US embassy cable - 04LILONGWE785

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LILONGWE 000785 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LUSAKA FOR RAO 
DEPT FOR AF/S, AF/PD, AND AF/RSA 
DEPT FOR INR/AA AND INR/TNC 
DEPT ALSO FOR R 
DIA FOR JITF-CT/AFRICA BRANCH/CUNNINGHAM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: X6 
TAGS: KISL, PINR, KPAO, PTER, ASEC, PREL, KIRF, OIIP, MI, Terrorism, Muslim Issues, Political 
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN MALAWI: A POST-MALAWI FIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: 03 LILONGWE 1246 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Peter W. Lord, reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S) The June 2003 expulsion of five non-Malawian Muslims 
suspected of ties to Al-Qaida (AKA the "Malawi Five"), which 
the press characterized as and most Malawians believe to have 
been a USG-initiative, came at time when the Muslim-Christian 
divide was being exploited by politicians in the run-up to 
the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections.  Though 
for different reasons, the event evoked fear and anger in 
both of Malawi's distinct Asian and Black Muslim communities, 
and in many ways united the two communities through a common 
anti-U.S. sentiment.  Though more challenging in the Asian 
Muslim community, creating a more positive opinion of the 
U.S. should be possible through intentional funding and 
programming to Muslim communities, using local Muslim 
organizations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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A BRIEF HISTORY 
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The Early Days of Islam in Malawi 
--------------------------------- 
2. (U) Islam first made its way to Malawi in the late 1500s 
through Arab Muslim traders seeking new markets in the 
African interior via Lake Malawi.  Thus, the greater 
population of Muslims came to live along the lakeshore and on 
the banks of the Shire River.  Cultural practices of certain 
ethnic groups, such as the Yao, married well with Islamic 
customs and facilitated the spread of formalized Islam. 
 
3. (U) When Western missionaries began settling in Malawi in 
the late 1800s, they brought both Christianity and education 
with them.  Most missionaries required that children convert 
to Christianity prior to attending school, thus many 
indigenous inhabitants converted to Christianity, especially 
the Chewa people.  With education came economic opportunities 
and access to the external world. 
 
4. (U) Those who refused to convert to Christianity remained 
largely uneducated and, therefore, had fewer opportunities 
for economic betterment.  To date, many Black Muslims are 
still reluctant to send their children to government schools 
for fear of forced conversion.  The legacy of inequitable 
access to education and, by extension, economic opportunities 
has led to Black Muslim communities having the highest 
illiteracy rates in the country. 
 
5. (U) The Asian Muslim population came with the British 
colonial administration in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  With their international connections and superior 
access to education and economic resources, Asian Muslims 
quickly gained an important voice in the Malawian business 
sector.  Many of them are among Malawi's most wealthy 
individuals. 
 
Islamic Sects in Malawi 
----------------------- 
6. (SBU) Most Muslims in Malawi are Sunni.  The two main 
"tariqa" ("brotherhoods" or "orders"), both of which find 
their roots in Sufism, are Qadriyah (or Quadriya) and Sukuti 
(or earlier on Shadhiliyah).  Though both orders came to 
Malawi from Zanzibar via Lake Malawi, Qadriyah was dominant 
in the early days.  In the 1930's, a reform movement began 
(Shadhiliyah first, then later Sukuti) that preached against 
many of the syncretic forms of religious rites of the 
Qadriyah.  The reformists stressed the importance of Arabic 
literacy for religion and English literacy for secular 
communication. 
 
7. (SBU) By the 1960's, Asian Muslims in Malawi began funding 
the construction of mosques and the establishment of schools. 
 Their support went to the Sukuti branch.  Today, the newer, 
more impressive mosques and schools are Sukuti, and the 
smaller, poorer ones are Qadriyah.  Those Muslim Malawians 
who have contact with Muslims in other countries (or who have 
been educated outside the country) are generally Sukuti.  The 
Qadriyah often resent the Sukuti's superior access to 
resources and education, a sentiment that extends to 
organizations like the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM), 
which is seen as a "Sukuti organization."  The very small 
Shiite presence in Malawi is primarily composed of 
foreigners. 
 
