US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2671

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS TO DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: WHY CHAVEZ "WON" 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 2081 
 
     B. CARACAS 2153 
     C. CARACAS 1950 
     D. CARACAS 2432 
     E. CARACAS 2309 
     F. CARACAS 2088 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) The Organization of American States (OAS) and Carter 
Center are auditing ballots now, but assuming that charges of 
electoral fraud are not substantiated, one must ask what 
happened and how Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won the 
August 15 recall referendum by such a large margin.  Chavez 
ran an effective, overwhelming electoral campaign using 
practically unlimited state resources against a divided and 
disorganized opposition.  High oil prices cushioned his 
success.  Chavez also utilized other mechanisms to ensure 
himself victory, including his control over the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) and, by extension, the international 
observer missions.  Chavez created a climate of uncertainty 
for opposition supporters and leaders, who expended enormous 
energy and political capital just to get to the referendum. 
Additionally, the opposition's "Si" campaign never really got 
off the ground, weakened by lack of money and off-target 
messages.  End summary. 
 
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Chavez the Great Campaigner 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Chavez ran an effective, overwhelming electoral 
campaign beginning in July 2003, when his popularity dropped 
to a low 36% in the polls.  Starting with the "Mision 
Robinson" literacy campaign, Chavez began using state 
resources to reach potential voters directly, offering cash 
stipends as well as access to elementary and high school 
degree completion programs.  Defeated most recently during 
the appeals process for presidential recall signatures, he 
then personally took control of the campaign and enlisted his 
ministers and other government officials to marshal the 
resources at their command. 
 
3. (C) Instead of letting the referendum be a Chavez vs. 
Chavez decision, he recast the referendum as an inevitable 
victory for his revolution.  Chavez launched his "No" 
campaign under the direction of the "Comando Maisanta," which 
sold the Chavez twist that the mere calling of the 
referendum, provided for by his own Bolivarian Constitution, 
was a victory for the participatory democracy espoused by his 
revolution (ref A). 
 
4. (C) If the numbers as of August 19 are correct, Chavez 
appears to have successfully mobilized lower class Venezuelan 
voters who have historically abstained from elections.  The 
GOV issued identity cards or "cedulas" to undocumented 
Venezuelans as well as foreigners through an accelerated 
program "Mision Identidad" and put them on the national voter 
registry before rolls closed July 10.  In June, the GOV 
naturalized 105,000 foreigners within one week, as part of 
its goal to naturalize 200,000 before July 10.  The average 
number of naturalizations per year previously had only been 
3,000 to 4,000.  The GOV unabashedly linked cedulas to votes 
for Chavez (ref B). 
 
5. (C) To mobilize the poor, he also fed them various 
populist programs.  High oil prices throughout the campaign, 
in addition to control over other ministry budgets, gave 
Chavez the revenue not only to launch the "No" campaign media 
blitz but also to provide populist food, health, and literacy 
programs for the poor.  Known as "misiones," these programs 
literally put cash into the hands of key voters.  Further, 
Chavez sent the clear message to voters that the opposition 
elite would take away these programs if they returned to 
power. 
 
6. (C) One of the biggest assets to the "No" campaign was 
Chavez, himself.  Throughout the campaign period, he 
continued his "Alo, Presidente" radio programs, held multiple 
marches and public addresses, and stepped up his vitriolic 
language against the U.S., the Bush Administration, 
neo-liberal economic policies, and "Yankee Imperialism."  Our 
policy to avoid bilateral feuding and keep the focus on the 
referendum itself weakened Chavez's strategy of making us a 
central issue.  His anti-American message and the idea that 
President Bush was his true opponent, however, resonated 
among those Chavistas who continue to believe the USG was 
behind the events of April 2002. 
 
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Controlling the CNE 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) Strongly favoring Chavez was his control of the CNE 
and, by extension, the international observer missions.  The 
three pro-government members on the CNE, Francisco 
Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez, and Oscar Battaglini, often 
appeared more ready to impede democratic expression than to 
facilitate it, and made it difficult for the opposition to 
collect the signatures necessary to convoke the referendum. 
Chavez suffered a blow after the signature appeals process, 
but ultimately, he benefited from the drawn out, seven-month 
signature collection and verification process that exhausted 
the opposition.  Chavez campaigned during this time, while 
the opposition was busy wrangling with the CNE over the 
validity of thousands of signatures and rules for the appeals 
process. 
 
8. (C) After the appeals process and clear Chavista 
dissatisfaction with the outspoken role of the Carter Center, 
Organization of American States (OAS), and the Group of 
Friends of the OAS Secretary General on Venezuela, the CNE 
set rules and regulations limiting international observer 
participation in the referendum.  The CNE also instituted 
automated voting over manual voting despite the opposition's 
concerns that an untested, computerized system would leave 
room for fraud and manipulation (ref C). 
 
9. (C) The possibility for fraud and manipulation of 
Smartmatic machine software and CANTV transmissions called 
for more extensive international observation of the process. 
Instead, the CNE initially delayed invitations to 
international observers, limited the number of observers per 
mission and their activities and movement, and banned "quick 
counts" as a methodology to check the accuracy of final vote 
tabulations.  Such limitations led the European Union to 
decline its invitation to observe.  The Carter Center and OAS 
accepted the invitations but had to negotiate with the CNE to 
secure the "minimum conditions" under which they would 
participate as observers.  Only three days before the 
election did the Carter Center get all of its requested 
observers and technicians accredited by the CNE. 
 
