US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI2809

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT 
 
E.O. 12958 DECL: 8/17/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, ECON, EFIN, UN, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF GCC FORCES TO IRAQ 
 
REF: A) ABU DHABI 2577  B) STATE 166158 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.5 
(b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Special Assistant to Abu Dhabi Deputy Prime Minister and 
UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed, 
Yousef al-Otaiba, in a courtesy call on the Ambassador, passed 
to us a paper analyzing the pros and cons of deployment of GCC 
forces to Iraq, which he said was prepared by the Emirates 
Center for Strategic Studies and Research and reflected the 
views of the UAEG.  The paper concludes that operational 
obstacles, such as questions over command and control, the risks 
of growing opposition domestically and regionally, and the 
likelihood of significant casualties, could make the deployment 
politically and militarily impossible at this time.  However, 
the paper does not close the door to an eventual deployment, 
noting that under the right conditions, a GCC deployment could 
help develop the GCC as a regional entity, both on the political 
and military levels, with the possible added benefit of 
presenting a deterrent to Iran. 
 
2. (C) Al-Otaiba explained that it is difficult for the armed 
forces of the GCC countries to deploy outside of a GCC umbrella. 
In regard to a potential deployment to Iraq, al-Otaiba noted 
that the IIG does not want forces from neighboring countries 
deployed inside Iraq.  This excludes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
The other four GCC countries do not have the manpower or 
resources to deploy without support from the much larger Saudi 
military. 
 
3. (C) In response to Otaiba's explanation for why the UAE would 
not send its own forces to Iraq in the near term, the DCM urged 
the UAE to endorse the concept of providing financial support to 
third countries that agreed to deploy forces to Iraq to support 
the UN (refs. A and B).  Noting that the U.S. was working with 
the IIG and the UN to support their efforts to establish a 
dedicated security force for the UN, the DCM told al-Otaiba that 
the U.S. was not looking to be an intermediary in the financial 
transactions.  Rather, the UAE would provide its support 
bilaterally to troop donors.  Al-Otaiba told DCM he would convey 
this message to MbZ and get back to him. 
 
4. (U) Begin Text of UAE paper: THE DEPLOYMENT OF A GCC 
PEACEKEEPING CONTINGENT TO IRAQ: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
It is necessary to address the deployment of a GCC peacekeeping 
contingent within a wider context of the unfolding security and 
political realities within Iraq, regional concerns and 
sensitivities, and developments in the international arena. 
This requires serious consideration by members of the GCC whose 
long-term interests will be best be served by integrating Iraq 
within a post-Saddam regional security architecture.  The 
escalating security crisis within Iraq has the potential to have 
grave regional geo-strategic implications.  However, a desire to 
co-opt Iraq within this regional arrangement must not be allowed 
to override more pressing realities on the ground that currently 
are not conducive to the deployment of a GCC peacekeeping 
contingent to Iraq. 
 
The continuation of major military operations throughout Iraq 
negates the notion of a peacekeeping force.  Peacekeeping has a 
stabilizing role in a post-war situation, but is not applicable 
in a war situation, replete with major urban warfare and large- 
scale coordinated rebellion, as exists in Iraq.  The reality is 
that any peacekeeping force would fall under the command of the 
U.S. military and, as such, would be seen as an extension of the 
U.S. occupation. (1) 
 
Advantages Associated With the Deployment of A Peacekeeping 
Contingent 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
The positive potential of a GCC deployment includes the 
following considerations: In addition to honoring the requests 
of the current, UN-approved government of Iraq, GCC involvement 
may help inject a greater level of legitimacy to the United 
Nations process, leading to elections in January 2005. 
Furthermore, a GCC taskforce would lend itself to Arab 
solidarity and territorial integrity, bringing closer to the 
GCC, with tangible geo-political gains.  Certainly, sharing a 
common language and culture will increase the effectiveness of 
the operation. 
 
Such a move may also foster a greater level of military 
cooperation between GCC partners (2).  It will help shed the 
image of the GCC as a "talk shop," sending a new signal that the 
GCC intends to play a more active role in the post-Saddam 
regional security arrangement.  This deployment would establish 
a precedent, as it would be the first time the GCC would 
collectively operate outside the borders of its members.  It is 
a marked departure from defensive to pro-active operations. 
These two facts, operating outside member territories and 
engaging in peacekeeping, present the opportunity of strategic 
evolution. 
 
As was the case with NATO, which played a primarily defensive 
role for much of its history until the conflict in Kosovo (3), 
the GCC's involvement in Iraq presents a similar opportunity. 
Finally, like NATO, the GCC would further demonstrate its 
commitment to multilateralism.  This commitment has the effect 
of putting pressure on proponents of unilateralism.  Yet, it 
will not serve long-term security requirements for the Gulf 
region to alienate their security guarantors within the United 
States, with whom they have forged a mutually accommodating 
security arrangement. 
 
