US embassy cable - 04ANKARA4600

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH TURKISH MFA ON TRUCKER 
SECURITY ISSUE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4529 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. EUR/SE EMAIL TO EMB ANKARA 08-13-2004 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Following MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin calling in the DCM (ref 
a), MFA Deputy Director General Sakir Fakili held a 
preliminary follow-up meeting with emboffs Aug. 13.  Fakili 
stressed the importance of secure transfer and offload 
facilities, enhanced convoy security, and insurance 
assistance.  He proposed that we attend a larger meeting of 
MFA and the major trucking companies and concerned export 
associations.  MFA officials are unhappy about Iraqi customs 
officials and regulations, though these are more related to 
the economic interests of the truckers, not their security. 
The Turks plan to raise trucker security with IIG President 
al-Yawar during his Aug. 16-17 visit to Ankara.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) MFA Deputy Director General for Bilateral Economic 
Relations Sakir Fakili called in Acting EconCouns and 
PolMilOff Aug. 13 to discuss GOT proposals to improve the 
security situation for Turkish truckers in Iraq (ref A). 
Fakili noted that he understood that we did not yet have 
guidance from Washington on the Turkish non-paper on this 
subject that MFA Deputy Under Secretary Ilkin had handed the 
DCM on Aug. 11 (see ref a).  As Ilkin's designated POC to the 
Embassy on trucker security, Fakili said he simply wanted us 
to meet him and his staff and begin to engage in a dialogue 
on this matter. 
 
3. (C) Fakili said that with the Aug. 2 murder of Turkish 
hostage Murat Yuce in Iraq and the continuing press 
coverage of kidnappings and attacks on Turkish truckers, this 
had become a "humanitarian issue" for the GOT.  He 
went over what he considered to be three primary steps that 
Turkey, the U.S., and/or the Iraqis might do to provide for a 
more secure environment: 
 
--the establishment of secure "transfer places" for 
offloading, layover, and maintenance of Turkish trucks.  He 
identified Zahko and the already-established fuel offloading 
site 10 km north of Mosul as possible sites.  He 
said that the major Turkish trucking associations, UND 
(International Transporters Association) and RODER, could 
play a role in financing these sites. 
 
--reinforcement of convoy protection by coalition forces. 
Fakili brought out the oft-repeated Turkish claim that 
coalition convoy security consists of only one vehicle 
driving far ahead of the convoy.  Fakili passed on Turkish 
truckers, request that (unless this is the case already) 
convoy protection vehicles travel behind or to the side of 
their trucks. 
 
--provision of insurance assistance for Turkish drivers and 
companies.  Fakili said that firms usually cannot 
accurately document losses due to terrorism in Iraq, and they 
also complain that premiums are now prohibitive.  He 
noted that the MFA has approached Turkish insurance 
companies, requesting that the companies study the 
possibility of offering truckers insurance against terrorism 
in Iraq. 
 
4. (C) Fakili reported that the MFA has met repeatedly over 
the past two weeks with the major trucking company 
associations (UND and RODER) and major export associations to 
discuss their concerns and possible solutions.  Fakili 
asked that emboffs consider attending such a meeting to hear 
directly from the associations.  He added that perhaps an 
outcome of such a meeting could be an MOU between the USG, 
the GOT, and the IIG.  While expressing concerns about 
participating in a single, large meeting of this type, 
emboffs said we would take this back for discussion, and 
that we would continue to seek Washington's and Embassy 
Baghdad's input.  We also pointed out that the security 
issue was of course one for the Iraqis as well.  Fakili took 
the point, noting that of course this was a major 
topic for President al-Yawar's visit to Ankara Aug. 16-17. 
 
5. (C) Acting EconCouns responded that the USG took the issue 
of security for Turkish truckers very seriously, but 
highlighted the difficulty for the coalition to reinforce 
trucking convoys in the context of the overall security 
environment in Iraq.  He noted the difficulty of dealing with 
this complex problem from Ankara, but repeated our 
willingness to work with the GOT and IIG on this matter. 
PolMilOff asked some specific questions regarding recent 
attacks: Where precisely have the Turkish truckers been 
attacked?  Were the trucks in coalition-protected convoys at 
the time and, if so, under what circumstances?  Fakili 
admitted that he did not have this information at hand but 
thought the truckers' associations might have more detailed 
information. 
 
6. (C) Fakili responded that he understood the need to work 
with the Iraqis, but seemed skeptical about the Iraqi 
authorities' ability to handle the issue at hand.  He claimed 
that Turkey is now number three (behind the U.S. and UK) on 
the list of countries who have lost people in Iraq, with 21 
deaths and 25-30 unaccounted for.  Akif Ayhan, MFA's Head of 
Desk for Bilateral Economic Affairs (Fakili's subordinate), 
cited reports that Iraqi police had actually handed over at 
least one Turkish trucker to the insurgents.  Fakili reported 
that Turkish-Iraqi trade so far in 2004 had exceeded the US$ 
one billion estimated for all of 2003; the financial benefit 
for Turkish truckers, who can make US$ 1000 for three trips 
to Iraq per month, was important. 
 
7. (C) Ayhan then launched into a critique of the Iraqi 
administration of the border, complaining that Iraq was 
about to impose a "severe" limitation on the amount of fuel 
Turkish trucks may carry from Iraq back into Turkey. 
(Note: Turkish truckers are widely reported to be bringing 
fuel into Iraq under coalition contract, but then buying 
cheap Iraqi fuel for re-sale in Turkey.  In fact, this trade 
increases Turkish truckers' risk profile, since they 
reportedly leave convoy protection to obtain the Iraqi fuel. 
End note.)  Ayhan also accused Kurdish IIG customs officials 
of imposing arbitrary fees and fines on Turkish truckers; he 
claimed that these officials do not enforce Iraqi federal 
law, only their own wishes.  He added that the weekly border 
meetings among IIG, GOT, and coalition personnel are 
"insufficient."  We asked Ayhan if these issues were really 
security-related, and Fakili brought the 
subject back to security, closing the meeting by again 
requesting us to attend a larger meeting with MFA and the 
trucking and export associations. 
 
8. (C) Comment: The Turks are anxious to prove to their 
public and the press that they are serious about trucker 
security, but post notes that both commercial and coalition 
traffic from Turkey into Iraq remains at the same level as 
before the Aug. 2 Yuce murder and the UND's subsequent call 
for a ban on trucking in support of the coalition.  The 
economic incentives Fakili himself cited in para. six are 
simply too strong for the Turks to turn off the tap, but an 
increase in violence against Turks in Iraq could affect 
public opinion sufficiently to increase the pressure on the 
GOT, or could convince a significant number of truckers that 
the risks outweigh the gain.  Post is not inclined to agree 
to MFA's request to attend a large group meeting in Ankara on 
this subject, but emboffs could meet with the parties 
concerned one-on-one.  We cannot imagine what purpose the 
suggestion of an MOU would serve. 
 
9. (C) Post awaits the Department's guidance in responding to 
the Turkish non-paper in ref A.  We suggest it is important 
to help the GOT appear to be trying to address the risks of 
working in Iraq.  Any measures to improve security for 
Turkish truckers would help assuage Turkish public opinion 
and maintain GOT support for trucking and contracting into 
Iraq.  (Note: Reports reached Ankara Aug. 16 of the 
kidnapping of two more Turkish drivers in Iraq engaged in 
delivering water for the USG.  End note.)  End comment. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN