US embassy cable - 04AMMAN6736

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2014 
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, JO 
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN LEADERS CRITIQUE THE KING 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 5109 
 
     B. AMMAN 6160 
     C. AMMAN 5789 
 
Classified By: CDA: David Hale, Reason 1.4(b) (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Prominent Palestinian critics of the 
regime -- malcontents who nonetheless voice views held 
more widely -- recently shared with us their analysis 
of King Abdullah,s standing.  They attacked his 
political reforms as lacking in substance, and therefore 
uninspiring to the public and a discredit to both the 
regime and its principal champion, the U.S.  Corruption 
as well was cited as a source of discontent.  While 
Abdullah,s authority has, if anything, been enhanced by 
his weathering of recent regional crises, these analysts 
fear the long-term consequences of failure to develop 
institutions, including the parliament and cabinet, that 
give a hearing to authentic political voices other than 
the monarch,s.  One such consequence may be an inability 
to absorb in any predictable, stable fashion the "moment 
of truth" when Jordanian-Palestinians are confronted 
with the reality of a settlement on the West Bank that 
makes no accommodation for their return and causes them 
to reassess their political stature in Jordan.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Two prominent Palestinian-Jordanian figures, on 
the outs with King Abdullah, gave free voice to their 
criticism of the Jordanian regime,s current direction 
in recent, separate meetings with the Charge.  Former 
Prime Minister Taher al-Masri and King Hussein,s former 
political advisor Adnan Abu Odeh made similar points: 
 
--King Abdullah and the "tribally oriented" Prime 
Minister Faisal al-Fayez were deliberately reinforcing 
messages of political exclusion and discrimination 
against Palestinian Jordanians (ref A). 
 
--Jordan,s themes of democratization and enhanced 
political participation lacked substance. 
Gerrymandered districts favored rural and tribal 
constituencies, producing members of parliament who 
were either tribal elders dependent on palace stipends 
or retired security officers who relied on pensions or 
their relations with the security apparatus for 
sustenance.  With the exception of the Islamic Action 
Front, parliament had few figures prepared to 
challenge the government.  Parliament acted as a 
rubber stamp for the cabinet, balking only at a 
few of the King,s social reforms, such as a woman,s 
right to divorce (ref B), which are ironically too 
liberal for the King,s men to swallow. 
 
--The Fayez cabinet was notably lacking in political 
strength as well as administrative competence.  The 
Prime Minister was described as amiable but obtuse, 
unable to command national political respect or 
to coordinate the work of his highly competitive 
ministers. 
 
--Corruption had reached unprecedented levels in 
Jordan, in terms of volume and blatancy (ref c). 
It was the topic of discussion not just in elite 
West Amman, but in every tent in Jordan.  Coupled 
with extremes in living standards between rich 
and poor, discontent regarding corruption was 
tainting the King,s image.  Because of the close 
association between Jordan,s regime and the U.S., 
Masri said the U.S. was viewed as complicit. 
 
--Abdullah,s failure to generate political evolution 
toward a more genuinely representative and credible 
parliamentary system posed no immediate risks.  The 
Palestinian middle classes were economically content, 
and the grassroots continued to invest themselves 
emotionally, if irrationally, in developments in 
the West Bank.  However, a "moment of truth" was 
inevitable, when the option of return to the 
West Bank will be permanently removed. Jordan's 
Palestinians -- 35 percent registered refugees -- 
have not emotionally reconciled themselves to that 
likelihood, and the "moment of truth" could be 
unsettling for Jordan.  East and West Bankers alike 
will have to reassess their stands.  Palestinian 
complacency at being effectively kept out of the 
political process in Jordan may end.  Abu Odeh 
claimed that it was in preparation for that day 
that King Hussein first launched his political 
liberalization strategy; however, his need to 
find a malleable parliament amenable to peace 
with Israel distorted the effort.  Abu Odeh and 
Masri both said they had advised Abdullah to 
resume that effort, to soften the shock of 
Palestinians, "moment of truth." 
 
--Islamic trends were gaining strength, but these 
two secular leaders denied that those trends could 
lay claim to represent Palestinian opinion.  Abu 
Odeh dismissed them as focused primarily on social 
issues, in an effort to defeat the influence of a 
Western lifestyle.  Masri saw a more sinister 
threat.  While mainstream Islamic trends posed no 
danger to the foundations of the regime now, the 
lack of alternative channels of dissent enabled 
the Islamists to continue to gain a strength that 
may later haunt the Hashemites. 
 
3. (C) Comment:  Masri and Abu Odeh, having been 
effectively sidelined, are nursing monumental 
grudges against the King and his advisors.  However, 
their views encapsulate criticism heard elsewhere 
from political elites who are disenchanted with a 
regime that pays lip service to democratization 
but, in reality, ensures through the intelligence 
directorate and key regime advisors that the process 
of political reform remains devoid of real substance. 
Critics conveniently ignore the fact that Jordanian 
political factions -- who have gained a healthy 
skepticism over the years about monarchical 
intentions to open Jordan,s political system -- 
themselves have failed to rise to the challenge of 
the King,s top-down reforms, by testing his 
redlines on press freedoms and political activism. 
Instead, his proposals for electoral and party 
reform are met largely with apathy. 
 
4. (C) Comment continued: Despite these problems, 
the pillars of the regime -- the tribes, the 
intelligence service, and the military -- remain 
staunchly supportive of the King and have enabled 
him to weather recent regional crises with his 
authority, if anything, enhanced.  In fact, part of 
the King's dilemma is that these reliable allies 
loathe democratization and the Palestinians who are 
perceived as the primary beneficiaries of political 
liberalization (and rock-ribbed East Bankers are no 
more prepared for the "moment of truth" than 
Palestinian refugees). Nor is there evidence that 
elements of discontent have either effective 
leadership or sufficient motivation to attempt to 
challenge the regime,s control.  But the King,s 
domestic political reform rhetoric is losing 
credibility.  The U.S. image as a champion of 
reform in the Middle East -- a subject met with 
some skepticism in Jordan to begin with -- suffers 
as well.  And over time, failure to establish 
a more malleable, representative foundation for 
Jordan,s political system will complicate the King,s 
ability to maneuver Jordan through crises to come, 
such as the political fate of the Palestinian 
community after a settlement on the West Bank. 
HALE