US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1504

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001504 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CG 
SUBJECT: A RELAXED RUBERWA RENEWS OLD ACQUAINTANCE WITH NEW 
AMBASSADOR 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador Meece's August 6 initial 
call on Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, Ruberwa provided a 
tour d'horizon, highlighting his concerns about the current 
situation. He outlined a series of challenges facing the 
transition, suggested a political solution to the Nkunda 
problem, and called for a stronger MONUC mandate. Ruberwa 
referenced the need to manage difficult DRC/Rwandan 
relations, but also referred to potential problematic Rwandan 
military involvement, for example in support of Nkunda's 
forces. The Ambassador concurred on the importance of 
ensuring the transition's success, and reiterated USG 
support. He pointed out potential pitfalls to a political 
'reward' for Nkunda. The Vice President, who seemed relaxed 
and comfortable throughout the meeting, said he planned to 
leave August 6 for a week in the Kivus. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador accompanied by PolOff made an 
introductory call on VP Ruberwa August 6. Ruberwa's political 
advisor was also present for the meeting, which lasted a bit 
over an hour. Ruberwa opened the substantive discussion with 
a tour d'horizon of the current situation in the country, 
highlighting his areas of concern. In Ruberwa's opinion, a 
lack of trust and confidence among the major composantes, a 
failure by certain parties to respect power-sharing 
principles, delays integrating the army, managing DRC-Rwanda 
relations, and resolving the Nkunda problem are major 
challenges facing the transition. On a personal level, 
Ruberwa said it is difficult to work in an environment where 
his motivations and actions are always considered suspect by 
both RCD hardliners and other government composantes. Ruberwa 
told Ambassador that he planned to leave later the same day 
for a week in the Kivus where he intends to meet with a wide 
range of people, even 'extremists' in Bukavu, Uvira, Burundi 
(Banyamulenge refugees) and possibly Goma. (Note. Ruberwa 
arrived in Bukavu on August 7. End note.) 
 
Internal Dynamics 
----------------- 
 
3. (C) The Vice President sees the fall of Bukavu and the 
resultant Nkunda/ Mutebusi problem as the most serious crisis 
the transition government has faced. He believes that if it 
is mishandled, it could derail the transition. In Ruberwa's 
view, there are two possible solutions---political or 
military. As Nkunda is a member of the RCD and part of his 
ethnic community, Ruberwa prefers a political solution, 
perhaps sending them to school overseas for a few years. More 
importantly, in his opinion, a military solution is unlikely 
to be successful because Nkunda knows the terrain, soldiers 
in the N. Kivu Military Region are mostly Rwandaphone and 
likely to side with Nkunda, and if fighting spreads into 
Goma, Rutshuru and Masisi, Rwanda might get involved. 
 
4. (C) In a subsequent response to Ruberwa's points, the 
Ambassador strongly reiterated USG support for the transition 
process, and underscored the need for ongoing dialogue 
between the major factions and leaders. He observed that 
everyone involved was well aware of the depth of mutual 
mistrust and the difficulty of implementing a peace process 
from the time of early negotiations. He emphasized that 
substantial progress had nonetheless already been achieved, 
making it even more important for all parties and leaders to 
maintain open channels of communication. Ruberwa acknowledged 
the point. Regarding Nkunda, the Ambassador noted the perils 
of 'rewarding' Nkunda and thereby creating potential 
incentives for other would-be rebels. Ruberwa did not 
challenge this, but questioned whether any other viable 
solutions existed. 
 
5. (C) Ruberwa said delays integrating the army were 
'inexcusable,' and elections will be impossible without 
military reform. He accused the PPRD of maintaining parallel 
military power structures, and complained about high-level 
corruption and mismanagement, which he sought to characterize 
as being at the worst levels ever. The Ambassador observed 
that corruption is a long-standing major problem in the DRC; 
Ruberwa concurred. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador made an oblique reference to problems 
within the RCD, but said that it did not seem the best time 
to discuss the issue. Ruberwa picked up on the reference, and 
said it would be a useful topic for the 'next meeting.' 
 
External Dynamics 
----------------- 
 
7. (C) In order to improve DRC-Rwanda relations, Ruberwa 
suggested dedicating 2-3 FARDC brigades to disarming the 
Interahamwe, preferably with MONUC logistical assistance. He 
called for a stronger MONUC mandate and opined that MONUC 
should use its 10,000 soldiers to forcibly disarm foreign 
combatants. He underscored the need for a more capable, and 
by implication, larger MONUC force. The Ambassador observed 
that we and all others were awaiting the UN SYG's report and 
its recommendations regarding the future of MONUC. Once we 
had that in hand, we could formulate our response to the 
proposals. He pointed out, however, that it is important for 
DPKO and the SYG's office to prepare recommendations that are 
realistic and can be implemented. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Ruberwa appeared relaxed and comfortable throughout 
the meeting, and made several references to Ambassador's 
previous time in Kinshasa. Ruberwa was frank in assessing the 
military situation in the east, including the likely 
sympathies of local soldiers and commanders, as well as the 
real possibility of direct Rwandan involvement. He clearly 
was looking for a way out to avoid what he sees as a 
potential military mess for Kinshasa, but could only come up 
with the dubious idea of an Nkunda and/or Mutebusi 
scholarship. Ruberwa is obviously in a very vulnerable 
position, and he made it clear he feels the pressure. His 
week-long trip east is undoubtedly motivated to a great 
extent by his need to shore up a position relative to the 
RCD-Goma organization, especially given the overt challenge 
posed by Bizima Karaha and seven other 'dissident' 
parliamentarians. It is less clear whether he is also seeking 
to do anything to address directly the problem of Nkunda 
while in the region. 
MEECE