US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU1590

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NEPAL: NATIONAL CONGRESS PRESIDENT KOIRALA: TILTING AT WINDMILLS?

Identifier: 04KATHMANDU1590
Wikileaks: View 04KATHMANDU1590 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2004-08-12 21:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL NP Political Parties Government of Nepal
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL-GURNEY 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NP, Political Parties, Government of Nepal (GON) 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: NATIONAL CONGRESS PRESIDENT KOIRALA: 
TILTING AT WINDMILLS? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (C)  In his August 6 courtesy call on National Congress 
(NC) President G.P. Koirala, the Ambassador urged the parties 
to reach consensus before talks with the Maoists.  Koirala 
replied that he wanted to stay outside the government to push 
for peace and position himself for power once elections were 
possible.  He believed that without India's goodwill the 
Maoist insurgency could not be solved. 
 
THE NC'S PLAN 
------------- 
 
2. (C) Koirala told the Ambassador that although India had 
advised him to join the government coalition, he would not - 
for three reasons.  He explained that to do so would tarnish 
the party's image because it had been critical of the King. 
Second, its voice would be weaker because it would have to 
toe the coalition's line.  Finally, Koirala said that if he 
and NC could solve the Maoist problem, the party's image 
would improve and NC would win the next election.  The 
Ambassador asked him whether he was worried that the Maoists 
might use the rift among the legitimate political forces and 
slow down the effort to build consensus, which was needed 
before talks with the Maoists.  While Koirala acknowledged he 
would have to be cautious about that, he focused on the King 
being the hurdle.  He complained that the King did not seem 
to be interested in talking about the Maoist problem. 
 
PURSUING PEACE WITH THE MAOISTS 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Koirala informed the Ambassador that the party had 
authorized him to have a dialogue with the Maoists in order 
to bring them into the political mainstream.  Koirala stated 
that he was hoping to first lay the groundwork with the 
international community and civil society before going to the 
other parties.  Koirala stated his belief that a political 
settlement was possible, however, the most important element 
would be convincing the Maoists to lay down arms.  He opined 
that if the Maoists agreed to do so, the UN could manage the 
process, along with rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Mentioning that he had met with UN Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs Tamrat Samuel, Koirala said he was 
concerned that although he had no objections to a UN role, it 
may not be palatable to the King, the people or India. 
 
4. (C) In reply to the Ambassador's query about the 
possibility of secret talks in a third country, Koirala said 
that would depend on India.  Talks could be done anywhere, 
Koirala noted, however, without India's goodwill, he did not 
think the problem would be solved.  Koirala continued that he 
had suggested to Indian interlocutors that, if there were 
UN-mediated talks, India could come as an observer. 
According to Koirala, India agreed to take his proposal under 
consideration.  Koirala went on to say that India agreed to 
his suggestion that because of Nepal's historic mistrust of 
India's intentions, India needed to remain in the background 
when talks with the Maoists occurred.  However, Koirala 
thought India needed to pressure the Maoists.  Continuing his 
efforts to promote possible peace talks with the 
international community, Koirala told the Ambassador he had 
also discussed a possible UN role with the Chinese Charge 
d'Affaires.  The Charge told Koirala that while the PRC could 
accept a UN presence at talks, it would not accept UN 
mediation. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5. (C)  The Ambassador repeatedly stressed to Koirala that 
there has to be unity among the legitimate political forces, 
including civil society and the palace, about how to go 
forward with the Maoists.  Koirala, however, seems to be out 
of the loop and believes he is pursuing a peace initiative 
that will cause the other legitimate political parties to 
fall in line. 
MORIARTY 

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