US embassy cable - 04SANAA2006

S E C R E T SANAA 002006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2014 
TAGS: KISL, PARM, PGOV, PINR, PTER, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: YEMEN:  AL-HOUTHI INSURGENCY CONTINUES UNABATED 
 
REF: SANAA 1962 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 (b), (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary.  The conflict continues between ROYG forces 
and armed-supporters of rebel Shi'ite cleric al-Houthi.  The 
fighting remains concentrated in the northern Marran 
mountains, although some fighting has been reported in urban 
centers in the Sa'da governate.  Although the crisis has yet 
to spin out of control, senior ROYG officials continue to 
express concern that pockets of al-Houthi supporters are 
operating in other areas of the country.  End Summary. 
 
Where is the Fighting? 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S/NF) ROYG forces continue to battle armed supporters of 
rebel Shi'ite cleric al-Houthi in the mountainous Marran area 
around Sa'da.  Fighting remains concentrated on two main 
peaks, but Yemeni press reports indicate for the first time 
that fighting has extended to the suburbs of Sa'da, causing 
non-combatant casualties and material damage.  (Note: DATT 
and CT Advisor have been aware for some time of isolated 
fighting in urban Sa'da.  Additionally the Yemen Air Forces' 
use of MIGs to bomb al-Houthi encampments in Marran is 
causing considerable collateral damage, without achieving 
substantial military gains.  End Note.)  Contrary to ROYG 
public statements, we believe there are roughly 20,000 Yemeni 
Regular Army and Central Security Forces in the region 
engaged with around 4000 insurgents. 
 
Saleh Fears Expansion of the Conflict 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (S/NF)  Saleh continues to press for U.S. assistance to 
quell the insurgency.  Expressing anxiety that the conflict 
may expand, senior ROYG officials have requested U.S. 
intelligence support to locate "isolated pockets" of 
al-Houthi supporters in "other areas" of the country.  (Note: 
 The USG has already provided military assistance to the 
Yemenis by training the Ministry of Interior's Special 
Central Security Forces and Army Special Forces, as well as 
providing Falconview Mapping technology.  We have not seen 
evidence of the technology being put to use, but the Minister 
of Interior told Ambassador and DCM in a August 18 meeting 
that the Special CSF forces were being deployed north that 
evening.  End Note). 
 
4. (C)  In an effort to circle the wagons, Saleh gathered 
Sa'da tribal sheikhs, dignitaries, and local officials in the 
capital on August 16, urging them to "play their role to 
eradicate this evil seed and to control extremism" in their 
region.  The Sa'da elite had a mixed-response, ranging from 
affirmation that the al-Houthi trend was dangerous to the 
state and to Islam, to complaints that the Sa'da leadership 
was not consulted until the situation got out of control. 
 
Could "al-Houthism" Spread? 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Comment:  It is unlikely that al-Houthi's Shia 
teachings, modeled on the Iranian Twelver Imam school of 
thought, will take root in majority Sunni Yemen or gain a 
true following beyond the loyal students who make up his 
vanguard.  Underlying political support for al-Houthi among 
Yemenis, where it exists, may be attributed to an 
undercurrent of anti-regime sentiment, and perhaps a certain 
joy in seeing Saleh's nose bloodied.  The heavy casualties 
sustained by the ROYG forces so far can be politically 
absorbed if the state prevails in the near future.  A 
prolonged conflict and/or a a runaway al-Houthi may make 
Saleh's regime vulnerablity to other potential rebels around 
the country. 
KRAJESKI