US embassy cable - 04QUITO2251

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 002251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KCOR, PREL, EC 
SUBJECT: PARTY POSTURING PROMPTS BUCARAM RETURN RUMORS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.5 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  President Lucio Gutierrez's recent comments 
favoring the return of exiled former President Abdala Bucaram 
have ignited a political firestorm in Ecuador, with leading 
opposition parties promising that impeachment proceedings 
would shortly follow.  Bucaram, whom Congress removed in 
February 1997 on "mental incapacity" grounds, subsequently 
fled to Panama and enjoys political asylum there; he 
continues to lead the Ecuadorian Roldosista party (PRE) en 
absentia.  Analysts surmised that Gutierrez, seeking an 
alliance between the PRE and his own Patriotic Society party 
(PSP), had acquiesced to the former's primary goal and 
platform plank, "the return of Abdala."  The Social 
Christians (PSC) loudly opposed, arguing that court orders 
demanding Bucaram's immediate arrest for fraud remained in 
force.  PRE leadership, however, assert that a provincial 
judge rescinded the orders in 2001, allowing for the swift 
return of their beloved master.  Non-partisan Embassy 
contacts and Presidency officials consider the PRE's public 
bluster, announcing Abdala's imminent arrival, a gambit 
designed to energize the bases.  We agree, viewing 
Gutierrez's discourse as another political test balloon.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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The Man They Call El Loco 
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2.  (C) Historians and political analysts rate Bucaram 
Ecuador's most corrupt leader, an impressive achievement in a 
country that Transparency International consistently ranks 
amongst the hemisphere's worst kleptocracies.  A 
self-proclaimed "loco" (he recorded a song titled "A Madman 
in Love"), Bucaram campaigned as a leader for the poor.  His 
raiding of the public till, combined with widescale fraud 
perpetrated by cabinet officials, worsened his constituents' 
poverty.  Public demonstrations calling for his ouster 
reached such levels in February 1997 that Ecuador's Congress, 
itself not lilly-white, impeached Bucaram on grounds of 
mental incapacity.  The president lost the subsequent vote, 
44-34, and eventually fled for Panama and political asylum. 
Embassy contacts and media speculate he bought his status. 
 
3.  (U) In remarks to Quito daily El Comercio August 5, 
Gutierrez welcomed the disgraced former president's return. 
"...I would like Bucaram to come back, because he didn't 
commit the crimes he was accused of.  Some politicians are 
terrified at his return (I am not).  But as president, I 
can't tell him to come, nor can I oppose him."  In an El 
Comercio interview published August 6, Bucaram proclaimed his 
innocence and thanked Gutierrez for displaying admirable 
political courage.  The deposed leader claimed the law was on 
his side.  "I could return tomorrow," Bucaram claimed, "but I 
need guarantees I won't be detained illegally."  His stated 
intention was to return in time to present his candidacy for 
the October Guayaquil mayoral race (August 17 is the cutoff 
date). 
 
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Method to the President's Madness? 
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4.  (U) Media speculated that Gutierrez's show of Bucaram 
support had political motivations.  Ecuadorian electoral law 
stipulates that parties not winning five percent of the vote 
in multi-candidate races shall be disbanded (Ecuadorian 
legislative elections are more parliamentary than 
presidential, with parties presenting candidate lists). 
Gutierrez's PSP fell below the threshold in 2002 national 
elections, and pollsters predict a similar showing in the 
October 2004 local races.  Allying with Bucaram's PRE offered 
the PSP greater prospects and a stay of execution.  Minister 
of Government Raul Baca lent weight to these theories August 
4, telling TeleAmazonas TV that PSP and PRE deputies already 
had joined forces in Congress. 
 
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Enemies Line Up For Fight 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) Opposition forces quickly denounced Gutierrez.  PSC 
stalwart Leon Febres Cordero led the pack, arguing that any 
move by the president to facilitate Bucaram's return 
represented an impeachable offense.  Press report that two 
criminal cases remain active against the former leader, both 
stemming from alleged misuse of government funds.  Were 
Gutierrez to order the police not to enforce the court order, 
he would "commit an attack against the security of the 
state," Febres Cordero asserted, violating the constitutional 
mandate for separation of powers. 
 