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Creating a Climate of Intimidation 
---------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The GOV also created a climate of uncertainty and 
intimidation for opposition supporters to suppress the "Si" 
vote.  Questionable criminal indictments and detentions of 
opposition figures, including Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles, 
Sumate directors Maria Corina Machado and Alejandro Plaz, 
Gente de Petroleo leader Juan Fernandez, retired Army General 
Manuel Rosendo, and Asemblea de Educadores leader Leonardo 
Carvajal, coupled with inexplicable dismissals from 
government service of employees who had participated in the 
signature drive contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust. 
The CNE's decision to use fingerprinting machines 
"cazahuellas" to verify a voter's identity led to the 
widespread belief that a person's vote would not be secret. 
 
11. (C) Other examples of intimidation included attacks on 
media outlets and acts of violence by hard-liner Chavistas 
following the appeals process, accusations against national 
 
 
telecommunications company CANTV and GOV threats that Plan 
Republica was prepared to intervene.  There were also rumors 
that the GOV would cut off gasoline supply to the eastern 
neighborhoods of Caracas, as had happened during the appeals, 
and thinly-veiled threats of violence by senior GOV officials 
(like VP Jose Vincente Rangel) if there was evidence of 
"sabotage" by the "terrorist" opposition. 
 
-------------------------- 
Failed Opposition Campaign 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The opposition's "Si" campaign bloomed late.  The CNE 
announced June 3 that preliminary calculations indicated the 
opposition had collected enough signatures to activate the 
recall referendum, and on June 8, set August 15 as the date 
for the vote.  The opposition's Coordinadora Democratica, 
however, did not launch its presidential recall "Si" campaign 
until June 25.  One Coordinadora advisor noted that an 
agreement between media owners and the GOV brokered by the 
Carter Center weakened the opposition's "air" forces.  The 
opposition, he said, then had to rely on its "ground" forces, 
and Coordinadora political parties and NGOs began working at 
the grassroots level. 
 
13. (C) Some critics of the Coordinadora do not think the 
"Si" campaign really got off the ground until August 1, when 
its leaders signed the "National Accord for Social Justice 
and Democratic Peace," establishing a framework for an 
opposition-led transition government and recommending a 
primary election to determine the unified opposition 
candidate in a follow-on presidential election.  Many 
observers saw this Governance Accord as a tangible 
demonstration of unity by a politically diverse opposition, 
but it did not emerge until less than two weeks before the 
vote (ref D). 
 
14. (C) Polling data before the referendum showed that the 
"Si" campaign was failing to bring in new supporters, 
according to an opposition political consultant.  The 
Coordinadora convinced itself that it was sufficient to have 
Chavez run against Chavez and ran a weak media campaign aimed 
at undecided voters, while others believed the focus should 
be on buttressing core support. 
 
15. (C) The financing for the "Si" campaign was also lacking. 
 Coordinadora advisors told us in mid-July that Chavez's 
success in projecting himself as the winner and polling data 
in his favor led to a drying up of funds from 
opposition-affiliated business executives.  They speculated 
that businesses were reluctant to donate money, and those 
that did, did so in lesser amounts, because they were 
unconvinced the opposition would win and did not want to be 
identified with the opposition if Chavez won.  Movement to 
Socialism (MAS) President and Coordinadora member Felipe 
Mujica confirmed there was a lack of financial support for 
the "Si" campaign when the GOV was clearly outspending the 
opposition (ref E). 
 
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Failed Opposition Leadership 
---------------------------- 
 
16. (C) The opposition relied on the substantial number of 
Venezuelans already dissatisfied with the Chavez 
Administration, the triumph of the signature appeals process, 
anti-Chavez messages already being transmitted by 
opposition-friendly media outlets, and marches to energize 
opposition supporters - but it did not rally behind a single 
leader.  Even though Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza 
emerged from the appeals process victory as the likely 
front-runner in a potential face-off with Chavez, the 
Coordinadora opted to stick with the Chavez vs. Chavez 
strategy. 
 
17. (C) The June 18 meeting of Venezuelan media magnate 
Gustavo Cisneros, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and 
President Chavez behind closed doors at Fuerte Tiuna 
undermined Coordinadora leaders - particularly Enrique 
 
Mendoza - and led opposition supporters to believe business 
leaders had decided to work with the GOV (ref F).  Other 
rumors that Democratic Action (AD) leaders might be cutting 
deals with Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) counterparts had the 
same damaging effect, although to a lesser extent, on the 
"Si" campaign. 
 
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Final Comment 
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18. (C) There are many reasons for Chavez's apparent victory. 
 Even if Chavez could not have won the vote outright, he 
successfully narrowed the margin in the run up to the 
referendum and controlled the CNE so that he probably could 
have stolen it, if necessary.  Identifying the strengths of 
Chavez's campaign, the pressure points within the Venezuelan 
electoral system, and the weaknesses of the opposition's 
campaign and leadership is important, however, for the next 
electoral match against Chavez. 
Shapiro 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02671 - CONFIDENTIAL