US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1309

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

In meetings with PDAS Camp, interlocutors show commitment to peace yet speak of obstacles

Identifier: 04COLOMBO1309
Wikileaks: View 04COLOMBO1309 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2004-08-09 08:22:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PTER CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  08-09-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  In meetings with PDAS Camp, interlocutors show 
commitment to peace yet speak of obstacles 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 1295, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During a July 29-30 visit to Sri 
Lanka, State Department PDAS for South Asia Donald Camp 
met with interlocutors throughout the government and 
political arena.  The government reiterated its 
commitment to talks and was clearly thinking about how 
to get back to the table.  Comments by Opposition Leader 
Wickremesinghe and members of the Buddhist monk JHU 
party highlighted the differing opinions in the south on 
the peace process.  MPs with the TNA described the 
LTTE's mistrust of the President and expressed their 
worries about the challenges she faced.  That said, the 
clear message from these meetings with PDAS Camp is that 
the various parties still believe the peace process is 
the path to pursue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) During a July 29-30 visit to Sri Lanka, State 
Department PDAS for South Asia Donald Camp met with 
interlocutors throughout the government and political 
arena.  While listening to their views on the peace 
process, PDAS Camp stressed that Sri Lanka currently 
benefited from the  the personal interest of Secretary 
Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage.  Camp warned that 
the leadership of the State Department could change in 
January, whatever the result of  the U.S. presidential 
election, and that Sri Lanka should take advantage of 
the next few months to make every effort to make 
positive progress in the peace process. 
 
Peace process views in the South 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In a July 29 meeting with PDAS Camp, Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse remained true to the 
government's message regarding the peace process: 
President Kumaratunga is willing to start negotiations 
at any time; it is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) who are delaying a resumption of talks. 
Rajapakse said the GSL was amenable to discussing the 
LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. 
The PM noted that during his recent trip to New Delhi, 
the new Indian government conveyed to him its position 
regarding the situation in Sri Lanka -- an interim 
administration should be part of the final resolution. 
 
4.  (C) Jayanthana Dhanapala, Secretary General of the 
(GSL's) Peace Secretariat, spoke more in depth about the 
government's thinking on the peace process.  Dhanapala 
noted the peace process was at a very critical -- and 
complex -- stage.  He cited three contributing factors: 
one, the uneasy coalition in the GSL and its lack of a 
parliamentary majority, two, the split in the LTTE and 
the LTTE's attempt to resolve this split with "the 
sword;" and three, a society desensitized to violence. 
 
5.  (C) Regarding a return to negotiations, Dhanapala 
felt that the GSL has compromised considerably from its 
original agenda -- to discuss core issues and interim 
arrangements -- and was developing its own set of 
interim proposals to answer the LTTE's ISGA.  When talks 
resumed, Dhanapala noted, the GSL would not conduct them 
as the previous UNP government had done.  Instead, they 
will move the talks to a lower level of publicity and 
when an agreement is reached take it to plenary.  In 
terms of who would run the GSL side of the talks, 
Dhanapala mentioned an apex body with the President and 
some senior cabinet members.  There would also be a 
parallel structure -- a proposed National Peace Council, 
hopefully co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the 
Opposition Leader.  The GSL intended to use this council 
as an advisory body only, reserving for itself the right 
of final decision. 
 
6.  (C) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Opposition Leader and head 
of the United National Party (UNP), presented a more 
pessimistic view of the peace process in his July 29 
discussion with Camp.  The former PM felt that the 
President would not be successful in peace talks, 
largely because the LTTE did not trust her.  He also 
felt that the political differences within her United 
People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) would constrain her 
attempts at peace.  Wickremesinghe grumbled that the 
President still did not want to talk to him or include 
him in peace discussions.  He discussed how he does not 
want the UNP and the UPFA to form a "southern front" 
against the Tigers, as well. 
 
7.  (C) Buddhist monk MPs in the non-government Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU) party also presented their view of 
the peace process to PDAS Camp in a July 30 meeting. 
Speaking through a translator, the JHU members said they 
saw the main goal of the peace process as retaining the 
unity of the country.  The problems in the north and 
east were a result of the LTTE, not simply ethnic 
differences.  They blamed the previous government's 
inaction regarding alleged LTTE violations of the 
ceasefire agreement for the current problems with the 
peace process.  (Speaking about their own political 
views, the JHU members described themselves as the voice 
of the "silent Sinhalese majority," adding that they are 
"Sinhalese nationalists, not extremists," and promised 
to support the government for "every good thing" it 
does.) 
 
