US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1362

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  08-18-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, JA, EU, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  EU AND JAPAN TALK TOUGH TO TIGERS 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 1323, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The EU troika and the Japanese 
ambassador both delivered tough messages to LTTE 
political chief Thamilchelvan on killings, child 
soldiers and a rapid return to the peace table. 
Thamilchelvan told all that the LTTE is committed to a 
federal solution in accordance with the Oslo declaration 
and that the LTTE-proposed ISGA is a stepping stone in 
that direction.  Both the EU and the Japanese noted that 
Thamilchelvan has dropped his rhetoric about not being 
able to return to the peace table until the Karuna issue 
is under control.  Moreover, the Norwegian Charge', to 
his surprise, found Thamilchelvan willing to discuss 
dates for peace talk resumption during his weekend trip 
to Kilinochchi.  The Norwegians here see the need for 
several weeks of "quiet diplomacy" to give them "room to 
maneuver" while the EU and Japan do not see the need for 
a co-chair's statement now but defer to their capitals. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Dutch Ambassador Blankhart and EU Charge' Wilton 
hosted an informal co-chairs meeting August 17 to brief 
on the previous day's EU meeting in Kilinochchi with 
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) political chief 
Thamilchelvan.  Japanese Ambassador Suda also reviewed 
his August 15 meeting with Thamilchelvan and Norwegian 
Charge' Laegreid brought the co-chairs up to date on his 
recent circuit-riding between the LTTE and the GSL. 
 
Japanese Perspective 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) Invited to go first, Japanese Ambassador Suda 
advised that he had focused on three points with 
Thamilchelvan.  First, Tokyo is seriously worried about 
the current political impasse on peace talks and is 
especially frustrated with the LTTE since, in Tokyo's 
view, President Kumaratunga (CBK) has made concessions 
which the LTTE has not reciprocated.  Japan believes it 
is time for the LTTE to "get serious."  Second, Suda 
said he laid down a strong marker about the recent 
uptick in killings and told Thamilchelvan that it is 
clear that for at least the last month the killings have 
been in one direction:  "headquarters LTTE" killing 
Karuna LTTE and members of other Tamil groups like the 
EPDP.  Finally, the LTTE must reconfirm its commitment 
to the tenets of the Oslo declaration, especially the 
commitment to a federal solution.  It is not 
constructive for the LTTE to only talk about its Interim 
Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. 
 
4. (C) In response, Suda said, Thamilchelvan "smiled and 
nodded as usual" but did not deny responsibility for 
killings (but did repeat his familiar language about how 
it is the GSL's responsibility to uphold security in its 
areas).  Asked what the major LTTE "obstacles" were in 
getting back to the peace table, Thamilchelvan said 
"confusion in the South" with too many voices holding 
forth on the peace process.  On federalism, 
Thamilchelvan said it was not possible under the current 
constitution and the Tamil people "could not wait" for 
constitutional reform.  Thus, a "more immediate" 
solution must be found.  He stressed to Suda, however, 
that the LTTE no longer desires a separate state and 
that the ISGA is a stepping stone to a solution within 
the context of a united Sri Lanka. 
 
5. (C) Thamilchelvan also told Suda that LTTE remains 
committed to the Oslo Declaration.  Norwegian Charge' 
Laegreid interjected that Thamilchelvan has reaffirmed 
LTTE commitment to the Oslo Declaration in recent 
conversations "without us having to solicit such 
reaffirmation."  The Norwegians have also been hearing 
the "within a united Sri Lanka" formulation lately and 
find this positive. 
Tough Talk from the EU 
---------------------- 
6. (C) Turning to the EU meeting, Blankhart said that 
the EU troika (Blankhart, Wilton and UK High 
Commissioner Evans) had hit Thamilchelvan hard on LTTE 
killings.  They noted that the EU had issued a balanced 
statement in early July calling on all sides to refrain 
from violence.  Now the situation was different, with 
only Kilinochchi LTTE carrying out killings.  As with 
the Japanese, Thamilchelvan did not deny the killings. 
Blankhart said the troika also hit Thamilchelvan hard on 
child soldiers, noting that recruitments were continuing 
and that the LTTE had lost all credibility on the issue. 
Thamilchelvan admitted the LTTE was "not in compliance" 
with the UNICEF program but then lapsed into the "usual" 
line about how "the children come to us so what can we 
do?"  Blankhart said she cut off Thamilchelvan and told 
him it was very clear what the LTTE should do: turn any 
and all child soldiers over to UNICEF rapidly and 
transparently. 
 