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MALAWI FIVE: THE SPARK OF ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
The Political Context 
--------------------- 
8. (S) The June 2003 expulsion of five non-Malawian (two 
Sudanese, two Turkish, and one Saudi) Muslims suspected of 
ties to Al-Qaida (AKA the "Malawi Five"), which the press 
characterized and most Malawians believe to have been a 
USG-initiative, came at time when politicians were using 
religion as a political issue in the run-up to the 2004 
presidential and parliamentary elections.  Ten years of 
Muslim former President Muluzi's administration and the 
recently-mandated public observance of Muslim holidays gave 
opposition political groups planks to build campaign 
platforms against the "Islamization of Malawi."  While 
Muluzi's party and administration were not exclusively 
composed of Muslims, the message resonated well with 
opposition party Christian Malawians who saw Asian Muslims 
gaining economic influence and development projects going to 
the ruling party's strongholds.  Muluzi's party, the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), which was originally financed by 
Asian Muslims, won the 2004 presidential elections with a 
Christian presidential candidate and a Muslim vice 
presidential candidate. 
 
The Cultural Context: Asian vs. Black Muslims 
--------------------------------------------- 
9. (S) Malawi's Muslim community is by no means monolithic. 
The largest divide, between Asians and Black Malawians, is 
based on economic and socio-cultural differences, not 
religious beliefs.  The two communities do not worship at the 
same mosques or socialize at the same Islamic centers. 
Largely speaking, the two communities have little personal 
interaction. 
 
10. (S) The relationship between these two groups, which is 
important to understanding their distinct reactions to the 
"Malawi Five," is that of giver and receiver.  By and large, 
within Muslim society, the Asians are the givers, and the 
Black Malawians are the receivers.  While there is little 
social interactions between the groups, their belief in Islam 
and observance of the "zakat" tradition (the Islamic custom 
of giving to those less fortunate) enables a nexus of 
positive interaction between the two groups and, to a certain 
extent, creates a bond of loyalty. 
 
11. (S) Several of the individuals in the Malawi Five group 
served as the functional link between these two communities. 
The Asians donated their zakat money to the organizations 
managed by the Malawi Five, and the Black Malawians benefited 
from the development projects and educational scholarships 
funded by the Malawi Five's organizations.  Both communities 
viewed the Malawi Five as "local heroes," who gave 
continually of their time and resources and who served the 
Islamic community well.  More specifically, the Asians saw 
them as good members of the community and as well-intentioned 
friends; the Black Malawians saw them as development workers 
who affected real change in Black Muslims' lives. 
 
Post "Abduction": Asian, Black Malawian Reactions Differ 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
12. (S) In many respects, the June 2003 expulsion of the 
Malawi Five united the Asian and Black Muslim communities by 
removing one of the principal link between them and giving 
them a common grievance against the U.S.  The expulsions 
evoked anger and fear in both groups, and no Malawian Muslims 
recognized (or even entertained the thought) that the Malawi 
Five could have been linked to extremist Islamic 
organizations.  Asian Muslims were angry because they felt 
their friends had been wronged and scared because they 
thought if these prominent members of their community were 
spied on, then any of them could also be subject to 
international scrutiny.  Black Malawians, on the other hand, 
were angry because the development projects they benefited 
from ceased and were scared because they thought if 
influential members of the community could be expelled, then 
any of them could also be subject to mistreatment, in a 
manner similar to what routinely occurred only ten years ago 
during President-for-Life Banda's regime. 
Post-Malawi Five Engagement 
--------------------------- 
13. (S) Because of the differing reasons behind their common 
reactions, post-Malawi Five engagement has required different 
strategies with the Asian and Black Muslim communities. 
Asian Muslims want venues to voice their opinions about the 
USG's foreign policy in the Middle East and still seek 
justice for their Malawi Five friends who they perceived to 
have been unjustly and illegally "abducted" from a country 
where they were doing good work.  Their concerns are not 
completely unfounded, because the Malawi Five were expelled 
extralegally by order of former President Muluzi and in 
defiance of a court order barring deportation.  For this 
reason, there is still a strong and continuing cold animosity 
toward the U.S. among Asian Muslims. 
 
14. (S) Black Malawians, on the other hand, have been more 
interested to engage with the USG on Islamic issues, such as 
the life of Muslims in the U.S. and developing US-Malawi ties 
between Muslim organizations.  Generally speaking, Black 
Muslims are looking for replacement of the benefits they lost 
when the Malawi Five were expelled from the country.  Focused 
programming and continued dialogue should go a long way to 
fostering good relations between Malawi's Black Muslims and 
the U.S. 
 