6.  (U) In a meeting with Poloff August 10, PSC Congressman 
Carlos Torres added personal recollections of the last days 
of Bucaram.  The PRE leader had attempted to buy "no" 
impeachment votes at $1 million per.  Losing the vote and the 
presidency, he left Ecuador with literally baskets of cash, 
stolen from the Central Bank.  By law, the fraud 
investigations against Bucaram had frozen upon his departure 
from Ecuador, but the charges remained outstanding.  Torres 
discounted the PRE-publicized decision by an Esmeraldas judge 
who, via a constitutional challenge, supposedly had cleared 
the ex-president's name.  "The PRE owns Esmeraldas," the PSC 
legislator asserted, and only the Supreme Court could issue 
such a challenge. 
 
7.  (U) PRE discourse announcing Bucaram's imminent return 
was old hat, Torres continued.  The party was really a cult 
of personality, directionless without its leader.  In the 
seven years since Bucaram fled, PRE leaders had trotted out 
the "he's coming" line before every election, hoping to get 
the faithful to the polls.  Torres believed Gutierrez 
eventually would wise up and retract support for Bucaram's 
return. 
 
8.  (U) Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot (PSC), perhaps the 
front-runner for the presidency in 2006, was convinced 
Bucaram did not want to return.  He would be arrested at the 
airport, Nebot told the Ambassador August 12, and he knows 
it.  The PRE leader's effectiveness is greatest from afar, 
lobbing charges against any and all parties.  Last, Nebot 
argued that the PRE's few serious politicians did not want 
the tarnish that Bucaram's return would bring. 
 
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And Supporters Say Abdala Was Framed 
------------------------------------ 
 
9.  (U) Ernesto Valle and Mario Touma, PRE legislators, 
maintained their boss's innocence, telling Poloff August 10 
that Bucaram's ministers were to blame in any malfeasance. 
"A leader can't be faulted for the actions of his followers," 
Valle incredulously explained.  Besides, there was no 
"documentary" proof of wrongdoing.  The Esmeraldas judge's 
finding was binding, as the government had not appealed 
within the mandated time limit.  ANd Gutierrez, as chief 
executive, was bound by law to enforce court rulings and thus 
allow Bucaram's return. 
 
10.  (C) "He owes us," Valle continued, revealing a four 
year-old verbal agreement between PRE congressmen and the 
then-cashiered Army colonel.  Under that deal, the PRE bloc 
would vote to amnesty Gutierrez and other participants in the 
2000 presidential coup, in exchange for future support in 
bringing Bucaram back.  There were tapes of the conversation, 
Valle threatened.  Touma insisted that Bucaram's return 
presented little political risk to the president.  The PSC 
might impeach, but the votes needed - 67, or two-thirds of 
Congress - were not there.  It would be one more crisis 
Gutierrez could overcome, he thought. 
 
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One Expert's View 
----------------- 
 
11. (U) Prominent analyst Adrian Bonilla ventured that 
Gutierrez's support for Bucaram was tongue-in-cheek. 
Although the president had committed numerous gaffes before, 
he was not so dumb as to miss the risks inherent in calling 
Bucaram home.  Only by removing Baca (a PRE demand) could 
this occur, since the MinGov was a straight-shooter certain 
to oppose instructions to ignore pending arrest warrants. 
Baca's departure spelled disaster, Bonilla believed, as he 
was one of few serious politicians in the current cabinet. 
Although he doubted Gutierrez would do it, he urged the 
Embassy to reconsider its support if he did. 
 
12. (U) Bonilla predicted the PSP would survive, regardless 
of its October showing.  The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 
had proven unsuccessful at decertifying parties commanding 
far fewer votes - its orders were essentially toothless. 
Additionally, PSP prospects looked good in Ecuador's jungle 
provinces.  He thus thought Gutierrez could jettison the PRE 
with minimal adverse effects. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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13.  (C) We have argued before that, despite numerous 
missteps and mounting political pressures, we don't see the 
silver bullet to take Gutierrez down.  A Bucaram return to 
Ecuador looks lethal, however, regardless of Touma's vote 
tally.  Thankfully, Gutierrez's comments appear more another 
test balloon, less a well-formed policy decision. 
Presidential Legal Advisor Carlos Larrea August 11 confirmed 
that Gutierrez had not issued Bucaram's travel orders, nor 
had he requested a legal opinion for political cover.  Larrea 
was confident the ex-president would remain in Panama.  END 
COMMENT. 
KENNEY