US embassy cable - 04BAGHDAD481

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IRAQI SHIA PARTIES NOT EMBRACING SADR

Identifier: 04BAGHDAD481
Wikileaks: View 04BAGHDAD481 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2004-08-15 17:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PINS PGOV KISL IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
P 151728Z AUG 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0723
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000481 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2024 
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, KISL, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQI SHIA PARTIES NOT EMBRACING SADR 
 
Classified by POLCouns Robert Ford, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Some angry remarks at the National Conference 
notwithstanding, it appears that the Shia establishment is 
not rallying behind Muqtada al-Sadr in his standoff against 
the Iraqi Government.  Late on the night of August 14, 
PolCouns spoke to a top aide to Iraqi Government Vice 
President and Da'wa Party leader Ibrahim Jaaferi.  The aide 
stated that Da'wa would not boycott the National Conference 
under any circumstance.  According to the aide, Jaaferi 
stood by his call for a peaceful solution to the battle in 
Najaf.  Jaaferi understands that the Mahdi militia must 
disarm and the city be returned entirely to Government 
control.  Jaaferi recognizes the danger of making 
concessions to militias nationwide and the need to 
reestablish law and order.  Jaaferi's aide urged the U.S. 
to stay engaged in helping to restore stability in Iraq and 
assisting the country's political development. 
 
2.  (C) Meanwhile, a key Government minister from another 
major Shia establishment party, the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), told the Ambassador on 
August 14 that the National Conference must succeed. 
Finance Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi said the Government made 
a mistake in opening negotiations with Sadr and that, if 
Sadr disavows violence and agrees to play a constructive 
role, military operations against him should recommence. 
 
3.  (C) PolCouns spoke on the evening of August 14 with 
Radwan Abbas, the custodian of Najaf's Imam Ali mosque who 
fled Najaf four months ago and is now in Baghdad.  Abbas 
assured PolCouns that the Najaf cleric establishment 
(Hawza) supports IIG and Coalition efforts to remove the 
Mahdi militia from Najaf/Kufa and the religious sites.  He 
said many clerics had to flee Najaf for their safety and 
many had come to Baghdad.  Abbas discounted the likelihood 
of public criticism from the Hawza if the Iraqi Government 
sends in forces to free the mosque from Sadr forces.  He 
pointed to the silence of late from the Hawza and quoted an 
Arabic proverb meaning that silence is a sign of consent. 
(He urged that we not send Coalition forces into the 
mosque, however.) 
 
4.  (C) On the morning of August 15, delegates from these 
Shia parties attended the Conference in large numbers.  A 
top SCIRI official in troubled Basra told the Regional 
Embassy Office on August 14 that he would attend the 
Conference as planned.  PolOffs at the Conference reported 
that there would be some speeches in support of a peaceful 
solution to the conflict in Najaf.  Post has also seen 
reports of a brief demonstration by Shia attendees of the 
National Conference demanding peace in Najaf.  The protest 
reportedly ended quickly and the Conference continued. 
There was also apparently some discussion of the Conference 
organizing a mission to go to Najaf directly to help 
facilitate a negotiated end to the standoff.  It was not 
clear if, in fact, such a team would actually go to Najaf. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT: Publicly expressed concerns about Najaf 
notwithstanding, the two main Shia political parties are 
not rushing to help Sadr (their potential political 
competitor).  Instead, Dawa and SCIRI are holding fast to 
the political process launched by the Government, 
symbolized now by the National Conference.  The lack of 
criticism against the Government or the Coalition from the 
Najaf Hawza, combined with the prospect of making inroads 
into the National Council through participation in the 
ongoing National Conference, give those parties incentive 
to continue staying with the Government.  The crowds 
gathering at the Imam Ali mosque make good TV images, but 
Post does not yet sense that Sadr is gaining any traction 
with the Shia establishment. 
 
 
Negroponte 

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