US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1380

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FIRST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ADENIJI

Identifier: 04ABUJA1380
Wikileaks: View 04ABUJA1380 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2004-08-11 14:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL CVIS AMGT NI SU CM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, AMGT, NI, SU, CM 
SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ADENIJI 
 
REF: YAOUNDE 1163 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell.  Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Foreign Minister Adeniji used his first 
meeting with incoming Ambassador August 1 to raise parking 
tickets and visa issues.  He was unable or unwilling to 
produce specifics on the Darfur peace talks, due to begin 
here August 23.  FM Adeniji said he did not know where the 
negotiations would be held in Abuja, nor who would be coming 
from any of the Sudanese delegations, and he ducked our query 
on Bakassi turnover.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Adeniji met at our request to discuss 
Nigeria's priorities in chairing the African Union (AU). 
Adeniji raised two issues: his Washington and New York 
missions telling him the USG would be "suspending bilateral 
economic assistance" if their parking tickets were not sorted 
out by August 15; and streamlining U.S. visa interviews. 
Ambassador noted the importance of U.S. law, and offered to 
get more information on Nigeria's specific situation from the 
Department. 
 
3. (C) On visas, Ambassador made four points: 
-- Both U.S. law and procedure had been tightened after 
September 11, and we were grateful that Nigerians understood 
the need for security; 
-- The number of Nigerian visa applicants had risen 
dramatically since then, and that the Mission was adding 
consular officers and other resources as a result; 
-- Visa workload was also increased because a significant 
minority of Nigerians attempted to gain visas by fraud; and 
-- With the efforts of the entire Mission and the 
augmentation to consular staff over the next few months, we 
hoped to reduce the waiting period for scheduled interviews 
by the end of the year. 
 
----- 
SUDAN 
----- 
 
4. (C) Adenji having exhausted his issues, the Ambassador 
asked about President Obasanjo's goals for his presiding over 
the AU.  Adeniji said the U.S. has a role to play in some of 
Nigeria's objectives, making the AU more involved in good 
governance within African states and in dealing with 
conflicts.  Adeniji was appreciative for U.S. help on Darfur, 
and noted positively our role in Sudan.  In response to a 
request for access to the Sudanese parties and the AU team at 
the talks in Abuja from August 23, Adeniji said he did not 
know who exactly was coming from the three Sudanese sides, 
would talk to the AU team "a day or two" before the meetings, 
and would see if access could be arranged.  (Note: Post will 
double track through other parts of the GON, and is confident 
we can arrange access.) 
 
5. (C) Adeniji said he was meeting with Sudanese Foreign 
Minister Ismail next week.  He said he would push Ismail hard 
to get the GOS to make up its mind on who was going to do 
peacekeeping and disarmament of the Janjaweed.  He noted that 
Darfur citizens do not trust Sudanese soldiers or police, and 
would continue asking if AU troops could help. 
 
---------------- 
BAKASSI-CAMEROON 
---------------- 
 
6. (C) Adeniji said another GON priority leading the AU would 
be pressing the NEPAD agenda.  The GON would seek follow up 
from the G-8 on decisions at Sea Island (NFI), and clearly 
spelled out decisions from NEPAD on building AU institutions, 
and commitments from NEPAD's (non-African) friends in the 
international community on Africa's trouble spots. 
Ambassador asked if the Bakassi issue would be off the 
trouble spots agenda by mid-September -- an allusion to the 
scheduled September 15 final land reversions between Nigeria 
and Cameroon.  Adeniji said President Obasanjo had visited 
Cameroon in July, and their resolution of the problem would 
bean example for the rest of Africa. 
 
7. (C) Adeniji said nothing more on what that resolution of 
Bakassi might be, and abruptly changed the subject to say the 
last two AU priorities for Nigeria would be Ethiopia-Eritrea 
and the Great Lakes.  Ambassador asked, "Zimbabwe?"  Adeniji 
said, "Yes, yes, those people are trying to paint us the 
villain, saying Nigeria is being cast as taking UK money to 
fund the opposition."  Adeniji then said that from time to 
time he wanted to keep talking with the Ambassador, and asked 
how the Ambassador was finding Nigeria.  After slipping in 
that Nigeria's change to democracy had not brought debt 
relief, and that Nigeria's economic team was making progress 
despite some Nigerians' opposition to liberalization, Adeniji 
ended the meeting. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C) Adeniji was notably cool, almost aloof, throughout the 
meeting.  He has not been a favorite U.S. interlocutor 
stretching back to his days in Sierra Leone at the height of 
the war, and the Foreign Ministry has been rather irrelevant 
to major issues in Nigeria's foreign policy since even before 
President Obasanjo took office in 1999.  On Sudan, Nigeria 
has been involved, or wanted to be involved, in helping 
resolve Sudan's conflicts since the late 1980's.  We have no 
doubt that Obasanjo is energized and will move forward on 
both the Darfur peace talks and the AU deployment to the 
extent allowed by the various Sudanese, and even push them 
some.  On Bakassi, Adeniji was more slippery than most of our 
political interlocutors who say withdrawal will happen on 
September 15 or sometime; but our military interlocutors all 
say withdrawal will not happen.  It may be too early to 
judge, and Adeniji's slippery approach may be more from not 
knowing than from trying to avoid substantive comment. 
 
9. (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL 

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