March, (Reftel A), the situation 
in Ampara became extremely tense, according to SLMM 
interlocutors.  An EPDP politician and town council 
leader of a local village was killed by the LTTE on July 
21 (Reftel B), and the GSL ordered a crackdown on the 
Ampara-area LTTE.  The STF increased its checkpoints and 
policing activities - providing a visible reminder of 
GSL control in Ampara.  The LTTE reacted negatively, 
complaining to the SLMM that the STF was trying to 
provoke the LTTE to break the Cease-Fire Agreement and 
demanded that the STF change its checkpoint procedures. 
After poloff's visit, the SLMM facilitated a meeting 
between the STF and LTTE and worked out one point of 
contention.  Now new checkpoint procedures dictate that 
female STF personnel search female LTTE cadres at 
checkpoints. 
 
13.  (C) Human rights interlocutors note that post- 
Karuna, security in Ampara is tenuous, with continued 
LTTE abductions of children.  They also report that 
human rights violations are committed by both the LTTE 
and the GSL, although the GSL's "violations" primarily 
dealt with its inability to provide government services 
- like distributing food to IDPs - as opposed to the 
LTTE's, which are typically violent. 
 
The Muslim Perspective in Ampara District 
----------------------------------------- 
14.  (C) After the CFA, incidents of kidnapping, vehicle 
theft, ransom and taxation of Muslims in the adjacent 
Ampara District abated.  Muslim interlocutors described 
the sporadic killings of LTTE opponents as an attempt by 
the Tigers to control the area, to gain "a dictatorship." 
M. A. Zubaideen, General Secretary of the Joint Security 
Peace Foundation, a local Muslim group, admitted that the 
larger Muslim population had experienced fewer incidents 
of LTTE intimidation since the CFA.  However, he was very 
concerned about what would happen under the LTTE's 
proposed ISGA.  He said that the "LTTE will never change," 
and that he feared Muslims would suffer under an LTTE 
administration.  He also noted that LTTE taxation and 
extortion of Tamils continues.  When queried about the 
views of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) MPs, Mr. 
Zubaideen charged that the MPs are concerned only about 
themselves and not about their communities, least of all the 
land issues that Muslims in the east are concerned about. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
15.  (C) The Tigers seem to be invested in improving 
both their reputation and their efficacy in Trincomalee 
District.  Never a support base for Karuna, LTTE 
resistance in Trinco comes from Muslims, Sinhalese, and 
EPDP-supporting Tamils.  (In contrast, Karuna enjoys an 
estimated 90% public support in Batticaloa.)  Ongoing 
tit-for-tat violence farther south in Batticaloa and 
Ampara has tied the Tigers' hands - they cannot afford 
to wage anything but a campaign for hearts and minds in 
Trinco.  More frequent Muslim community-orchestrated 
hartals (general strikes) over the past few months 
probably indicate increased Muslim insecurity about the 
LTTE's proposed ISGA, under which Muslims would have 
limited redress from a group that has historically 
mistreated them.  The LTTE is keeping a careful watch on 
anyone helping Tamils - whether it be the JVP or the GSL 
- lest anyone usurp the Tigers' self-proclaimed role as 
savior for the Tamil people.  Meanwhile, inadequate GSL 
development efforts in Ampara leave the area more 
vulnerable to JVP influence in the interior, and LTTE 
influence along the coast.  Throughout the east, the 
LTTE is seeking to educate itself about development, 
likely to prepare for administering its proposed ISGA. 
 
ENTWISTLE 

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