US embassy cable - 04CARACAS2605

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S REFERENDUM:  THE DAY AFTER 
 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, for Reasons 1.4( 
b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Venezuelans will vote August 15 on whether to recall 
President Hugo Chavez.  If the opposition wins, it plans to 
hold primaries to pick a candidate and then battle Chavez 
again in presidential elections.  Though removed from office, 
Chavez will still lead the country's largest political 
movement and expects to have the full support of the 
Venezuelan state to wage his campaign.  If Chavez wins the 
recall referendum, it will be a mortal blow to the 
opposition's current political leadership.  Chavez the victor 
will likely strike a conciliatory tone initially to attract a 
loyal opposition from the remains of the opposition, but will 
continue to persecute symbolic opposition.  The legitimacy of 
the victory for either side is crucial, making fraud 
allegations and the margin of victory key variables in how 
the results are accepted by the Venezuelan people.  Although 
the Constitution speaks of an election 30 days after the 
President leaves office, it is unlikely that the National 
Electoral Council will be able to stage one in such a short 
period of time.  End summary. 
 
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If The Opposition Wins ... 
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2. (C) If the "Si" vote wins in the August 15 presidential 
recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez, the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) must, according to the constitution, 
hold convoke elections within 30 days.  Given the logistical 
requirements for such an election, the date is likely to slip 
up to 90 days.  The opposition plans to hold a presidential 
primary to select its candidate.  Although close to agreement 
on rules and a date for the primary, both are still under 
discussion. 
 
3. (C) The opposition will seek to maintain its united front 
against Chavez throughout the campaign, and will not field 
multiple candidates to face Chavez in the new election. 
Coordinadora Democratica (CD) leader and Miranda State 
Governor Enrique Mendoza is the front-runner.  If the 
opposition's candidate wins that election, he or she would 
complete the presidential term through 2006.  The new 
president would face the challenge of forming a government 
out of a diverse opposition, reuniting a deeply divided 
society, re-energizing an economy addicted to high oil 
revenues and unsustainable social spending, and reforming a 
Venezuelan state corrupted by five years of Chavez's 
Bolivarian Revolution. 
 
4. (C) If Chavez loses the referendum, he will be politically 
wounded and stripped of his claim to represent Venezuela's 
majority.  His control over four of the five branches of 
government (legislative, judicial, moral, and electoral) and 
leadership of Venezuela's largest political party, the Fifth 
Republic Movement (MVR), however, will give him room to 
maneuver and possibly negotiate with the opposition.  Vice 
President Jose Vicente Rangel would become president and is 
likely to continue to give Chavez complete support of the 
Venezuelan state.  Some note, however, that Rangel's personal 
ambition may temper his support for a beaten Chavez.  Though 
the Supreme Court (TSJ) has not definitely ruled that a 
recalled Chavez can run immediately in the new election, most 
politicians believe Chavez will be permitted to run.  TSJ 
President Ivan Rincon told the Ambassador in late 2003 that 
since the Constitution does not explicitly say a recalled 
President cannot run he should be allowed to do so.  He also 
thought it essential for political reasons. 
 
5. (C) If the opposition wins by a thin margin, political 
uncertainty will be heightened.  A voting system failure 
could have similar consequences if results are delayed more 
than 48 hours.  Chavez could react as he did during the 
November signature drive and claim the opposition had engaged 
 
in "megafraud."  Chavez supporters have already set the stage 
for this accusation by suggesting that CANTV, Venezuela's 
privatized national telephone carrier, is capable of 
manipulating election data during transmission.  If Chavez 
supporters perceive they are losing the referendum due to 
fraud, there is likely to be some violence by Chavez 
supporters, both in the streets and against opposition 
targets such as media outlets. 
 
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If Chavez Wins ... 
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6. (C) If the "No" option wins, Chavez will probably call for 
reconciliation in the wake of his victory and try to reach a 
modus vivendi with some opposition parties.  Rumors have some 
opposition politicians already negotiating with Chavez. 
Chavez insiders predict that Chavez will make changes in the 
cabinet and moderate his rhetoric.  Such overtures are likely 
to be short-lived (as experienced post-April 2002), however, 
and Chavez will likely return to his persecution of key 
opposition figures (such as the NGO Sumate, former PDVSA 
managers, and Baruta Mayor Enrique Capriles).  Chavez will 
have political momentum going into the regional elections, 
and could win key gubernatorial and mayoral offices.  With a 
vanquished domestic opposition, Chavez will have a free hand 
to develop his foreign policy of challenging the USG, free 
trade, and globalization.  He will characterize his victory 
as a defeat for the United States and the imperialism he 
believes it represents, and will become more outspoken. 
 
7. (C) The leadership of the political parties, whom 
anti-Chavistas will blame for the loss, will suffer a mortal 
blow.  The Coordinadora Democratica is likely to cease to 
exist in its present form.  A new wave of opposition leaders 
will then have less than two years to regroup for a 2006 
presidential bid.  A few opposition politicians may answer 
Chavez's call for reconciliation or, at least, lessen their 
resolve to oppose him.  The opposition would also be 
fractured going into regional elections, perhaps costing them 
key positions throughout the country.  In sum, the opposition 
would endure its dark night, but could still recover in time 
to challenge Chavez in 2006 if they can generate fresh 
leadership. 
 
8. (C) If Chavez's victory comes via fraud or, more likely, 
manipulation by the GOV, the opposition would cry foul. 
Radicals in the Democratic Bloc would call for resistance to 
the GOV, and probably some civic groups and Coordinadora 
member groups would promote demonstrations and street 
blockades.  This type of resistance to a suspicious or clean 
win by the GOV would fizzle out.  A tainted victory would 
undermine Chavez's democratic credentials before the 
international community. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) An opposition victory would mean one more round of 
elections for Venezuela in which Chavez could yet again 
return to power.  The aftermath of an opposition victory 
would be fraught with challenges, and in many ways would 
present daunting challenges for governance.  There is 
concern, for example, about how institutions that have become 
accustomed to the centralized authority of President Chavez 
would behave.  If Chavez wins the referendum, Venezuela's 
crisis will continue to fester, especially if Chavez 
maintains his divisive leadership.  The referendum is a 
critical juncture for Venezuela, but it is just the beginning 
for finding real resolution of Venezuela's deeply-divided 
society. 
Shapiro 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02605 - CONFIDENTIAL