US embassy cable - 04HARARE1360

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UN VISITOR TESTS WATERS

Identifier: 04HARARE1360
Wikileaks: View 04HARARE1360 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2004-08-12 15:05:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2009 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI 
SUBJECT: UN VISITOR TESTS WATERS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1335 (B) HARARE 1313 (C) HARARE 1250 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting at the Embassy August 6, United 
Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs 
Tuliameni Kalomoh solicited the Ambassador's assessment of 
the Zimbabwean political and humanitarian situations.  He 
advised that his five-day visit to Zimbabwe was "private" but 
that he had met with leaders from the ruling and opposition 
parties and would report back to Secretary-General Annan, who 
was following Zimbabwe closely.  Kalomoh commented on the 
ruling party leadership's hostility to the United States, and 
inquired what steps might be taken by either side to lower 
temperatures.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Assistant Secretary-General, a Namibian 
national, was in Zimbabwe August 2-7.  He did not request a 
meeting with the Ambassador (he said he thought the 
Ambassador had left post), and the Embassy only became aware 
of his visit through other diplomats.  We understand that he 
met separately with Swedish and Norwegian ambassadors, ruling 
party officials (NFI), selected representatives of civil 
society, and MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai.  His visit was 
ignored by the state media but noted in the independent 
Financial Gazette (owned by Reserve Bank Governor Gono) in a 
front page article, "UN Spying on Zim."  Kalomoh reportedly 
was hosted by the Center for Peace Initiatives in Africa, 
whose director, Leonard Kapungu, is a retired UN official and 
Zimbabwean national.  During the meeting with the Ambassador, 
Kalomoh was accompanied by Kapungu but no UN officials. 
 
UN Posture 
---------- 
 
3.  (C)  Kalomoh said that Secretary-General Annan was 
concerned that, while Zimbabwe was not in conflict, its 
political crisis lacked resolution.  The Secretary-General's 
hope was for the creation of an environment for free and fair 
elections in 2005 that would effectively put the 2000 
parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections behind the 
country.  The UN was interested in fostering dialogue between 
the two parties and civil society, and was encouraged by 
proposed electoral reforms and prospects for the 
establishment of a truly independent election commission with 
real authority.  The UN was not in a position to observe 
Zimbabwean elections but could help to coordinate observers 
and offer technical assistance.  The GOZ, however, still 
maintained that it had sufficient resources to conduct its 
election without assistance.  Kalomoh noted that ruling party 
elements differed in their views of the UN; some regarded it 
as a lackey of the British and Americans but others appeared 
willing to engage meaningfully. 
 
Polarization and Elections 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Kalomoh remarked on the leading parties' starkly 
different perceptions regarding upcoming elections.  To the 
ruling party, the election climate was fine; it looked 
forward to elections in March or at the latest June following 
the implementation of proposed election reforms.  The 
opposition had nothing good to say about the election 
climate; its principal objections to election reforms were 
that they didn't go far enough and the opposition had not 
been sufficiently consulted. 
 
5.  (C) Kalomoh asserted that the parties were not separated 
as much by substantive policy differences as by "too much war 
of words" over the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential 
elections.  He noted deep ruling party antipathy toward MDC 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai in contrast to its more positive 
view of MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube; he inquired 
about the relationship between the two.  He said he had 
discussed concerns over the treason trial with the parties 
and with civil society; many thought Tsvangirai would be 
convicted but ruling party interlocutors gave the impression 
that he would not be executed.  He recognized that the 
upcoming parliamentary elections and the ZANU-PF succession 
issue complicated political posturing within each party and 
between them.  Kalamoh asserted that the fact that each side 
seemed to believe that it would win a free and fair election 
offered some hope that they could come together on the terms 
of a free and fair election.  He reported that the GOZ 
planned to conduct a by-election in September for the Seke 
seat vacated by MDC MP Ben Tumbare-Mutasa's death last month. 
 (Comment: Electoral Supervisory Commission officials told 
poloff they were unaware of plans to conduct the by-election, 
which we understand would not be required legally given the 
imminence of scheduled parliamentary elections.  End comment.) 
 
Mugabe, Africa, and the United States 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) According to Kalomoh, the ruling party did not speak 
with one voice but was unanimous on its view of the United 
States, the UK, and the EU as being out to dictate Zimbabwean 
policy and to impinge on Zimbabwean sovereignty.  Ruling 
party officials had been adamant that the parliamentary 
elections would involve observers from SADC and African 
countries but none from the United States, Canada or EU 
member states. 
 
