US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1048

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, PRM, DRL 
STATE PASS AID/ANE CHRISTINE WEGMAN 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2014 
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, EAID, PINS, PGOV, BM, Human Rights, Ethnics, NGO 
SUBJECT: UNHCR LOOKS FOR SHORT-TERM FUNDS FOR EASTERN 
PROJECTS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 5226 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 574 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. CHIANG MAI 139 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. RANGOON 405 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: CDA a.i. Ron McMullen for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: UNHCR's activities in the recently opened 
eastern border areas are gaining momentum.  As the GOB 
expands its preparations for possible future repatriation of 
refugees in Thailand, the UNHCR is expanding its roving 
presence and basic infrastructure work.  We support the UNHCR 
request for some short-term funds to get a larger expatriate 
presence in the region, a hotbed of human rights abuses, as 
soon as possible.  End summary. 
 
GOB Gets its Act Together 
 
2. (SBU) UNHCR's Rangoon representative Rajiv Kapur told the 
Chief of Mission on July 21st that UNHCR staff had just 
completed a fourth trip to the Thai border regions (areas of 
Karen and Mon States and Tanintharyi Division) since a 
February agreement with the GOB to allow UNHCR access to 
assess conditions for potential repatriation of refugees from 
Thailand (refs A and B).  Kapur said he was very pleased to 
see that the various Burmese army regional and tactical 
commanders in the area, after initial suspicion and reluctant 
cooperation, had come to "accept UNHCR's mandate" and are now 
helpful in facilitating UNHCR's trips.  Kapur reported no 
difficulties in going wherever and meeting with whomever he 
wanted. 
 
3. (C) He also said that the GOB is going full steam ahead in 
preparing the area for the potential returnees.  The 
government is actively upgrading 57 village tracts to 
sub-township level and planning for constructing schools, 
hospitals, and, naturally, offices for local "Peace and 
Development" Councils and Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (the regime's mass member organization) branches. 
 Kapur, one of the savviest UN officials in Burma, said it 
was evident this development campaign was primarily to ensure 
the regime's immediate political control of returnees.  Kapur 
said he has made it clear to GOB authorities that UNHCR would 
not support forced resettlement of returnees, when the time 
comes, to these sub-townships.  Returnees must have the right 
to settle in the towns or in the surrounding countryside as 
they chose. 
 
UNHCR Outreach Gets Moving 
 
4. (SBU) Nonetheless, Kapur was quite excited by plans for 
immediate UNHCR activity.  Though planning repatriation would 
wait until the government had finalized a cease-fire with the 
Karen National Union (KNU; refs C and D), there is work to be 
done for UNHCR upgrading water systems, sanitation, and 
existing schools and clinics.  He said the baseline 
conditions in the eastern border areas are far better than in 
northern Rakhine State (on the Bangladesh border) where UNHCR 
had to start from scratch building infrastructure for 
repatriated Rohingya refugees. 
 
5. (C) A positive element of these UNHCR advance missions is 
the regular visitation of expatriate officials into these 
previously off-limits areas -- hotbeds of human rights 
abuses.  Kapur pointed out that only ICRC and MSF-Holland 
have limited permanent expatriate staff in the eastern 
regions.  Senior Karen officials in Rangoon told us that they 
very much support having some UNHCR presence in the region. 
They said that Karen refugees and IDPs trust the UNHCR the 
most, even before their own political and military leaders. 
 
Balance of Power in Karen State 
 
6. (C) Kapur commented that during the course of his four 
trips he has had some revelations on the political balance of 
power in these border regions.  Particularly he described the 
weakness of the KNU, which controls only patchy and 
economically unviable areas around Myawaddy and in the Douna 
mountain range and is often surrounded by large detachments 
of GOB troops and rival militias.  Conversely, he noted, 
elements of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA; a 
splinter KNU group allied with the SPDC) are "everywhere" and 
their arrogant postures telegraph an intent to stay 
"indefinitely." 
 
7. (C) On the economic side, Kapur noted that the DKBA is a 
major economic player in the region, particularly in the 
import-export business.  He said DKBA convoys bringing trade 
goods to and from the Myawaddy border crossing are 
commonplace.  An interesting twist, he said, is that the DKBA 
and KNU often pay protection money to each other to ensure 
safe passage through each other's zones of control. 
The Pitch: The Sooner the Better 
8. (C) Kapur made a pitch for immediate funds to expedite the 
formation of a larger and more permanent assessment officers' 
presence in the eastern region.  He said that the EC, the 
Japanese, and the Australians have already contributed 
$400,000 each and he is hoping for $250,000 from the United 
States for the rest of CY 2004.  The money is needed now 
because there is nothing in the UNHCR's 2004 budget for the 
eastern border activities (as they were not foreseen during 
UNHCR's previous budget discussions) and UNHCR headquarters 
is unwilling to give additional funds for non-emergency 
extra-budgetary projects.  According to an August 3rd letter 
from Kapur, U.S. monies would be used for the salaries of six 
UNHCR international protection staff members ($239,600), 
travel expenses for assessment missions to the border region 
($5,980), two satellite phones ($2,520), and one laptop 
computer ($1,900). 
 
Comment: A Worthy Cause 
 
9. (C) It does not appear that there will be a formal UNHCR 
appeal for funding from HQ in Geneva.  Thus, we urge PRM and 
USAID to take a look at UNHCR-Burma's request.  We support 
expanding UNHCR's temporary international presence in this 
poorly understood area, which has been a hotbed of some of 
the GOB's most egregious human rights abuses in the past 
decades.  Likewise, active UNHCR participation in the GOB's 
preparatory work for returnees will help prevent any untoward 
activities and may diminish the risk of forcible 
repatriations.  Finally, we have been very impressed with 
UNHCR's work in Burma under its current management, which is 
quite firm with the GOB and avoids the rose-tinted glasses 
that often afflict UN operations here.  End comment. 
McMullen