US embassy cable - 04BAGHDAD463

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BAGHDAD 000463 
 
STATE FOR PM DAS LIKENS, PMAT AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/14 
TAGS: MOPS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, IZ 
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE 
TERMS WITH MOQTADA AL SADR BUT PM NOT ON BOARD 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Muaffaq al Rubaie, reached at our initiative in the 
afternoon of August 13, said he was approaching agreement 
with an envoy of Moqtada al Sadr over a nine point peace 
plan (para 6 below.)  Apparently Rubaie had never been able 
to meet with Sadr but met several times with his envoy.  A 
ceasefire originally established only to facilitate the 
meeting has lasted most of the day.  The nine-point plan 
appears to have numerous weaknesses including: agreement on 
a pull-back by Coalition Forces; no timeline for turning 
over control of the mosques to the Iraqi government; and an 
open-ended provision for security forces for Moqtada and 
his Lieutenants. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Negroponte, General Casey and Pol-Mil 
Counselor Neumann met with Prime Minister Allawi at 1600 
hours.  Allawi had not talked to Muaffaq since 0900 hours. 
He had not heard of the nine-point plan.  Allawi said his 
instructions had been to tell Sadr he had to get his forces 
out of Najaf and disband them and Sadr could be allowed to 
enter the political process.  Allawi said of the nine 
points, "thatQs too much."  Allawi said he felt that Sadr 
was not serious and would not sign even these points.  He 
believed Sadr was trying to drag out negotiations and that 
it wasn't in the government's interest. 
 
3. (C) Allawi said that Iraqis are encouraged to move to 
the opposition by displays of weakness.  This is what 
happened earlier with both the spring negotiations with 
Moqtada and Fallujah.  He believes it important not to do 
that again. 
 
4. (C) Allawi is waiting for the return today of Defense 
Minister Sha'lan, who is in Najaf.  Allawi will contact us 
as soon as he hears from MOD.  Allawi is very conscious 
that military operations have been interrupted and that 
time is being lost. 
 
5. (C) Comment: We saw no evidence in Allawi's comments or 
behavior that Rubaie is negotiating the weaker approach of 
the nine points on instruction from his boss.  Allawi said 
that he has not come under any serious political pressure 
from the other Shia religious leaders.  Although Allawi 
does not like the fact that Vice President Jafari and the 
Dawa Party are calling for a cease fire (staking out some 
distance in case operations fail), he does not seem 
inclined to change his approach.  SCIRI and its head Hakim 
have not said anything publicly.  Allawi felt that news 
coverage of Najaf exaggerated the situation but did not 
seem bothered by that either. 
 
6.  (C) Following are the nine points as taken down orally 
by telephone. 
 
Nine-Point Plan: 
 
1) MNF-I pullout of Najaf and Kufa with the exception of 
Military Police Trainers; 
 
2) SADR movement will work in constructive way with IIG 
to ensure security and stability in IQ and an honest 
election of a full, independent, elected government; 
 
3) Legal Case referred to Majariyh (or tribal 
customs?); 
 
4) Removal of all military, armed fighters and arms from 
whole governate with exception of para 6.  Najaf city 
administration and city security is duty of IIG and 
ISF, including inner city and shrine; 
 
5) JM - declare JM is not an armed militia but a popular 
ideological movement and, for the sake of preserving 
holy cities and keeping blood of our  sons, request 
all members lay down arms and dissolve all C2 centers 
and military and security establishments and handover 
all non-personal arms.  Members of this army can only 
carry arms under IQ law like other citizens; 
 
6) Personal Security:  MS has right to keep personal 
security for him, his offices and his lieutenants like 
any other distinguished dignitary in IQ political 
arena; 
 
7) Holy Shrine: 
 
i. administration by persons appointed by Majariyh; 
 
ii. forbidden to use shrine for political purposes; 
especially for political offices and Friday sermons; 
 
8) Release of all detainees and prisoners and those 
kidnapped in recent events (Note, this seems to refer 
to those detained in recent fighting only); 
 
9) Establish joint committee for coordination and follow 
up. 
 
7. (C) There are many things we do not like about these 
ideas.  Among them are a pullout of Coalition Forces, the 
lack of a definite time line and no commitment to a public 
statement.  MAS and his lieutenants have large numbers of 
"bodyguards" who have often been the main actors in illegal 
and bullying actions.  We noted some of these deficiencies 
to Allawi, who agreed. 
 
 
NEGROPONTE