7.  (C) Kalamoh noted Mugabe's skill at managing 
confrontation -- "he's not so good when it's not there."  In 
this instance, Mugabe had played on African resentment of the 
West and a genuine perception among Africans that the West 
could not tolerate the GOZ's redistribution of land from 
whites to blacks.  Kalamoh said Africans generally regarded 
Zimbabwean elections as no worse than many other African 
elections; the contrast between the West's rejection of 
Zimbabwe's elections and its relative acceptance of others 
fueled conspiracy theories.  In that vein, he expressed 
personal bitterness over the West's reliance on Commonwealth 
assessments of Zimbabwean elections in 2002 in complete 
disregard of SADC observation reports with which he had been 
involved.  In any event, Africans perceived that the United 
States had been enlisted by the UK to support its effort 
reverse land reform and believed that the two western powers 
should "make the first move". 
 
8.  (C) Kalomoh asked about interactions between the USG and 
State House, and whether the Ambassador would be paying a 
farewell courtesy call on the President.   He inquired about 
USG views of proposed electoral reforms and whether some 
positive note could be taken of the reform efforts.  If not 
now, how far would the GOZ have to go?  Under what 
circumstances could any of the targeted sanctions be removed? 
 
Doubts on Food 
-------------- 
 
9.  (C) Noting that he also had talked to offices involved in 
the food situation here, Kalomoh expressed concern about GOZ 
crop forecasts.  He said that UN agencies and others had 
concluded that GOZ forecasts were significantly 
underestimated. 
 
GOZ and USG Distance 
-------------------- 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador advised Kalomoh that he had submitted 
a pro forma request for customary departure courtesies, 
including a call on the President, but had yet to receive a 
response.  (Comment: The British Embassy received no response 
to a similar submission prior to the recent departure of its 
Ambassador; in blaring front page headlines, the state media 
then blasted his "slinking out" without observing diplomatic 
etiquette.  End comment.)   He recounted his meeting 
periodically with the MFA PermSec and selected members of the 
Cabinet, but indicated that the GOZ and ruling party had 
shown little interest in engaging.  The USG had issued 
balanced statements on elections and repeatedly voiced 
support for lawful and non-violent land reform, but any 
positive or encouraging tenor in USG pronouncements had been 
ignored.  On the contrary, the state media appeared to seize 
and to exaggerate every possible issue to drive a deeper 
wedge in bilateral relations. 
 
11. (C) The Ambassador stressed the great importance attached 
by the USG to progress on the rule of law, cessation of 
political violence, and the conduct of free and fair election 
as a means to move the country in the right direction.  He 
emphasized the potential significance of the treason trial 
outcome: a guilty verdict based on the flimsy evidence 
presented would erase the last vestige of judicial integrity 
in the country and cast a pall over prospects for meaningful 
political reconciliation.  The Ambassador also noted 
bipartisan Congressional support for the USG position on 
Zimbabwe.  Americans of all political stripes were concerned 
about the situation in Zimbabwe not because "white land" had 
been taken, but because of the violence, abuse of human 
rights and attacks on the independence of the media and 
judiciary that had occurred.  In conclusion, the Ambassador 
expressed concern that the proposed NGO bill (ref C) would 
further shrink democratic space in the country and outweigh 
any putative benefits of election reform. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C) The ruling party generally has been suspicious of 
the UN, as evidenced by its disinvitation of a UN election 
assessment team in mid-visit last March and official media 
castigation of selected UN employees for disseminating "bad 
information" on Zimbabwe.  The state media's non-coverage of 
Kalomoh's visit was uncharacterisic in that regard, and may 
reflect divisions or uncertainty in the leadership about the 
means and ends of marketing  electoral reforms 
internationally.  Some of Kalomoh's inquiries implied 
interest in tying benchmarks of political progress to 
international re-engagement, echoing an effort by the bishops 
troika to elicit benchmarks from us to entice the ruling 
party into inter-party dialogue last year.  We were impressed 
with Kalomoh's familiarity with the issues and believe that 
UN interest can be constructive, especially to the extent it 
connects election fairness to legitimacy in the eyes of 
domestic and regional players. 
SULLIVAN 

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