7. (C) Blankhart said the troika was also blunt about 
the need to get back to the table, echoing the Japanese 
formulation that CBK has made concessions but the LTTE 
has not.  Thamilchelvan demurred, stating that the LTTE 
no longer insisting on a separate state is a "concession 
for peace."  He then started his argument about how the 
proliferation of "voices" in the south is an obstacle to 
peace.  Blankhart said she told Thamilchelvan that in 
democracies there are always "many voices" speaking out 
on all issues and that this is a good thing.  She told 
Thamilchelvan that the only voice in the South he needed 
to listen to was the President's.  Asked about adherence 
to Oslo and the role of the ISGA, Thamilchelvan told the 
EU ("he made it very clear") that the ISGA is something 
to be negotiated with the GSL, not something that the 
LTTE will insist the GSL accept or reject.  Moreover, 
Thamilchelvan stated, "the ISGA should lead to the 
federal solution that was discussed in Oslo." 
 
Karuna Obsession Over? 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Both the Japanese and the EU troika noted that 
Thamilchelvan did not raise his long-familiar talking 
point that there can be no progress on a return to the 
peace table until the Karuna issue is resolved.  Indeed, 
they had to raise Karuna and the situation in the East 
with Thamilchelvan.  Both parties said that their clear 
impression is that the LTTE leadership believes it has 
gotten control of the Karuna issue and made progress on 
reasserting control over the East.  Norwegian Charge' 
Laegreid concurred, noting that the LTTE has indeed 
dropped its "Karuna obstacle" language and now is "back 
to arguing about wording and linguistics." 
 
Norwegians See Some Hope (Maybe) 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) In that vein, Laegreid noted that when he met 
with Thamilchelvan last weekend, the LTTE political 
chief had told him that the LTTE would not accept any 
GSL language on an interim authority as the basis for a 
return to peace talks.  Rather, only the ISGA could be 
the basis for discussion.  Laegreid had earlier on 
August 17 conveyed this message to GSL Peace Secretariat 
Jayantha Dhanapala who had instructed Laegreid to tell 
the LTTE that the GSL would never agree.  ("I don't even 
have to go to the President with this.")  Laegreid said 
he had passed the GSL view back to the LTTE by phone and 
expected to have a reply from them by the end of the 
week.  Meanwhile, Laegreid said, the GSL continues to 
work on its own interim authority proposal which it 
probably will not make public before the next round of 
talks to "avoid having it picked apart in the press." 
 
10. (C) Laegreid also reported that in his weekend 
meeting with the LTTE, the Tigers had launched into 
their usual riff about the longsuffering Tamil people 
who were not getting their share of development 
assistance, etc.  Laegreid said he had cut them off and 
told them that development assistance would not flow 
until progress was under way towards a "final solution." 
If the LTTE really cares about the Tamil people, why are 
they dragging their feet on peace?  This engendered an 
intense LTTE sidebar conversation in Tamil.  After a few 
minutes of this, Laegreid interrupted to say, "what 
about returning to talks in mid-September?" 
Thamilchelvan said they could not, since there will be a 
large Tamil meeting in Geneva then.  But, to Laegreid's 
surprise, the LTTE leader said "What about early 
October?"  Laegreid said he had raised that time period 
with Dhanapala earlier on August 17 and the Peace 
Secretariat chief had said that would be fine with the 
 
SIPDIS 
GSL.  Laegreid had conveyed that back to Kilinochchi, 
along with a message from Dhanapala that the GSL cannot 
be expected to "sit idly by" while the LTTE kills Sri 
Lankan citizens. 
 
11. (C) Laegreid emphasized that it was not clear if 
Thamilchelvan had the authority to seriously discuss 
dates or not.  Nonetheless, the Norwegians had found it 
encouraging and see it as a possible sign that the LTTE 
realizes they have to move on peace talks.  Laegreid 
said that there is "no timetable" for Solheim or 
Helgesen to come back in the near future (local press 
reports notwithstanding) but that could "change rapidly" 
depending on events on the ground. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
12. (C) Blankhart and Suda both felt that the LTTE, 
having been hit hard by the EU and Japan, would need 
some time to take this on board and consider next steps. 
Laegreid observed that Thamilchelvan needs time to 
"ponder" and the Norwegians need "time to maneuver" and 
continue "quiet diplomacy" in light of the discussion of 
dates and the apparent LTTE dropping of the "Karuna 
obstacle."  Thus, a co-chair's statement now probably 
was not needed although this was a matter for capitals 
to decide.  Laegreid said Helgesen would be talking 
shortly with Deputy Secretary Armitage and with Japanese 
envoy Akashi (we understand the conversation with the 
Deputy Secretary occurred overnight). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C) The tough EU and Japanese messages seem to have 
been heard loud and clear although it is impossible to 
know whether Thamilchelvan reports back accurately to 
his masters and to what extent they care what the EU and 
Japan think.  Both Thamilchelvam's mention of dates for 
peace talks and his apparently newfound lack of concern 
on the Karuna "obstacle" are noteworthy, although many 
semantic differences remain to be ironed out before the 
LTTE and the GSL agree on what would be discussed at the 
next round.  Meanwhile, the Norwegians continue to 
deliver quite a bit of mail in both directions.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
ENTWISTLE