15. (S) NOTE: In the wake of the Malawi Five expulsions, post 
formulated and cleared carefully chosen language and press 
guidance which expressed support for the GOM's action, and 
also explained some of the reasons for the expulsions.  The 
statement was especially for use with the Asian Muslim 
community.  However, after local consultations and careful 
consideration, we determined it would actually be best not to 
use the statement, as vilifying the individuals or their 
organizations would not help the USG's cause.  The Malawi 
Five were so highly regarded and their organizations so 
widely respected that the statement would have likely further 
damaged the USG's credibility and been misconstrued as a 
confirmation of the USG's involvement in the expulsions. END 
NOTE. 
 
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MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.: USG VS. AMERICANS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
16. (S) Most Muslim Malawians, whether Asian or Black, view 
individual American citizens positively and often report good 
one-on-one interactions with Americans.  Their criticism, 
especially that of Asian Muslims, is generally focused on the 
USG and its foreign policy in the Middle East.  As most 
Malawians do not think their own government acts in their 
best interests, they often make the assumption that the USG's 
actions and policies are not rooted in American citizens' 
opinions or political beliefs. 
 
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"MUSLIM DONORS" IN MALAWI 
------------------------- 
 
17. (S) The only Muslim nation diplomatic mission resident in 
Malawi is Libya, and continual delays have caused most 
Malawians to cast a skeptical eye on its promised development 
assistance.  Egypt also has a small diplomatic mission to 
Malawi.  (Most Muslim nations have non-resident coverage from 
Lusaka, Nairobi, or Pretoria.)  However, there are several 
Muslim aid organizations in Malawi, most of which build 
mosques and health clinics in Black Muslim communities and 
fund madrasses and scholarships for Black Muslim children. 
The larger internationally-funded organizations, like African 
Muslim Agency (AMA) and Youth Muslim Organization (YMO), also 
provide scholarships for international study to the brighter 
students in their madrasses.  In fact, some of the leaders in 
the Muslim Associations of Malawi (MAM), a predominantly 
Black Muslim umbrella organization, studied abroad in various 
Middle Eastern countries through such programs.  Several MFA 
officials also attended diplomatic tradecraft courses at the 
Pakistani equivalent of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). 
 
18. (S) Local and international Muslim organizations with 
development and education projects in Malawi do not publicize 
their programs or coordinate with other NGOs and donors. 
They are normally active only in predominantly Muslim areas. 
Often the site of the only mosque in an area, the madrasa 
compounds are generally open to the surrounding communities 
for use.  Emboffs have visited many sites around Malawi and 
were warmly received and given free access to all the 
facilities.  In addition, most of the organizations welcomed 
more involvement with the USG, through both funding and 
programming. 
 
19. (SBU) The US Mission has in recent years done very little 
programming through and in support of local Muslim 
organizations, in part because Muslim organizations have not 
traditionally responded to proposal requests (even at post's 
prodding). 
 
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COMMENT 
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20. (S) Malawian Muslims' concerns are not completely 
unfounded, and it should be noted that the USG and GOM's 
maladroit handling of the Malawi Five incident created many 
of them.  However, fostering a more positive attitude toward 
the U.S. among Malawian Muslims is by no means an impossible 
task, especially among Black Muslims.  And one of the most 
effective ways to do that is through focused funding and 
programming to Muslim organizations working in Muslim 
communities.  Since many local Muslim aid organizations are 
managed by Asian Muslims and benefit Black Muslims, using 
these local organizations (both Qadriyah and Sukuti) would be 
an effective vehicle to reach both Muslim communities.  Given 
previous reluctance to respond to post's proposal requests 
(whether because of political aversion, cultural differences, 
or capacity deficiencies), it will require creative thinking 
and intentional planning on post's part to integrate Malawi's 
previously ignored Muslim population into regular Mission 
programs. 
 
21. (U) COMMENT CONTINUED.  To facilitate USG involvement in 
and assistance to local Muslim organizations working in 
Muslim communities, post suggests the creation of a Muslim 
outreach fund that enables flexible small-scale funding, 
similar to the Ambassador's Special Self-Help Program.  Such 
a fund would give post an easy entree to local Muslim 
communities and would foster goodwill through tangible 
support.  END COMMENT. 
RASPOLIC