View on the rise in violence 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Discussing the rise in low-level violence, Prime 
Minister Rajapakse characterized the July 7 suicide 
bombing in Colombo as a "warning" by the LTTE.  While he 
discounted rumors that the GSL was involved in support 
to breakaway Tiger rebel Karuna, Rajapakse admitted that 
the GSL would have to give the rebel leader "total 
protection" as a Sri Lankan citizen.  The PM felt that 
the Tigers could not accept the fact that Karuna might 
have real military strength in the east, therefore to 
maintain the allegiance of their cadre, the group had to 
allege that Karuna was backed by the government.  In 
response, the Ambassador suggested that the GSL and LTTE 
could quietly discuss the situation and work to resolve 
it for the "greater good of the peace process." 
 
9.  (C) Peace Secretariat head Dhanapala had a slightly 
different opinion, stating that the LTTE was no longer 
talking about Karuna and the east but focusing on the 
ISGA as the agenda for talks.  He said, however, given 
the LTTE's past behavior, the Tigers are not likely to 
come to the table unless they feel secure and confident. 
Dhanapala felt that the ceasefire agreement (CFA) was 
holding, but that it was under tremendous pressure, 
especially with the inter-factional fighting in the 
LTTE. 
 
10.  (C) Separately, Wickremesinghe felt that because of 
the bad relationship between the GSL and the LTTE, the 
ceasfire was in danger.  Therefore, the CFA needed to be 
the main issue between the two sides, not peace talks. 
He reiterated his belief that the army was involved with 
Karuna, and mentioned the army allegedly taking Karuna 
to Jaffna to point out key LTTE areas. 
 
TNA take on the peace process 
----------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) In a July 30 meeting, pro-LTTE Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) parliamentarians Joseph Pararajasingham, 
from the eastern town of Batticaloa, and Gajen 
Ponnambalam, from the northern town of Jaffna, shared 
their views on the peace process with PDAS Camp.  Both 
MPs noted several times that the LTTE did not trust the 
President.  They questioned whether the President would 
stand by her position regarding the agenda for peace 
talks and how she would overcome objections from her 
main alliance partner, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP).  The two MPs described the need for 
clarity from the President, ideally in writing, 
regarding the ISGA as the basis for talks.  The ISGA 
would put power in the hands of the LTTE, which 
"delivers on issues."  The ISGA gives them far fewer 
reasons to return to war, they felt.  If the President 
does go into talks, they said the TNA would support the 
government (about peace, not majority making) or, at the 
very least, not vote against the government.  In 
response to Camp's query as to what the USG could do in 
the situation, Ponnambalam requested that the USG ask 
the President to call the JVP's bluff over its stance on 
the peace process.  Further, the U.S. could pressure the 
UNP to support the peace process and not cause problems 
for the government. 
12.  (C) Regarding the LTTE, they said the group would 
be prepared to start talks if the eastern situation 
(i.e., Karuna) was brought under control. 
Pararajasingham said that it was openly known that 
certain elements in the GSL and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) 
were helping Karuna.  Ponnambalam rejected the notion 
that the ethnically-mixed east could be separated from 
the Tamil-dominated north, arguing that the combined 
region had been a demand of the Tamil community for the 
past 50 years. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (C) Despite the gloomy, pessimistic picture painted 
by Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen during his 
July 26-28 visit to Sri Lanka, the clear message from 
these meetings with PDAS Camp is that the various 
parties still believe the peace process is the path to 
pursue.  That is not to say that everything is 
copasetic.  All sides continue to differ regarding the 
agenda for the talks and the President clearly faces 
several obstacles.  The LTTE's lack of trust for her has 
not been helped by the widely held perception that the 
government is aiding Karuna and widely reported 
confusion within the ranks of the UPFA regarding their 
position.  Her political rival, Wickremesinghe, does not 
seem disposed to unite with her for the good of the 
peace process or the country and she would certainly 
only seek an alliance on her terms that met her agenda. 
When the time comes, she will have to sell the 
government's position to a southern polity that loudly 
speaks of its nationalistic tendencies.  It will take 
lots of dynamism and energy on her part to bring 
everything together.  END COMMENT. 
 
14.  (U) PDAS Camp cleared this message. 
 
ENTWISTLE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04