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| Identifier: | 04COLOMBO1309 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04COLOMBO1309 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Colombo |
| Created: | 2004-08-09 08:22:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PTER CE LTTE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001309 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD PLEASE PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-09-14 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties SUBJECT: In meetings with PDAS Camp, interlocutors show commitment to peace yet speak of obstacles Refs: (A) Colombo 1295, and previous (U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 29-30 visit to Sri Lanka, State Department PDAS for South Asia Donald Camp met with interlocutors throughout the government and political arena. The government reiterated its commitment to talks and was clearly thinking about how to get back to the table. Comments by Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe and members of the Buddhist monk JHU party highlighted the differing opinions in the south on the peace process. MPs with the TNA described the LTTE's mistrust of the President and expressed their worries about the challenges she faced. That said, the clear message from these meetings with PDAS Camp is that the various parties still believe the peace process is the path to pursue. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) During a July 29-30 visit to Sri Lanka, State Department PDAS for South Asia Donald Camp met with interlocutors throughout the government and political arena. While listening to their views on the peace process, PDAS Camp stressed that Sri Lanka currently benefited from the the personal interest of Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage. Camp warned that the leadership of the State Department could change in January, whatever the result of the U.S. presidential election, and that Sri Lanka should take advantage of the next few months to make every effort to make positive progress in the peace process. Peace process views in the South -------------------------------- 3. (C) In a July 29 meeting with PDAS Camp, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse remained true to the government's message regarding the peace process: President Kumaratunga is willing to start negotiations at any time; it is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who are delaying a resumption of talks. Rajapakse said the GSL was amenable to discussing the LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. The PM noted that during his recent trip to New Delhi, the new Indian government conveyed to him its position regarding the situation in Sri Lanka -- an interim administration should be part of the final resolution. 4. (C) Jayanthana Dhanapala, Secretary General of the (GSL's) Peace Secretariat, spoke more in depth about the government's thinking on the peace process. Dhanapala noted the peace process was at a very critical -- and complex -- stage. He cited three contributing factors: one, the uneasy coalition in the GSL and its lack of a parliamentary majority, two, the split in the LTTE and the LTTE's attempt to resolve this split with "the sword;" and three, a society desensitized to violence. 5. (C) Regarding a return to negotiations, Dhanapala felt that the GSL has compromised considerably from its original agenda -- to discuss core issues and interim arrangements -- and was developing its own set of interim proposals to answer the LTTE's ISGA. When talks resumed, Dhanapala noted, the GSL would not conduct them as the previous UNP government had done. Instead, they will move the talks to a lower level of publicity and when an agreement is reached take it to plenary. In terms of who would run the GSL side of the talks, Dhanapala mentioned an apex body with the President and some senior cabinet members. There would also be a parallel structure -- a proposed National Peace Council, hopefully co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader. The GSL intended to use this council as an advisory body only, reserving for itself the right of final decision. 6. (C) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Opposition Leader and head of the United National Party (UNP), presented a more pessimistic view of the peace process in his July 29 discussion with Camp. The former PM felt that the President would not be successful in peace talks, largely because the LTTE did not trust her. He also felt that the political differences within her United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) would constrain her attempts at peace. Wickremesinghe grumbled that the President still did not want to talk to him or include him in peace discussions. He discussed how he does not want the UNP and the UPFA to form a "southern front" against the Tigers, as well. 7. (C) Buddhist monk MPs in the non-government Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) party also presented their view of the peace process to PDAS Camp in a July 30 meeting. Speaking through a translator, the JHU members said they saw the main goal of the peace process as retaining the unity of the country. The problems in the north and east were a result of the LTTE, not simply ethnic differences. They blamed the previous government's inaction regarding alleged LTTE violations of the ceasefire agreement for the current problems with the peace process. (Speaking about their own political views, the JHU members described themselves as the voice of the "silent Sinhalese majority," adding that they are "Sinhalese nationalists, not extremists," and promised to support the government for "every good thing" it does.) View on the rise in violence ---------------------------- 8. (C) Discussing the rise in low-level violence, Prime Minister Rajapakse characterized the July 7 suicide bombing in Colombo as a "warning" by the LTTE. While he discounted rumors that the GSL was involved in support to breakaway Tiger rebel Karuna, Rajapakse admitted that the GSL would have to give the rebel leader "total protection" as a Sri Lankan citizen. The PM felt that the Tigers could not accept the fact that Karuna might have real military strength in the east, therefore to maintain the allegiance of their cadre, the group had to allege that Karuna was backed by the government. In response, the Ambassador suggested that the GSL and LTTE could quietly discuss the situation and work to resolve it for the "greater good of the peace process." 9. (C) Peace Secretariat head Dhanapala had a slightly different opinion, stating that the LTTE was no longer talking about Karuna and the east but focusing on the ISGA as the agenda for talks. He said, however, given the LTTE's past behavior, the Tigers are not likely to come to the table unless they feel secure and confident. Dhanapala felt that the ceasefire agreement (CFA) was holding, but that it was under tremendous pressure, especially with the inter-factional fighting in the LTTE. 10. (C) Separately, Wickremesinghe felt that because of the bad relationship between the GSL and the LTTE, the ceasfire was in danger. Therefore, the CFA needed to be the main issue between the two sides, not peace talks. He reiterated his belief that the army was involved with Karuna, and mentioned the army allegedly taking Karuna to Jaffna to point out key LTTE areas. TNA take on the peace process ----------------------------- 11. (C) In a July 30 meeting, pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarians Joseph Pararajasingham, from the eastern town of Batticaloa, and Gajen Ponnambalam, from the northern town of Jaffna, shared their views on the peace process with PDAS Camp. Both MPs noted several times that the LTTE did not trust the President. They questioned whether the President would stand by her position regarding the agenda for peace talks and how she would overcome objections from her main alliance partner, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The two MPs described the need for clarity from the President, ideally in writing, regarding the ISGA as the basis for talks. The ISGA would put power in the hands of the LTTE, which "delivers on issues." The ISGA gives them far fewer reasons to return to war, they felt. If the President does go into talks, they said the TNA would support the government (about peace, not majority making) or, at the very least, not vote against the government. In response to Camp's query as to what the USG could do in the situation, Ponnambalam requested that the USG ask the President to call the JVP's bluff over its stance on the peace process. Further, the U.S. could pressure the UNP to support the peace process and not cause problems for the government. 12. (C) Regarding the LTTE, they said the group would be prepared to start talks if the eastern situation (i.e., Karuna) was brought under control. Pararajasingham said that it was openly known that certain elements in the GSL and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) were helping Karuna. Ponnambalam rejected the notion that the ethnically-mixed east could be separated from the Tamil-dominated north, arguing that the combined region had been a demand of the Tamil community for the past 50 years. Comment ------- 13. (C) Despite the gloomy, pessimistic picture painted by Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen during his July 26-28 visit to Sri Lanka, the clear message from these meetings with PDAS Camp is that the various parties still believe the peace process is the path to pursue. That is not to say that everything is copasetic. All sides continue to differ regarding the agenda for the talks and the President clearly faces several obstacles. The LTTE's lack of trust for her has not been helped by the widely held perception that the government is aiding Karuna and widely reported confusion within the ranks of the UPFA regarding their position. Her political rival, Wickremesinghe, does not seem disposed to unite with her for the good of the peace process or the country and she would certainly only seek an alliance on her terms that met her agenda. When the time comes, she will have to sell the government's position to a southern polity that loudly speaks of its nationalistic tendencies. It will take lots of dynamism and energy on her part to bring everything together. END COMMENT. 14. (U) PDAS Camp cleared this message. ENTWISTLE
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