US embassy cable - 04ISTANBUL1279

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 001279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, TU, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: GREEK, ARMENIAN PROPERTY WOES PROMPT COMPARISON 
WITH "GOOD OLD OTTOMAN DAYS" 
 
REF: A. 02 ANKARA 6116 
 
     B. 02 ANKARA 7290 
     C. 02 ANKARA 8586 
     D. 03 ISTANBUL 202 
     E. 03 ANKARA 2909 
     F. ISTANBUL 843 
     G. 02 ISTANBUL 1778 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Stuart Smith for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1. (sbu) Summary: Turkey's Istanbul-based minority religious 
communities report that while recent legislation has enabled 
them to "legalize" ownership of numerous properties already 
under their control, the new law is inadequate in that it 
does not permit the community foundations (mostly Greek 
Orthodox and Armenian) to reclaim properties that were seized 
by the state over the last 30 years.  In addition, community 
representatives note that they continue to face outright 
discrimination, in violation of the Lausanne Treaty, as their 
religious foundations must meet requirements not imposed on 
other foundations in order to acquire new properties.  While 
these institutions operated more freely during the Ottoman 
period, our contacts note that the problems they face today 
stem directly from a xenophobic, paranoid, "deep-state" 
mentality that continues to pervade the bureaucracy, courts, 
and military.  Interestingly, a decision taken by the Jewish 
community in the 1930s appears to have left it in a much 
better position than its counterparts.  End Summary. 
 
A Tough Place to Be a Religious Minority 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
2. (u) Legal problems aside, the most grave injustices 
committed against the minority communities are unlikely to 
ever be redressed.  The post-WWI population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey, the WWII wealth tax that forced many 
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews to sell their businesses and 
properties (and sent those who could not pay to labor camps), 
the 1955 anti-Greek riots that destroyed thousands of Greek 
businesses, and subsequent Greek-Turkish tensions in the 
1960s and 70s all created conditions in which members of the 
minority communities were forced to sell their properties at 
firesale prices or abandon them altogether.  This cable 
examines only those properties to which the minority 
community foundations have legal claims through acquisition 
(usually by donation) or prior ownership. 
 
Ottoman Era: Benign Neglect 
--------------------------- 
3. (u) The complex challenges faced by the communities stem, 
in part, from the historical context of the transition from 
the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic.  During the 
Ottoman period, the minority religious communities had no 
"foundations" and ran themselves under their own laws 
concerning church or synagogue matters.  Their churches, 
synagogues, schools, monasteries, seminaries, and other 
properties either pre-dated the Ottoman Empire or were 
granted and authorized by the Sultan himself.  It wasn't 
until 1935 and 1936 that Turkey imposed rules and regulations 
on these institutions by defining them as "foundations" 
(although this confused them with the many thousand Muslim 
"vakifs" or foundations that operated under different rules), 
by placing them under the supervision of the General 
Directorate for Foundations (GDF), and by requiring them to 
submit declarations listing their extant properties. 
 
Modern Turkey: Regulate and Control 
----------------------------------- 
4. (u) In 1974 a Turkish high court decided that the minority 
religious foundations had no right to acquire property beyond 
those listed on their 1936 declarations, thus initiating a 
process that has continued almost to this day by which the 
state began to seize communal properties under various 
pretexts.  Such properties included those that had fallen 
into disuse, disrepair, or, according to the authorities, had 
insufficient "documentation" to establish firm legal 
ownership.  When the local population in specific areas fell 
below the statutory requirements, two Greek Orthodox 
foundations were taken into custody by the state in their 
entirety.  Almost all of the properties confiscated since 
1974 were rent-generating apartments and stores (not 
churches, synagogues, monasteries or other core communal 
institutions) that previously belonged to members of the 
community and had been bequeathed to the community 
foundations. 
 
