US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1500

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X.6 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, CG 
SUBJECT: FORMER FM GHONDA DISCUSSES HIS DISMISSAL 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1456 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE 1.5 (b/d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In an informal August 1 meeting with the 
Ambassador, former Foreign Minister Antoine Ghonda (protect) 
observed that he had had growing problems over time with the 
leader of his ostensible party, VP Jean-Pierre Bemba.  In 
addition, Ghonda reported that Ugandan President Museveni had 
become upset at the recent AU summit when Ghonda provided 
little satisfaction in response to Museveni,s desire to 
revive the Lusaka Accord Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), 
provoking a Museveni complaint to Bemba.  Ghonda acknowledged 
feelings of mixed loyalties to party leader Bemba and DRC 
President Kabiladuring his tenure as Minister.  It was clear, 
however, that Ghonda continues to work closely with Kabila, 
and we would not be surprised to see Ghonda take some new 
official position with Kabila after a suitable interval, 
sealing the official end of his ties with Bemba,s MLC.  In 
the meantime, intra-government relationships have become a 
bit more complicated. End summary. 
 
2. (C)  Former Foreign Minister Antoine Ghonda (please 
protect throughout) stopped by the CMR on August 1 for an 
informal meeting with the Ambassador.  His comments regarding 
his views about scheduled tripartite meetings and 
negotiations for a proposed Joint Verification Mechanism were 
reported ref.  This cable summarizes his account of factors 
leading to his dismissal as Foreign Minister by Vice 
President and MLC party leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and related 
comments. 
 
Bemba,s Man in the Ministry - Sort of 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3. (C)  The Ambassador asked Ghonda to summarize what factors 
had led to Bemba,s decision the previous week to replace 
Ghonda as Foreign Minister  (Note: Under terms of the DRC 
transition accords, individual factions have the right to 
name and remove Ministers and other officials &allocated8 
to them.  The Foreign Minister position has been designated 
as an MLC position, and therefore MLC President Bemba has the 
right to make the change with or without concurrence from 
President Kabila.  End note).  Ghonda said that he had been 
having growing problems with Bemba for some time, charging 
that Bemba had often had contacts or arrangements with 
foreign officials without informing Ghonda, sometimes putting 
Ghonda in an awkward spot.  As an example, he said that Bemba 
had arranged the purchase of Charles Taylor,s plane without 
Ghonda knowing.  He became aware of the situation when Bemba 
asked for Ghonda,s help to recover a plane Bemba said was in 
Nigeria for servicing.  For whatever reason, the Nigerians 
seemed to be balking about releasing the plane, and Bemba 
wanted Ghonda to help.  At the time, Ghonda said he knew 
nothing about a Taylor connection, and assumed it was a Bemba 
personal aircraft which happened to be in Nigeria.   He 
therefore phoned Nigerian FM Adeniji about the matter.  After 
some difficult moments, Adeniji reportedly asked Ghonda if he 
realized that the aircraft was Taylor,s.  Embarrassed, 
Ghonda admitted he did not, checking back with Bemba who told 
Ghonda that he must have forgotten to mention that fact 
earlier.  Ghonda said, however, that over time, it was clear 
this was how Bemba operated, often leaving him out of the 
loop when dealing with sensitive issues.   In an aside, 
Ghonda firmly asserted that the Taylor plane was not a DRC 
government aircraft, nor did the transaction have anything to 
do with the MLC as a party.  He emphasized the reported 
purchase was strictly a Bemba personal deal. 
 
4. (C) Later in the conversation, Ghonda acknowledged that he 
had mixed feelings about his own dealings with Bemba.  He 
asserted Bemba viewed Ghonda first and foremost as his own 
representative, wanting for example to be informed first of 
important developments or communications.  Ghonda, by 
contrast, felt that as a minister of the government, he 
needed to be able to communicate with President Kabila 
privately, and certainly felt an obligation to convey 
official messages first to Kabila, followed as appropriate by 
reports to Bemba, the other Vice Presidents, and other GDRC 
officials.  Ghonda indicated that he and Bemba never reached 
a mutual understanding in this area.  The Ambassador asked 
about Ghonda,s original affiliation with Bemba, including 
the how and why of his first joining the MLC.  Ghonda 
provided a lengthy account centered on efforts by then-MLC 
Secretary General Olivier Kamitatu, a long-time Ghonda 
 
SIPDIS 
friend, to get Ghonda involved in the DRC transition, with 
the MLC offering the best prospects.  Ghonda noted he had had 
contacts with the MLC and Bemba stretching back for some 
years, although he added that he had some links with Kabila 
and other leaders as well. 
 
The Museveni Factor 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador also asked what exactly had happened at 
the July AU summit in Addis prompting widespread reports that 
Ugandan President Museveni had asked for Ghonda,s dismissal. 
 Ghonda reported that he was active in meetings during the AU 
summit.  At one point, while in a meeting with Namibian 
President Nujoma, he received a message that Museveni wanted 
to see him urgently.  Going directly to Museveni following 
the Nujoma meeting, Ghonda reported finding an apparently 
agitated Museveni impatiently rocking back and forth on his 
feet.  According to Ghonda, Museveni immediately accused 
Ghonda of seeking to block Ugandan efforts to revive the 
Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) established under the 
original Lusaka Accord, and asked Ghonda what he found 
objectionable about Lusaka.  Ghonda said that in this and at 
least one subsequent meeting, he sought to finesse the matter 
by affirming that he had no mandate to discuss the issue, 
suggesting that if Museveni felt this to be a major issue, he 
dispatch FM Mbabazi to Kinshasa for talks with Kabila. 
Ghonda said that Museveni was clearly unhappy with Ghonda,s 
responses, and said that a Museveni aide later told him that 
&the Mzee8 was angry.  Continuing, Ghonda said that 
Museveni tried floating some compromise proposals in a later 
meeting, to which Ghonda provided similar answers, likely 
increasing Museveni,s unhappiness. 
 