The role of Iran is also a matter of geo-strategic concern. GCC 
collective action in creating a stable Iraq would be a new 
strategic factor for Iran, which currently holds a very strong 
position.  This Iranian strength is in part due to its ability 
to influence internal actors, such as the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  That being said, Iran could 
very well perceive GCC participation as a threat, and respond 
with direct or covert aggression (e.g., against GCC peacekeeping 
units or against member states, etc.). 
 
Disadvantages Associated With the Deployment of A Peacekeeping 
Contingent 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
This raises discussion of the more difficult aspects of such a 
mission.  In the current climate the GCC would enter a stage 
with regional powers like the United States, Turkey, Israel (4), 
and Iran.  The GCC forces would face the risk of becoming 
entangled in Iraq's religious and ethnic conflicts.  How then 
will the role of the GCC be received by the Iraqi people?  Will 
this lead to confrontations with Iraqi civilians?  Would the GCC 
units become marked targets for terror attacks?  Militant 
leaders in Iraq have already made it clear that they would 
consider an Arab force as a legitimate target.  Abd al-Hadi al- 
Darraji, from Al-Sadr's bureau stated that any Arab force would 
be treated as "occupying forces and forces that are helping the 
occupation complicate the situation in Iraq."(5) If this 
scenario emerges and deaths mount, what of the domestic 
political consequences to GCC members? 
 
The GCC currently enjoys good relations with the Iraqi people. 
A peacekeeping contingent, operating under the command structure 
of U.S. occupying forces, could find itself participating in 
offensive operations.  This would be a violation of the very 
heart of the peacekeeping mission, and would result in both 
substantial casualties and severe damage to the reputation of 
the GCC among the Iraqi people. 
 
On another level the GCC faces the possibility of problems of 
cooperation.  Militarily the GCC is essentially a defensive 
organization and may well face operational challenges, at least 
initially, were it to expand its role.  The political consensus 
may also be hard to reach, and could be shattered should one of 
the countries decide to withdraw its troops in response to 
domestic or military pressures.  Such a move could have far- 
reaching implications for GCC relations. 
 
An important issue concerning GCC participation is the question 
of US willingness to have regional forces intervene.  Colin 
Powell's initial reaction to the Saudi proposal for Muslim 
troops from non-neighboring countries was luke-warm at best. 
Even if a GCC contingent was deployed to Iraq, it would risk 
being used as a shield for US troops, and more importantly being 
perceived that way.  Even if GCC peacekeepers were in Iraq under 
the auspices of a UN resolution, or that of another multilateral 
body, in practical terms there can be little doubt that the 
tactical operations of the GCC contingent would fall under the 
direct influence of the U.S. military.  This further increases 
the danger of this mission being perceived as endorsing US 
occupation, which itself does not accept that its military 
operations in Iraq should come under the control of any other 
organization.  The peacekeepers of the GCC would then face 
greater danger as a result of the uncertainty over the chain of 
command in Iraq peacekeeping operations. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
On a strategic and abstract level there are clear benefits to 
sending a GCC contingent of peacekeepers to help regain 
stability in Iraq, but certainly the practical obstacles would 
be too great to advocate such a move.  The deployment would help 
in the continuing development of the GCC as a regional entity, 
both on a political and military level, possibly with the added 
benefit of presenting a deterrent to Iran.  It would also help 
in the process of encouraging a broadening of multilateral 
ideals in regional international affairs.  However, the 
operational obstacles, such as questions over command and 
control, the risks of growing opposition domestically and 
regionally, and the likelihood of significant casualties could 
make the deployment politically and militarily (sic). 
 
Finally, if the decision were taken to deploy a peacekeeping 
contingent, the mandate of such a mission would have to 
explicitly prevent GCC troops from being stationed in areas of 
heightened ethnic and sectarian sensitivities. 
 
Footnotes 
--------- 
 
(1) In an interview on 17 July, Iraq Prime Minister Iyad Allawi 
clearly stated, "The multinational forces are under the command 
of the United Nations and since the United States has the 
largest force, then it is natural that they are under its 
command," in "Iraq PM says UN Arab contingent will be under US 
command," Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 18 
July 2004. 
 
(2) The establishment of the peninsula shield force in 1982 
provided a clearly defined military dimension to the 
organization.  A peacekeeping contingent in Iraq may help the 
GCC make the leap from a defensive entity into a more pro-active 
body. 
 
(3) The performance of UAE peacekeepers in Kosovo was widely 
hailed as a success by the international community.  Combined 
with the mine clearing operation in south Lebanon, the UAE could 
lend its experience in post conflicts situations to a GCC 
peacekeeping contingent. 
 
(4) See Seymour Hersh, "PLAN B: as June 30th approaches, Israel 
looks to the Kurds," New Yorker 28 June 2004. 
 
(5) "Al-Jazeera talk show on Saudi plan to send Muslim troops to 
Iraq," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 5 August 2004. 
 
End Text 
 
SISON