On the Road to the EU: A New Era? 
--------------------------------- 
5. (c) As part of the 2002 EU Copenhagen criteria reforms, 
the Turkish parliament passed a law which in principle allows 
the minority religious communities to acquire, sell, and 
apply to register properties (ref A).  According to this 
initial reform, subsequent changes, and implementing 
regulations (refs B-E), minority foundations may indeed in 
principle acquire (either by purchase or donation) and sell 
properties, but only with the prior approval of the GDF. 
They may also apply to register properties under their 
control to which they do not already have clear legal 
ownership.  The laws do not permit them, however, to reclaim 
any of the properties acquired since 1936 that were 
expropriated following the 1974 court decision.  The Greek 
Orthodox and Armenian communities also both complain that 
these reforms do not address their other core concerns on 
obtaining recognition of legal personality for their 
Patriarchates, educating their clergy, and other issues. 
Huseyin Hatemi, an Istanbul University law professor and 
adviser to both communities, told poloff that the law does 
not turn the clock back to 1974 (when the communities freely 
acquired properties without special permission), much less to 
1935 (when they were almost totally unregulated). 
 
6. (c) Ata Sakmar, a Galatasaray University law professor and 
another adviser, agreed with Hatemi and noted to poloff that 
the root of the problem is a deeply frozen, xenophobic, 
paranoid, "deep state" mentality that stems from the events 
of World War I, the Treaty of Sevres, and what the Greeks 
refer to as the "Asia Minor Catastrophe."  Turkey only 
grudgingly accepted the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (guaranteeing 
freedoms and protections for non-Muslims) and ever since has 
tried, without any legal basis, to link its treatment of 
minorities with Greece's treatment of the Muslim population 
in Thrace.  Sakmar said this mentality is pervasive in the 
bureaucracy and even the courts.  In an ongoing expropriation 
case of the Greek Orthodox orphanage on Buyukada, for 
example, a civil court judge discarded the entire civil code 
and applied an irrelevant administrative code to reach a 
decision against the Patriarchate, something Sakmar likened 
to having a U.S. small claims court decide to impose an 
involuntary divorce on a plaintiff.  Sakmar said the same 
attitude was exhibited by the new interministerial commission 
tasked to resolve minority issues in their January meeting 
with the Ecumenical Patriarch (ref f). 
 
7. (c) Not all of the minorities are complaining, however. 
Silvio Ovadya, the newly appointed President of the Jewish 
Community, told poloff that they are pleased with the new 
reforms.  To date, they have won approval to purchase some 
land, to sell some properties, and to legalize their 
ownership of properties, including the Italian synagogue in 
Istanbul.  Founded for and used by non-Turks, the synagogue 
was deliberately excluded on the community's 1936 
declaration.  With the disappearance of that element of the 
community, however, Istanbul's remaining Jews have maintained 
the property.  Establishing ownership in a similar pending 
petition for properties in Izmir is more problematic and 
Ovadya did not seem to expect a positive response.  Unlike 
the Greek Orthodox and Armenians, however, the Jews have few 
property grievances.  When they were asked to list their 
properties in 1935-6, in what now seems to have been a 
prescient decision, they simply formed associations, 
transferred most rent-generating properties to the 
associations, and left them off the list. 
 
8. (c) Adnan Ertem, the Acting Director for the GDF in 
Istanbul and the senior official responsible for implementing 
the new laws, argued to poloff, however, that enormous 
strides had been made over the last two years.  He claimed 
that his office has rapidly and liberally implemented the new 
laws.  Although the regulations allow for a more narrow 
reading, Erdem asserts that his office has decided that even 
rent-generating properties will be deemed to meet the 
"cultural and religious" needs of the communities (presumably 
the rents will ultimately go to that purpose).  He asserts 
further that no application to acquire new property has yet 
been refused (Note: This was an early concern for the 
communities, ref g).  With regard to the almost 2000 
applications to legalize existing properties, Erdem claimed 
to have kept rigidly to the 2-month limit for considering 
such cases.  Roughly one-third have been approved, one-third 
sent back for more documentation (of those that have been 
resubmitted, Ertem claims that 90 percent have been 
approved), and one-third refused (on the grounds that they 
legally "belong" to third parties -- i.e., they were 
expropriated or are simply listed in the names of other 
individuals -- for the most part these were not under the 
control of the foundations and therefore ineligible for 
legalization under the new laws). 
 
