US embassy cable - 04VATICAN3197

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

HOLY SEE CLARIFIES POSITION ON NAJAF MEDIATION

Identifier: 04VATICAN3197
Wikileaks: View 04VATICAN3197 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Vatican
Created: 2004-08-18 16:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KIRF PHUM IZ VT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  VATICAN 003197 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, NEA, AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL, KIRF, PHUM, IZ, VT 
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE CLARIFIES POSITION ON NAJAF MEDIATION 
 
REF: LEVIN-HARDT 8/17 E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires, D. Brent Hardt.  Reasons:  1.5 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The Holy See's Acting Foreign Minister 
Pietro Parolin told Charge August 18 that the Holy See would 
be willing to help mediate the standoff in Najaf if all 
parties to the conflict requested it, but had indicated this 
willingness only in response to a public request made by an 
al-Sadr "spokesman."  Charge outlined the U.S. view (reftel) 
that al-Sadr's proposal was merely a delaying tactic, and did 
not reflect a good faith desire to resolve the impasse. 
Charge also emphasized that resolution of the conflict was 
the responsibility of the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), 
which was best placed to determine the way forward.  Parolin 
noted that the Holy See had come under intense pressure from 
the media late August 15 to respond to the al-Sadr "proposal" 
and had issued their standard statement of Holy See 
willingness to provide good offices when all parties to a 
conflict request such support. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) During an August 18 call on Acting FM-equivalent 
Monsignor Pietro Parolin, Charge solicited clarification of 
recent press reports of Vatican willingness to help mediate a 
resolution to the current standoff in Najaf.  Parolin 
responded that the Holy See was eager to hear what the U.S. 
thought of the idea, which had first been floated August 15 
by al-Sadr "spokesman" Ahmad al-Shaybani.  Drawing from 
reftel, Charge said the proposal did not appear genuine. 
Al-Sadr was playing for time and playing to the media, but 
did not appear to be seriously interested in resolving the 
standoff.  Moreover, his broader agenda -- to disrupt 
progress toward democracy and move towards a theocratic state 
infused with a radical Shi'a outlook -- was contrary to U.S. 
and Holy See goals for Iraq. 
 
3. (C) Parolin expressed appreciation for the U.S. 
perspective, noting that since this issue first came to their 
attention, the Holy See had not had any input on the 
coalition attitude toward such mediation.  He said that 
Cardinal Sodano had told him that the media was "persecuting" 
him for a response on the plane back from the Pope's trip to 
Lourdes, which had prompted the Secretary of State to issue 
his first statement on the matter to the effect that "if 
requested, the Pope will allow this mediation."  He 
elaborated further, noting that the "whole endeavor of the 
Pope and the Holy See is an endeavor of mediation," and that 
he could envisage a "good offices" mediation aimed at 
encouraging concerned parties to talk.  Sodano had also 
condemned ongoing killings in Najaf as "a dishonor for Islam" 
and appealed for respect for the sacred character of the city. 
 
4. (C)  Following continued media speculation, Parolin said 
the Vatican press office issued a further clarification 
August 17 in which it stressed the general nature of the 
Vatican offer, since the Vatican had never actually received 
any formal request for mediation.  The Vatican spokesman 
explained that "the Holy See is always ready to help the 
parties so they can talk and dialogue, on the condition that 
there really is a will to undertake peaceful ways for the 
solution of conflicts."  CDA noted that the recent statements 
from the al-Sadr spokesman, which attempted to portray the 
mediation as a Papal initiative -- and not something Al-Sadr 
had first raised -- offered further confirmation that the 
proposal was not intended to be taken seriously. 
 
5. (C)  Parolin indicated that should there ever be interest 
in Vatican mediation, their Nuncio in Baghdad, Fernando 
Filoni, would likely undertake such an effort.  At the same 
time, the Holy See would be willing to send a special envoy 
if the occasion should ever arise.  He said the Nuncio 
personally had no further details on the alleged al-Sadr 
proposal.  The Nuncio had observed publicly that it would be 
"useless to make predictions until (al-Sadr) clarifies his 
real intentions."   Parolin said he understood that the 
disarmament of al-Sadr's forces remained the sticking point 
in any durable political solution to the standoff. 
 
6. (C) Parolin did express the Holy See's mounting concern 
about the flight of Christians from Iraq in the wake of the 
recent bombings of Christian churches.  The Vatican has heard 
that 40,000 Christians had fled since the attacks, primarily 
to Syria and Jordan, compounding an exodus that had begun in 
the wake of the war.  Despite the Chaldean community's deep 
historic roots in Iraq, Christians were becoming identified 
with the West and with the military presence. 
 
7. (C) Parolin queried whether the U.S. had concerns about 
Iran's role in the Najaf uprising, and said the Holy See 
would be interested in hearing if there were firm indications 
 
of Iranian involvement.  Parolin also asked about the UN's 
role, and when it would step forward to play a greater role. 
Charge conveyed a copy of USAID's recent summary of progress 
in Iraq, "A Year in Iraq," noting that despite problems there 
were positive developments.  Parolin welcomed this 
information, but concluded that until the security situation 
improved significantly, the outlook for further progress 
would be bleak. 
 
HARDT 
 
 
NNNN 

 2004VATICA03197 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04