US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2023

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, PHUM, CH, TW, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: LOCAL TAIWAN 
OFFICIALS WEIGH IN 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1846 
     B. THE HAGUE 1796 (NOTAL) 
     C. THE HAGUE 1779 (NOTAL) 
     D. THE HAGUE 1660 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Taiwanese representatives in The Hague are 
engaging the Dutch government and parliamentarians in an 
effort to slow down the EU's rush to lift its arms embargo on 
China.  Several parliamentarians have expressed sympathy for 
the Taiwanese position, but do not want to undercut the Dutch 
EU presidency by forcing the issue.  Dutch commercial 
relations with China have also been cited as a reason for 
supporting lifting the embargo.  Taiwanese efforts here (and 
elsewhere in Europe) could help raise the public profile of 
the embargo issue, particularly with regard to regional 
stability.   END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) PolCouns and PolMilOff were invited to meet with 
Siao-Yue Chang, Head of the Taipei Representative Office in 
the Netherlands and her colleague Steve C.C. Hsia on August 
10 to discuss the EU's China arms embargo.  EmbOffs outlined 
U.S. concerns about a possible lift of the EU's embargo as 
well as Mission's efforts on this issue in general terms.  We 
noted that we have stressed both regional stability and human 
rights concerns to the GONL when making our case against 
lifting the embargo.  Chang said she had been in repeated 
contact with GONL officials to express Taiwan's opposition to 
lifting the embargo, but was not hopeful about bringing the 
Dutch government around on this issue.  MFA Asia Director 
Robert Milders reportedly told her that the British have 
already decided to support lifting the embargo, while Asia 
Deputy Director Margarita Bot reportedly argued that the 
Netherlands, as current EU president, had to remain neutral 
in the matter. 
 
3. (C) Chang also described her ongoing efforts to raise 
awareness of the issue in the Dutch parliament.  Opposition 
MPs -- such as Labor Party foreign affairs spokesman Bert 
Koenders and Socialist Party foreign affairs spokesman Harry 
van Bommel -- strongly oppose lifting the embargo, according 
to Chang, but are basically powerless to affect the 
government's plans on this issue.  Chang has therefore 
focused her recent efforts on convincing ruling coalition 
members -- including the Chairman of the Second Chamber's 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Henk de Haan of the Christian 
Democrats, and Liberal Party defense affairs spokesman Hans 
van Baalen -- to push the government to take a stronger stand 
on the embargo.  Although de Haan and van Baalen are 
sympathetic, Chang said, they also want the Netherlands to 
have a successful EU presidency, and apparently accept the 
government's argument that a successful EU-China Summit in 
December is necessary to achieve this.  Chang observed that 
Dutch commercial relations with China had also been cited as 
an argument in favor of lifting the embargo.  According to 
Chang, however, Dutch-Taiwan trade was not insignificant -- 
two-way trade was 5.4 billion USD and the Dutch investment in 
Taiwan was 2.5 billion USD -- and should be factored into 
Dutch calculations. 
 
4. (C) Chang said her colleagues at Taiwan offices throughout 
the EU had been instructed to raise the embargo with host 
governments, and sought advice on which nations might be more 
receptive to such approaches.  Given the U.S. security 
equities at stake, Hsia asked if the issue had been discussed 
in a NATO context, and wondered whether it might be useful to 
do so.  In response to a question from Emboffs, Chang 
assessed that there was little likelihood of Beijing 
canceling or sabotaging the EU-China summit if the embargo 
was not lifted, since to do so would be embarrassing for the 
PRC leadership. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  The efforts of Chang in the Netherlands will 
be useful in raising the profile of the embargo issue here. 
We encouraged her and Hsia to continue to engage with the 
GONL, particularly with regard to impressing upon Dutch 
interlocutors the seriousness of the regional security 
concerns.  As noted previously, however, the GONL's narrow 
focus on hosting successful EU-China summit has so far taken 
precedence over the human rights and regional security 
concerns raised by us and others, including the Dutch 
parliament.  In December 2003, for example, the Dutch 
parliament unanimously supported a resolution opposing the 
lift of the embargo; the vote, however, was not formally 
binding on the GONL, and FM Bot told parliament the following 
January that the government would not block an EU consensus 
to lift.  Parliament has been largely silent on the issue 
since then.  End comment. 
RUSSEL