6. (C) Ghonda commented that he believed Museveni,s JMC 
ideas were not useful, potentially causing major 
complications relative to MONUC and pending negotiations for 
a Joint Verification Mechansim (JVM).  He speculated that 
Museveni,s interests were prompted by the fact that there 
are now a number of factions in DRC,s northeast Ituri region 
which did not exist when Lusaka was originally signed, nor 
when some of the subsequent agreements were reached.  By 
reviving a new form of the JMC now, he thought, Museveni 
might be seeking to increase his influence through new allies 
and proxies.  In any event, he certainly did not have the 
authority in Addis to discuss the issue. 
 
7. (C) Ghonda said he thought Museveni probably conveyed his 
unhappiness with Ghonda to Bemba, adding that that Bemba 
continues to regard Museveni with great respect and that the 
two maintain a close relationship.  He believes that 
undoubtedly the Museveni complaint was a factor leading to 
Bemba,s decision to change Foreign Ministers. 
 
And the Politics of Sharing 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The third specific issue Ghonda cited was a debate 
long underway about the distribution of the DRC,s 
Ambassadorial slots.  Ghonda reported that he believed a 
number of key slots should be retained for career diplomats. 
In particular, he observed that the Kampala and Kigali 
embassies could not be given to any of the DRC,s transition 
parties without major complications, and that he was very 
concerned as well about key posts in Washington, New York, 
London, and Brussels.  Much of this was in conflict with 
Bemba,s wishes, who felt Ghonda was insufficiently attentive 
to Bemba and MLC interests.  Ghonda claimed that the impasse 
with Bemba, as well as claims by other parties, led 
eventually to the creation of a commission which recently 
presented a set of recommendations that Ghonda asserted 
coincided very closely to his own original proposals.  While 
all parties have now accepted this recommendations, the 
exercise served as one more point of Bemba disenchantment 
with Ghonda. 
 
Political Implications 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Ghonda made it clear that he felt no continuing 
attachment to Bemba.  He reported that as of August 1 he had 
not yet even spoken with Bemba since his return from abroad. 
He said that Olivier Kamitatu had conveyed an offer from 
Bemba to appoint Ghonda to the Agriculture Ministry.  Ghonda 
said he rejected the idea, telling Kamitatu that he thought 
the problems he had working with Bemba would continue 
regardless of the specific portfolio.  In addition, Ghonda 
observed that Bemba would not even have made the offer if he 
didn,t feel he needed Ghonda.  Expanding, Ghonda said that 
Bemba had hurt himself with the Bakongo and Bandundu 
communities by his actions, including Ghonda,s dismissal. 
In addition, in the face of the widely reported Museveni 
involvement, Bemba also badly undercut the nationalist 
credentials he has been working very hard to establish. 
Ghonda was adamant that he had no desire to renew a Bemba tie. 
 
10. (C) Ghonda acknowledged that he continues to have ongoing 
contacts with Kabila, admitting that one of the three 
cellular phones he carried was  a &red line8 for Kabila,s 
use.  He said, for example, that he had been working the 
previous couple of days, among other things, to prepare 
condolence letter(s) and make other arrangements for Kabila 
relative to funeral arrangements being made in Libreville for 
Congo (Brazzaville) President Sassou,s son-in-law who had 
just died.  Ghonda denied having any current designated 
position, however.  In fact, he said he had made clear to 
Kabila that he would like to participate in an executive 
training seminar to be held in Boston during the latter part 
of August.  Only after that when some of the dust had settled 
would it seem suitable for something to be formalized. 
 
11. (C) For now, Ghonda said that Kabila refuses to have 
anything to do with new Foreign Minister Ramazani, Bemba,s 
new choice.  Ghonda said he is working to try to soften 
Kabila,s stance, albeit with little success to-date.  Ghonda 
said that he personally has no problems with Ramazani, 
although Ramazani would presumably face the same sort of 
conflicting pressures as Minister that Ghonda had felt. 
 
Comment: Added Complexities 
-------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Comment:  Ghonda,s account provides some interesting 
insights to the way the &national unity8 government in 
Kinshasa is operating, and specifically into the undoubtedly 
strained Kabila/Bemba relationship.  As well, Ghonda,s 
observations about Bemba,s concern about support in Bacongo 
and Bandundu are well-founded.  There has been recent street 
talk that Bemba has also been pushing for removal of Mines 
Minister Diomi, a designated &opposition8 Minister not 
under Bemba,s control.  While Diomi,s removal might 
arguably be a plus in terms of the DRC,s economic interests, 
Diomi is the only remaining major Bakongo figure of 
Ministerial rank.  This has prompted renewed complaints from 
the relatively well-organized Bakongo community of being 
marginalized, all of which undoubtedly works to Bemba,s 
disfavor.  For now, the immediate effect of Ghonda,s 
replacement is to complicate further relationships inside the 
government.  Ghonda,s comments about Ramazani also sound 
about right, with all signs indicating that Ramazani does not 
have any meaningful contact with Kabila.  We and other 
foreign governments will need to exercise some increased 
deftness as well to maintain multiple channels of 
communications without getting drawn needlessly into internal 
Congolese battles.  End comment. 
MEECE