9. (c) Asked about other problems encountered by the 
communities -- but not addressed in the new laws -- Ertem 
evinced an accommodating attitude.  He agreed, for example, 
that there is no need to restrict participation in elections 
for foundation boards to small geographic districts. 
Allowing anybody in Istanbul to participate, for example, 
would allow foundations in neighborhoods in which the 
community no longer resides to continue to operate (Note: 
Ertem suggested that we might want to raise this in Ankara 
where the foundation law is being rewritten).  Asked about 
the recent appropriation of the Greek Orthodox community's 
Buyukada orphanage, Ertem averred that solutions could have 
been found to keep the orphanage in the community's hands, 
but argued that the Patriarchate is more interested in 
preserving the original deed which is in its name (Note: 
Because Turkey does not recognize the Patriarch as a legal 
entity, the GDF challenged the deed and won a court ruling to 
expropriate the property).  Finally, Ertem disputed 
allegations that minority community foundations face 
discrimination, arguing that other foundations also require 
GDF approval to acquire and sell properties (in fact they 
require additional court approval to sell).  Ertem agreed 
that having two separate sets of laws is inappropriate and 
said that he hopes the new draft foundation law will apply 
equally to all foundations. 
 
10. (c) In an off-the-record postscript, Ertem told poloff 
that the Jewish and Armenian communities have good working 
relationships with his office.  The Greek Orthodox, however, 
never raise their problems with him, instead taking them 
directly to the Prime Minister, his cabinet, other countries, 
and even the European Court of Human Rights (Note: The 
Turkish press reported widely on August 10 that the ECHR had 
agreed to consider a petition by a Greek Orthodox foundation 
in Istanbul).  Ertem speculated that this may be because the 
Greek Orthodox community is primarily motivated by political, 
not administrative, concerns.  Specifically, the Patriarchate 
wants legal status for itself, something with which Ertem 
claimed to have no personal problem, but which can only come 
from being recognized by the Turkish government. 
 
11. (u) Neither the Greek Orthodox nor the Armenians ever saw 
the 2002 reforms as a solution to their problems and both 
continue to lobby government officials to address their 
concerns.  Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II met with FM Gul on 
July 16 and presented him with a letter detailing his 
community's grievances.  Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, 
meanwhile, gave interviews this month to the BBC, Associated 
Press, and Reuters, in which he explained his problems. 
(Note: Bartholomew's interview with Reuters generated 
critical local press coverage when he was misquoted as 
calling on EU countries to "pressure" Turkey on these 
issues). 
 
Comment: The Real Problem 
------------------------- 
12. (c) Even the fiercest critics of Turkey's inability to 
resolve the problems of its minority religious communities 
admit that the AKP government seems determined to tackle the 
issue (an opinion expressed by both Hatemi and Sakmar, 
although Hatemi wondered whether FM Gul's appointment of 
notorious hardline nationalist Ambassador Bolukbasi-- who 
narrowly escaped assassination by the Armenian terrorist 
group ASALA years ago and whose nickname is Ambassador No -- 
to the interministerial commission was intended to sabotage 
the effort).  If Ertem is correct, the new laws on property 
are being implemented in a timely fashion.  The reforms 
adopted so far, however, have two fundamental flaws.  First, 
the laws do nothing to address the principal Greek Orthodox 
and Armenian grievances on property issues -- specifically, 
to allow them to reclaim properties that were seized since 
1974.  Second, the narrow reforms fail to address the wider 
political concerns of the communities. 
 
13. (c) The Armenian Patriarch, concerned about the long-term 
viability of the 60,000-plus member community, has focused 
primarily on his ability to find Armenian-capable teachers 
for their schools, train priests and reopen churches, and 
preserve the historical legacy of the community.  The 
Ecumenical Patriarch, with fewer than 3,000 Greek Orthodox 
left in Turkey, is more concerned with obtaining recognition 
of his Ecumenical status and reopening the Halki seminary to 
train new generations of clergy loyal to the Patriarchate. 
Both also seek a relaxation of strict rules on electing 
foundation board members and recognition of their "legal 
personality" as a means to securing their leadership 
positions in their respective communities. 
 
14. (c) Ertem's accommodating attitude notwithstanding, 
anecdotal evidence provided by our interlocutors and our 
personal observations of public reactions to minority issues 
support charges that the root of the problem lies in a 
xenophobic paranoia that pervades the bureaucracy.  As such, 
the problems that continue to afflict the communities' are 
unlikely to be resolved with piecemeal reforms and countless 
ongoing appeals to the GDF and the courts.  Instead, it seems 
to us that a solution will only be possible when the Turkish 
government faces the fundamental issues head-on, takes a firm 
decision that these communities are an asset and not a threat 
to Turkey, and resolves to do whatever it takes to help them 
survive. 
 
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